WO2017193949A1 - Procédé et dispositif de contrôle d'altération de flux de code et système de communication - Google Patents

Procédé et dispositif de contrôle d'altération de flux de code et système de communication Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2017193949A1
WO2017193949A1 PCT/CN2017/083868 CN2017083868W WO2017193949A1 WO 2017193949 A1 WO2017193949 A1 WO 2017193949A1 CN 2017083868 W CN2017083868 W CN 2017083868W WO 2017193949 A1 WO2017193949 A1 WO 2017193949A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
stream
live
source
live stream
monitoring
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Ceased
Application number
PCT/CN2017/083868
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English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
陈正江
刘志军
杨斌
贺镇海
王雨
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ZTE Corp
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ZTE Corp
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/20—Servers specifically adapted for the distribution of content, e.g. VOD servers; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/23—Processing of content or additional data; Elementary server operations; Server middleware
    • H04N21/238—Interfacing the downstream path of the transmission network, e.g. adapting the transmission rate of a video stream to network bandwidth; Processing of multiplex streams
    • H04N21/2389—Multiplex stream processing, e.g. multiplex stream encrypting
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1466—Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L65/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for supporting real-time applications in data packet communication
    • H04L65/60—Network streaming of media packets
    • H04L65/61—Network streaming of media packets for supporting one-way streaming services, e.g. Internet radio
    • H04L65/611—Network streaming of media packets for supporting one-way streaming services, e.g. Internet radio for multicast or broadcast
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L65/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for supporting real-time applications in data packet communication
    • H04L65/60—Network streaming of media packets
    • H04L65/75—Media network packet handling
    • H04L65/762—Media network packet handling at the source 
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/103—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying security measure for protecting copyright

Definitions

  • the present application relates to the field of communications, for example, to a code stream tampering monitoring method, apparatus, and communication system.
  • the live broadcast service is provided through a media server, and the user receives the live stream in the server through a personal terminal to watch the live broadcast.
  • the media server exposed to the live broadcast service provided by the public on the public network and the live broadcast stream sent by the user have high security risks in the network environment. Since the live stream is transmitted on the public network, there will be an attacker. Illegal tampering with the content of the live stream, allowing users to view the illegal content, which is not what the service provider wants to provide to the user.
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic structural diagram of a related tamper-proof system. As shown in FIG. 1 , the entire tamper-resistant system is divided into a DRM server and a client agent.
  • the DRM system can implement basic tamper-proof functions.
  • the deployment of the DRM system is relatively complicated.
  • the DRM front-end server is connected in series between the live broadcast source and the CDN (Content Delivery Network), which increases the service nodes that may be faulty.
  • the system side and the terminal side need to cooperate to implement the system. Operators generally do not deploy DRM systems.
  • the present disclosure provides a code stream tampering monitoring method, apparatus, and communication system to solve the problem that the related art needs to deploy a DRM system to implement tamper-proof monitoring.
  • the present disclosure provides a code stream tampering monitoring method, including:
  • the monitoring result is output based on the comparison result.
  • the generating the signature information according to the source live broadcast code stream may include: acquiring the source live broadcast code stream, calculating the source live broadcast code stream by using a predetermined algorithm, and generating the signature information;
  • the generating the verification information according to the live broadcast code stream may include: acquiring the end live broadcast code stream, calculating the end live broadcast code stream by using the predetermined algorithm, and generating the verification information.
  • Acquiring the source live stream may include: obtaining a copy of the live stream from the live stream of the live stream, and/or the content distribution network node, and/or the content distribution network transcoding node, as the source live stream.
  • Obtaining the live broadcast stream may include: obtaining the live broadcast received by the destination terminal from the destination terminal of the live stream, and/or the routing device of the multicast group to which the destination terminal belongs, and/or other devices of the multicast group to which the destination terminal belongs. A copy of the code stream is used as the end live stream.
  • the generating the signature information may include: using a predetermined algorithm to encrypt and store the data content of the source live stream, and generating the signature information; generating the verification information comprises: using a predetermined algorithm to encrypt and store the data content of the end live stream to generate the verification information.
  • the data content may include at least one of video content, a source IP address, and a transmission path.
  • the outputting the monitoring result according to the comparison result may include: if the comparison result is that the signature information and the verification information are the same, the monitoring result that the live stream is not falsified is output; if the comparison result is that the signature information is different from the verification information, the output live stream is tampered with Monitoring results and reporting.
  • the present disclosure provides a code stream tampering monitoring apparatus, including:
  • a signature module configured to generate signature information according to a source live stream
  • the verification module is configured to generate verification information according to the terminal live stream; compare the signature information and the verification information, and output a comparison result;
  • the monitoring module is configured to output the monitoring result according to the comparison result.
  • the signing module may be configured to acquire the source live broadcast code stream, calculate the source live broadcast code stream by using a predetermined algorithm, and generate the signature information;
  • the verification module may be configured to acquire the end live broadcast code stream, calculate the end live broadcast code stream by using the predetermined algorithm, and generate the verification information.
  • the signature module can be configured to obtain a copy of the live stream from the live broadcast source of the live stream, and/or the content distribution network central node, and/or the content distribution network transcoding node, as the source live stream.
  • the verification module may be configured to obtain the live stream received by the destination terminal from the destination terminal of the live stream, and/or the routing device of the multicast group to which the destination terminal belongs, and/or other devices of the multicast group to which the destination terminal belongs. A copy of the live stream as the end.
  • the signature module may be configured to encrypt and store the data content of the source live stream by using a predetermined algorithm to generate signature information;
  • the verification module is configured to encrypt and store the data content of the end live stream using a predetermined algorithm to generate verification information.
  • the data content may include at least one of video content, a source IP address, and a transmission path.
  • the monitoring module may be configured to output a monitoring result that the live stream is not tampered if the comparison result is the same as the signature information; if the comparison result is different from the signature information, the monitoring result of the live stream being tampered is output. And reported.
  • the present disclosure provides a communication system including the code stream tampering monitoring apparatus provided by the present disclosure.
  • Embodiments of the present disclosure also provide a non-transitory computer readable storage medium storing computer executable instructions arranged to perform the above method.
  • An embodiment of the present disclosure further provides an electronic device, including:
  • At least one processor At least one processor
  • the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, the instructions being executed by the at least one processor to cause the at least one processor to perform the method described above.
  • the present disclosure provides a code stream tampering monitoring method.
  • a source live stream is obtained, a predetermined algorithm is used to calculate a source live stream, and signature information is generated.
  • the end live stream is obtained, and a predetermined algorithm is used to calculate the end.
  • Live stream generate verification information; compare signature information and verification information, output comparison results, and output monitoring results according to comparison results;
  • the monitoring of the live stream of the name mechanism does not require the deployment of a dedicated DRM system, and solves the problem that the related technology needs to deploy a DRM system to achieve tamper-proof monitoring.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic structural view of a related tamper-proof system
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of a code stream tampering monitoring apparatus according to a first embodiment of the present disclosure
  • FIG. 3 is a flowchart of a code stream tampering monitoring method according to a second embodiment of the present disclosure
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a communication system according to a third embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 5 is another schematic diagram of a communication system according to a third embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 6 is a flowchart of a code stream tampering monitoring method according to a third embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the code stream tampering monitoring apparatus includes:
  • the signature module 11 is configured to obtain a source live stream and calculate a source live stream by using a predetermined algorithm to generate signature information.
  • the verification module 12 is configured to acquire the end live stream, calculate a terminal live stream by using a predetermined algorithm, generate verification information, compare the signature information and the verification information, and output a comparison result;
  • the monitoring module 13 is configured to output a monitoring result according to the comparison result.
  • the predetermined algorithm includes, but is not limited to, an encryption algorithm such as an ECC (Error Correcting Code) encryption algorithm, an MD5 (Message-Digest Algorithm 5) encryption algorithm, and an encryption algorithm.
  • ECC Error Correcting Code
  • MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm 5
  • the end-end live stream is calculated and processed to prevent the calculated data from being illegally attacked and falsified, thereby losing the verification function.
  • the signature module 11 in the above embodiment is configured to obtain a copy of the live stream from the live stream of the live stream, and/or the content distribution network central node, and/or the content distribution network transcoding node. , as the source live stream.
  • the signature module 11 can be implemented in the form of a server, so that the signature module 11 can directly communicate with the live broadcast source, and/or the content distribution network central node, and/or the content distribution network transcoding node to obtain the need.
  • Replica data of course, the signature module 11 can also be configured as part of the device in the form of a live broadcast source, and/or a content distribution network central node, and/or a content distribution network transcoding node, etc. to obtain the required data.
  • the verification module 12 in the above embodiment is configured to be the destination terminal from the live stream, and/or the routing device of the multicast group to which the destination terminal belongs, and/or other devices of the multicast group to which the destination terminal belongs. Obtaining a copy of the live stream that is received by the destination terminal as a live broadcast stream.
  • the verification module 12 may be implemented in the form of a server, such that the verification module 12 can directly communicate with the destination terminal, and/or the routing device of the multicast group to which the destination terminal belongs, and/or the multicast group to which the destination terminal belongs.
  • the other device communicates to obtain the required copy data.
  • it may also be used as a part of the device, which is set in the destination terminal, and/or the routing device to which the destination terminal belongs, and/or other devices to which the destination terminal belongs. And so on to get the data you need.
  • the signature module 11 in the above embodiment is configured to encrypt and store the data content of the source live stream using a predetermined algorithm to generate signature information; the verification module 12 is configured to use the predetermined algorithm to stream the end stream.
  • the data content is encrypted and stored to generate verification information.
  • the data content in the above embodiment includes at least one of video content, a source IP address, and a transmission path.
  • the transmission path refers to the node identifier that the video code stream passes during the transmission process. If the video code stream is tampered with, it is necessary to tamper with the data content through some nodes/devices that are not in the transmission path, and the verification of the transmission path can be performed. Quickly judge whether the data has been tampered with.
  • the video content generally includes a video picture and audio.
  • the source IP address is the source address of the video stream. When the user is interested in the content of the video stream, the source IP address can be viewed according to the source IP address.
  • the two contents are generally The main object of tampering, by comparing them, can quickly determine whether the data has been tampered with.
  • the monitoring module 13 in the above embodiment is configured to compare the results as a signature. If the information is the same as the verification information, the monitoring result of the live stream is not falsified. If the comparison result is different from the verification information, the monitoring result of the live stream is falsified and reported.
  • the present disclosure provides a communication system including the code stream tampering monitoring apparatus provided by the present disclosure.
  • the code stream tampering monitoring method includes:
  • S301 Acquire a source live stream, and calculate a source live stream by using a predetermined algorithm to generate signature information.
  • S302 Acquire a live broadcast stream, calculate a terminal live stream by using a predetermined algorithm, generate verification information, compare the signature information and the verification information, and output a comparison result;
  • the obtaining the source live stream of the foregoing embodiment includes: obtaining a live stream from the live stream of the live stream, and/or the content distribution network node, and/or the content distribution network transcoding node. A copy, as the source live stream.
  • the acquiring the live broadcast stream in the foregoing embodiment includes: a destination terminal from the live stream, and/or a routing device of the multicast group to which the destination terminal belongs, and/or other multicast group to which the destination terminal belongs.
  • the device obtains a copy of the live stream received by the destination terminal as a live broadcast stream.
  • the generating the signature information in the foregoing embodiment includes: using a predetermined algorithm to encrypt and store the data content of the source live stream, and generating the signature information; and generating the verification information includes: using the predetermined algorithm to the data of the terminal live stream The content is encrypted and stored to generate verification information.
  • the data content in the above embodiment includes at least one of video content, a source IP address, and a transmission path.
  • the outputting the monitoring result according to the comparison result in the foregoing embodiment includes: if the comparison result is that the signature information is the same as the verification information, outputting a monitoring result that the live stream is not tampered; if the comparison result is signature information and verification If the information is different, the monitoring result of the live stream is tampered with and reported.
  • a method for preventing tampering of a live stream can be effectively monitored in time.
  • a live code stream tamper-proof monitoring system and method based on a digital signature mechanism is proposed.
  • the system includes:
  • the live stream code signing server is configured to implement the function of the signing module 11 in the above, and is configured to receive the live source code stream and output the signature information of the live stream.
  • the live monitoring server is configured to implement the function of the verification module 12 in the above, and receives the signature information of the live stream and the live stream. If the live stream is found to be tampered with, the alarm is reported to the management server.
  • the management server is configured to implement the functions of the monitoring module 13 above, and may be responsible for the management of the live stream tamper-resistant system and the monitoring of the running status of the device.
  • FIG. 4 and FIG. 5 are schematic diagrams showing two structures of the live code stream tamper-proof system in the present disclosure.
  • the management server, the live source server, the media server (content distribution system), the live stream code signature server, the live stream monitoring server, the user client and the like are included.
  • the management server, the live stream code signature server, and the live stream monitoring server are newly added network elements.
  • the live stream code signature server receives the live source code stream and outputs the signature information of the live stream.
  • the live monitoring server receives the signature information of the live stream and the live stream. If the live stream is found to be tampered with, the alarm is reported to the management server.
  • the management server may be responsible for the management of the live stream code anti-tampering system and the monitoring of the running status of the device.
  • the live source server provides a source server for the content provider to provide a live media stream to the service provider.
  • the media server can provide a live broadcast service for the user.
  • the tamper-proof monitoring method provided in this embodiment includes:
  • the management server sends signature policy information (including but not limited to which channels need to be signed, etc.) to the live stream code signature server.
  • the live stream code signature server receives the live stream source or the CDN center/transcode node media code stream according to the policy information, and summarizes the data content of the code stream according to a predetermined algorithm (including but not limited to an ECC encryption algorithm, an MD5 encryption algorithm, etc.). / Encryption calculation, output the signature information of the live stream.
  • a predetermined algorithm including but not limited to an ECC encryption algorithm, an MD5 encryption algorithm, etc.
  • the management server sends monitoring policy information (including but not limited to which channels need to be monitored, etc.) to the live monitoring server.
  • the live monitoring server obtains the live media code stream obtained by the terminal and the signature information sent by the live stream code signature server according to the monitoring policy information, and performs the code stream according to a predetermined algorithm (including but not limited to an ECC encryption algorithm, an MD5 encryption algorithm, etc.).
  • a predetermined algorithm including but not limited to an ECC encryption algorithm, an MD5 encryption algorithm, etc.
  • the data content and the like are subjected to digest/encryption calculation, output verification information, and comparison signature information and verification information to determine whether the live stream is tampered with.
  • the method of the embodiment can implement the monitoring of the live code stream tampering based on the digital signature mechanism.
  • Embodiments of the present disclosure also provide a non-transitory computer readable storage medium storing computer executable instructions arranged to perform the method of any of the above embodiments.
  • the embodiment of the present disclosure further provides a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device.
  • the electronic device includes:
  • At least one processor 70 which is exemplified by a processor 70 in FIG. 7; and a memory 71, may further include a communication interface 72 and a bus 73.
  • the processor 70, the communication interface 72, and the memory 71 can complete communication with each other through the bus 73.
  • Communication interface 72 can be used for information transfer.
  • Processor 70 can invoke logic instructions in memory 71 to perform the methods of the above-described embodiments.
  • logic instructions in the memory 71 described above may be implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as a stand-alone product, and may be stored in a computer readable storage medium.
  • the memory 71 is a computer readable storage medium, and can be used to store a software program, a computer executable program, a program instruction/module corresponding to the method in the embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the processor 70 executes the function application and the data processing by running the software program, the instruction and the module stored in the memory 71, that is, the code stream tampering monitoring method in the above method embodiment.
  • the memory 71 may include a storage program area and a storage data area, wherein the storage program area may store operations The system, the application required for at least one function; the storage data area can store data created according to the use of the terminal device, and the like. Further, the memory 71 may include a high speed random access memory, and may also include a nonvolatile memory.
  • the technical solution of the embodiments of the present disclosure may be embodied in the form of a software product stored in a storage medium, including one or more instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network) The device or the like) performs all or part of the steps of the method described in the embodiments of the present disclosure.
  • the foregoing storage medium may be a non-transitory storage medium, including: a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk, and the like.
  • the present disclosure provides a code stream tampering monitoring method.
  • a source live stream is obtained, a predetermined algorithm is used to calculate a source live stream, and signature information is generated.
  • the end live stream is obtained, and a predetermined algorithm is used to calculate the end.
  • the live stream is generated, the verification information is generated, the signature information and the verification information are compared, the comparison result is output, and the monitoring result is output according to the comparison result; thus, the monitoring of the live code stream tampering based on the digital signature mechanism can be realized, and the dedicated DRM system does not need to be deployed. It solves the problem that related technologies need to deploy DRM system to achieve tamper-proof monitoring.
  • the code stream tampering monitoring method, device and communication system provided by the present application can realize the monitoring of the live code stream tampering based on the digital signature mechanism, and does not need to deploy a dedicated DRM system, and solves the related technology that needs to deploy the DRM system to achieve tamper resistance. Monitoring problems.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Two-Way Televisions, Distribution Of Moving Picture Or The Like (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé et un dispositif de contrôle d'altération de flux de code et un système de communication. Le procédé consiste : à générer des informations de signature en fonction d'un flux source de code diffusé en direct; et à générer des informations de vérification en fonction d'un flux final de code diffusé en direct; à comparer les informations de signature et les informations de vérification, et à émettre un résultat de comparaison; et à émettre un résultat de contrôle en fonction du résultat de comparaison. Au moyen de la mise en œuvre de la présente invention, le contrôle d'empêchement d'altération d'un flux de code diffusé en direct sur la base d'un mécanisme de signature numérique peut être réalisé, et il n'est pas nécessaire de déployer un système de DRM dédié, résolvant ainsi le problème de la technologie associée de nécessité de déploiement d'un système de DRM pour réaliser un contrôle résistant à l'altération.
PCT/CN2017/083868 2016-05-11 2017-05-11 Procédé et dispositif de contrôle d'altération de flux de code et système de communication Ceased WO2017193949A1 (fr)

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CN201610309195.7A CN107370712A (zh) 2016-05-11 2016-05-11 一种码流篡改监控方法、装置及通信系统
CN201610309195.7 2016-05-11

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