WO2018203842A2 - Système et procédé de détection de fraude de bypass téléphonique utilisant le renvoi automatique d'appels dans des réseaux de communication mobile - Google Patents

Système et procédé de détection de fraude de bypass téléphonique utilisant le renvoi automatique d'appels dans des réseaux de communication mobile Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2018203842A2
WO2018203842A2 PCT/TR2017/000136 TR2017000136W WO2018203842A2 WO 2018203842 A2 WO2018203842 A2 WO 2018203842A2 TR 2017000136 W TR2017000136 W TR 2017000136W WO 2018203842 A2 WO2018203842 A2 WO 2018203842A2
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
call
detection unit
calling
sim box
called number
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/TR2017/000136
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English (en)
Other versions
WO2018203842A3 (fr
Inventor
Enes Şahi̇n
Mert DEVA
Mehmet Can Deni̇z
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Turkcell Teknoloji Arastirma Ve Gelistirme AS
Original Assignee
Turkcell Teknoloji Arastirma Ve Gelistirme AS
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Turkcell Teknoloji Arastirma Ve Gelistirme AS filed Critical Turkcell Teknoloji Arastirma Ve Gelistirme AS
Publication of WO2018203842A2 publication Critical patent/WO2018203842A2/fr
Publication of WO2018203842A3 publication Critical patent/WO2018203842A3/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
    • H04W12/72—Subscriber identity

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a system and method for detecting call bypass frauds which are connected to the called subscriber by making domestic call upon bypassing the call to the SIM Box system -wherein a SIM card registered to a domestic operator is inserted- through VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) while carrying out call set-up among international GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) operators.
  • VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol
  • test calls are made to the numbers registered in the operator in order to determine the SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) cards purchased from the operator to make call bypass fraud on the desired network.
  • SIM Subscriber Identity Module
  • CLI Calling Line Identity
  • An objective of the present invention is to realize a system and method for detecting frauds made by means of call bypass (SIM Box, etc.) by following up network signals in international calls.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic block diagram of the inventive system.
  • Figure 2 is a flow chart of the inventive method.
  • MSC Mobile Switching Center
  • the inventive system (1) for detecting call bypass frauds in international calls comprises: at least one database (2) which records calling and called numbers so as to initiate test call;
  • At least one HLR (3) which comprises mobile number information recorded in to the network
  • At least one call initiation module (4) which can initiate call from the calling number -that is included in the database (2)- to the called number over a contracted international operator;
  • At least one call reception module (5) wherein the call reaching the called number is forwarded;
  • At least one MSC (6) which forwards the calls initiated on the network and the calls reaching the network;
  • At least one international carrier (7) which receives and transmits international calls contracted with mobile operator
  • At least one SIM Box detection unit (8) which receives the T-CSI (Terminating CAMEL Subscriber Information) information -that is included on the HLR (3)- of the called number received from the database (2) and updates the MSC (6) in order that it forwards the call to the call reception module (5), transmits the information of the calling and the updated called number to the call initiation module (4), receives the calling number information of the call reaching the call reception module (5) and compares it with the calling number information that it transmits to the call initiation module (4) ( Figure 1).
  • T-CSI Terminal CAMEL Subscriber Information
  • the database (2) included in the inventive system (1) is a unit wherein the calling and the called numbers where the test call is initiated are recorded.
  • the database (2) is also a unit wherein the fraud number detected by the SIM Box detection unit (8) is recorded.
  • the HLR (3) included in the inventive system (1) is a unit wherein all subscription information such as identification, network based location, service usage parameters belonging to all subscribers of the communication network are recorded.
  • the call initiation module (4) included in the inventive system (1) receives the information of the calling and the called number wherein the test call will be initiated from the SIM Box detection unit (8).
  • the call initiation module (4) initiates call from the calling number towards the called number over an international contracted operator with the information of the calling and the called number received.
  • the call reception module (5) included in the inventive system (1) is a unit which receives the calls forwarded to the called number wherein the test call is initiated. In the event that a call is forwarded to the called number, the call reception module
  • the call reception module (5) transmits the called number information to the SIM Box detection unit (8).
  • the call reception module (5) is a unit which runs in connection with CAMEL (Customized Applications for Mobile Enhanced Logic).
  • the MSC (6) included in the inventive system (1) is a unit which enables to forward calls made on the network to intra-network or non-network subscribers.
  • the MSC (6) receives the calls coming from the international carrier (7) and performs forwarding according to the called number information.
  • the MSC (6) comprises definitions in order to forward the call to the call reception module (5) according to the T-CSI information that is located on the HLR (3) of the called number wherein the test call is made and that is updated by the SIM Box detection unit (8).
  • the international carrier (7) included in the inventive system (1) is a unit which receives and forwards international calls.
  • the international carrier (7) transmits the call, which is initiated by the call initiation module (4) and transmitted by the contracted foreign mobile operator, to the MSC (6).
  • Call bypass fraud is performed by reaching the call -that is forwarded through the international carrier (7)- to the called number over another server (SIM Box) not forwarding it to the MSC (6).
  • the SIM Box detection unit (8) included in the inventive system (1) determines the calling and the called numbers for test call from the numbers included in the database (2).
  • the SIM Box detection unit (8) records the T-CSI information by receiving the HLR (3) records of the called number and allocates an up-to-date T- CSI information to the called number. Definitions made in the MSC (6) for the T- CSI value used ensure that the calls reaching the called number are forwarded to the call reception module (5) by the MSC (6).
  • the SIM Box detection unit (8) transmits the information of the calling and the up-to-date called number to the call initiation module (4).
  • the SIM Box detection unit (8) waits for the call initiated by the call initiation module (4), to be forwarded to the call reception module (5) together with the T- CSI information allocated to the called number. In the event that the call is forwarded to the call reception module (5), the call reception module (5) transmits the called number information of the forwarded call to the SIM Box detection unit (8). The SIM Box detection unit (8) compares the calling number information of the call forwarded by the call reception module (5) with the calling number information transmitted to the call initiation module (4). If the two numbers are the same as a result of the comparison, the SIM Box detection unit (8) decides that no call bypass fraud is made.
  • the SIM Box detection unit (8) determines that the calling number of the call forwarded to the call reception module (5) is forwarded and records the calling number information -that is transmitted by the call reception module (5)- by transmitting it to the database (2) as the fraud (SIM Box) number. Then, the SIM Box detection unit (8) changes the T-CSI information of the called number with the previous value by querying the HLR (3).
  • the inventive system (1) in calls made among international mobile operators, it is enabled to detect call bypass fraud which ensures that a call is realized as a domestic call upon being forwarded to a number recorded to a domestic network.
  • the inventive SIM Box fraud detection method (1) for detecting call bypass frauds in international calls comprises steps of:
  • the SIM Box detection unit (8) receiving the calling and the called number information for the test call from the database (2) (101);
  • the SIM Box detection unit (8) receiving the HLR (3) records of the called number (102);
  • the SIM Box detection unit (8) recording the T-CSI information of the called number and allocating a new T-CSI to the called number (103); the SIM Box detection unit (8) transmitting the calling and the up-to- date called number information for the test call from the database (2) (104);
  • the call initiation module (4) initiating a call from the calling number to the called number over a contracted foreign network (105); the international carrier (7) forwarding the initiated call to the MSC (6)
  • the MSC (6) detecting the call initiated to the called number having the T-CSI information allocated by the SIM Box detection unit (8) and forwarding it to the call reception module (5) (107); the call reception module (5) transmitting the calling number information of the forwarded call, to the SIM Box detection unit (8) (108);
  • the SIM Box detection unit (8) comparing the calling number information sent to the call initiation module (4) and transmitted by the call reception module (5) (109);
  • the SIM Box detection unit (8) determining the calling number information transmitted by the call reception module (5) as the fraud (SIM Box) number and recording it to the database (2) (1 10); the SIM Box detection unit (8) restoring the T-CSI information of the called number to its initial state by initiating a query to the HLR (3) and terminating the transaction (11 1).
  • inventive call bypass fraud method (100) in calls made among international mobile operators, it is enabled to detect call bypass fraud which ensures that a call is realized as a domestic call upon being forwarded to a number recorded to a domestic network. It is possible to develop various embodiments of the inventive system (1) and method (100), the invention cannot be limited to examples disclosed herein and it is essentially according to claims.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Meter Arrangements (AREA)
  • Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un système et un procédé de détection de fraudes de bypass téléphonique qui sont liées à l'abonné appelé par établissement d'un appel domestique lors du bypassing de l'appel vers le système SIM Box - où une carte SIM enregistrée auprès d'un opérateur domestique est insérée - par VoIP tout en mettant en oeuvre une configuration d'appel parmi des opérateurs GSM internationaux. Le système (1) de l'invention est constitué d'une base de données (2), d'un HLR (3), d'un module d'établissement d'appels (4), d'un module de réception d'appels (5), d'un MSC (6), d'une porteuse internationale (7) et d'une unité de détection de SIM Box (8).
PCT/TR2017/000136 2016-12-20 2017-12-08 Système et procédé de détection de fraude de bypass téléphonique utilisant le renvoi automatique d'appels dans des réseaux de communication mobile Ceased WO2018203842A2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
TR2016/19005A TR201619005A2 (tr) 2016-12-20 2016-12-20 Mobi̇l i̇leti̇şi̇m şebekeleri̇nde çağri taşima dolandiriciliğinin tespi̇t edi̇lmesi̇ni̇ sağlayan bi̇r si̇stem ve yöntem
TR2016/19005 2016-12-20

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2018203842A2 true WO2018203842A2 (fr) 2018-11-08
WO2018203842A3 WO2018203842A3 (fr) 2019-01-03

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PCT/TR2017/000136 Ceased WO2018203842A2 (fr) 2016-12-20 2017-12-08 Système et procédé de détection de fraude de bypass téléphonique utilisant le renvoi automatique d'appels dans des réseaux de communication mobile

Country Status (2)

Country Link
TR (1) TR201619005A2 (fr)
WO (1) WO2018203842A2 (fr)

Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN114189866A (zh) * 2021-11-09 2022-03-15 武汉绿色网络信息服务有限责任公司 一种多卡宝的欺诈检测方法和装置
CN115942321A (zh) * 2022-12-08 2023-04-07 广州市申迪计算机系统有限公司 呼转技术下的诈骗号码识别方法、系统、装置及存储介质
KR20240041505A (ko) * 2022-09-23 2024-04-01 한국과학기술원 이동통신망 단말의 제어평면 메시지 기반 핑거프린트를 사용한 심박스 차단 방법 및 장치
KR20250058336A (ko) * 2023-10-23 2025-04-30 에스케이텔레콤 주식회사 심박스 탐지 방법 및 이를 지원하는 기지국 장치

Family Cites Families (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2009015273A2 (fr) * 2007-07-24 2009-01-29 Roamware, Inc. Intelligence prédictive
WO2012080781A1 (fr) * 2010-12-12 2012-06-21 Gayan Samarasekara Procédé et système de détection de numéros de mobile utilisés par des opérateurs de contournement de passerelle internationale (boîte sim)

Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN114189866A (zh) * 2021-11-09 2022-03-15 武汉绿色网络信息服务有限责任公司 一种多卡宝的欺诈检测方法和装置
KR20240041505A (ko) * 2022-09-23 2024-04-01 한국과학기술원 이동통신망 단말의 제어평면 메시지 기반 핑거프린트를 사용한 심박스 차단 방법 및 장치
KR102678476B1 (ko) 2022-09-23 2024-06-26 한국과학기술원 이동통신망 단말의 제어평면 메시지 기반 핑거프린트를 사용한 심박스 차단 방법 및 장치
CN115942321A (zh) * 2022-12-08 2023-04-07 广州市申迪计算机系统有限公司 呼转技术下的诈骗号码识别方法、系统、装置及存储介质
KR20250058336A (ko) * 2023-10-23 2025-04-30 에스케이텔레콤 주식회사 심박스 탐지 방법 및 이를 지원하는 기지국 장치
KR102923324B1 (ko) * 2023-10-23 2026-02-04 에스케이텔레콤 주식회사 심박스 탐지 방법 및 이를 지원하는 기지국 장치

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Publication number Publication date
TR201619005A2 (tr) 2018-07-23
WO2018203842A3 (fr) 2019-01-03

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