WO2019018431A1 - Procédé et appareil de prendre en charge de multiples diffuseurs indépendamment à l'aide d'un système d'accès conditionnel unique - Google Patents

Procédé et appareil de prendre en charge de multiples diffuseurs indépendamment à l'aide d'un système d'accès conditionnel unique Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2019018431A1
WO2019018431A1 PCT/US2018/042542 US2018042542W WO2019018431A1 WO 2019018431 A1 WO2019018431 A1 WO 2019018431A1 US 2018042542 W US2018042542 W US 2018042542W WO 2019018431 A1 WO2019018431 A1 WO 2019018431A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
receiver module
pairing key
encrypted
information
encrypted version
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Ceased
Application number
PCT/US2018/042542
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English (en)
Inventor
Ronald P. Cocchi
Gregory J. Gagnon
Dennis R. Flaharty
Michael A. Gorman
Jacob T. CARSON
Matthew A. SKUBISZEWSKI
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Inside Secure SA
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Inside Secure SA
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Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from US15/652,082 external-priority patent/US10477151B2/en
Application filed by Inside Secure SA filed Critical Inside Secure SA
Publication of WO2019018431A1 publication Critical patent/WO2019018431A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
    • G06F21/101—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM] by binding digital rights to specific entities
    • G06F21/1012—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM] by binding digital rights to specific entities to domains
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
    • G06F21/109—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM] by using specially-adapted hardware at the client
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G06F21/74—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information operating in dual or compartmented mode, i.e. at least one secure mode
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2105—Dual mode as a secondary aspect
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2107—File encryption
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2141—Access rights, e.g. capability lists, access control lists, access tables, access matrices
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2153—Using hardware token as a secondary aspect

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to systems and methods for providing conditional access to media programs, and in particular to a system and method for providing for such conditional access between multiple independent broadcasters and a plurality of customers using a single conditional access system.
  • subscriber-based services are readily available in some areas, they are not available on a world-wide basis.
  • subscribers are typically offered services from a small number of providers (e.g. DIRECTV or ECHOSTAR, or the approved local cable provider) each of which typically provide a large number of media channels from a variety of sources (e.g. ESPN, HBO, COURT TV, HISTORY CHANNEL).
  • providers e.g. DIRECTV or ECHOSTAR, or the approved local cable provider
  • sources e.g. ESPN, HBO, COURT TV, HISTORY CHANNEL
  • each service provider typically encrypts the program material and provides equipment necessary for the customer to decrypt them so that they can be viewed.
  • the present invention discloses a method, apparatus, article of manufacture for brokering the enabling of communication of encrypted media programs from a plurality of independent broadcasters to a plurality of receivers, each encrypted media program decryptable by a first receiver module securely communicating with a second receiver module according to a pairing key associated with one of the plurality of receivers.
  • the method comprises the steps of transmitting a service enabling request from one of the plurality of broadcasters to a broker independent from the one of the plurality of broadcasters, the request comprising an identification of the one of the plurality of receivers; receiving a first encrypted version of the pairing key E s [K p ] from the broker, the first encrypted version of the pairing key E s [K p ] decryptable by first information
  • the apparatus is described by system for brokering the enabling of communication of encrypted media programs from a plurality of independent broadcasters to a plurality of receivers, each encrypted media program decryptable by a first receiver module securely communicating with a second receiver module according to a pairing key K associated with one of the plurality of receivers.
  • the system comprises a broker, for providing a first encrypted version of the pairing key E s [K p ] in response to a service enabling request from one of the plurality of broadcasters, the service request having an identification of one of the plurality of receivers, wherein the first encrypted version of the pairing key E s [K p ] is decryptable by first information S 1 stored in the first receiver module.
  • at least one of the first information S x and the second information S 2 may be derived from a hardware root of trust stored in at least one of the first receiver module and the second receiver module
  • FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a media program distribution system
  • FIG. 2 is a diagram of a typical subscriber station
  • FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating a multiple broadcaster media program distribution system
  • FIGs. 4A-4D are diagrams illustrating one embodiment of how the pairing system cooperatively operates with multiple service providers and equipment at the subscriber stations to implement a conditional access system
  • FIG. 5A is a diagram illustrating one embodiment of the service provider
  • FIG. 5B is a diagram illustrating an embodiment of a table stored in the pairing system
  • FIG. 5C is a diagram illustrating an embodiment of a table stored by the service provider
  • FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating one embodiment of the STB
  • FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating an exemplary embodiment of the transport module and the CAM.
  • FIG. 8 is a diagram of a computer that can be used to implement selected modules. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
  • FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a media program distribution system 100.
  • the system 100 includes a plurality of service providers (hereinafter alternatively referred to as broadcasters) 102, including a first service provider 102A that broadcasts media programs from a satellite broadcast facility 152A via one or more uplink antennas and one or more satellites 156, a second service provider 102B, that broadcasts media programs from terrestrial broadcast facility 152B and one or more terrestrial antennas 164, and a third service provider 102C that broadcasts media programs via a cable link 160.
  • broadcasters service providers
  • the system 100 also comprises a plurality of subscriber stations 104A, 104B (alternatively referred to hereinafter as subscriber station 104), each providing service to one or more subscribers 112A, 112B (alternatively referred to hereinafter as subscribers 112).
  • subscriber station 104 also comprises a plurality of subscriber stations 104A, 104B (alternatively referred to hereinafter as subscriber station 104), each providing service to one or more subscribers 112A, 112B (alternatively referred to hereinafter as subscribers 112).
  • Each subscriber station 104A, 104B may include a satellite reception antenna 106A, 106B (alternatively referred to hereinafter as satellite reception antenna 104) and/or a terrestrial broadcast antenna 108A, 108B (alternatively referred to hereinafter as terrestrial broadcast antenna 108) communicatively coupled to a receiver 110A, HOB (alternatively referred to hereinafter as receiver 110), which is also known as a set top box (STB) or an integrated receiver/decoder (IRD).
  • satellite reception antenna 104 and/or a terrestrial broadcast antenna 108A, 108B
  • terrestrial broadcast antenna 108 communicatively coupled to a receiver 110A, HOB (alternatively referred to hereinafter as receiver 110), which is also known as a set top box (STB) or an integrated receiver/decoder (IRD).
  • STB set top box
  • ITD integrated receiver/decoder
  • each receiver 110A, HOB (or at least, each conditional access system used with each receiver) is capable of receiving subscriber-based media programs from only one of the media program providers 102.
  • the subscriber may need not only to have a multiple receivers 110 at the subscriber station 104A, but also, will require multiple conditional access systems.
  • FIG. 2 is a diagram of a typical subscriber station 104.
  • Each station 104 includes at least one receiver or STB 110, which itself includes a transport module 202 that communicates with a conditional access module (CAM) 206.
  • CAM conditional access module
  • the CAM 206 is a smart card that is removably
  • the CAM 206 is a device such as a chip or a collection of devices that are physically integrated with the STB 110 and irremovable.
  • the service providers typically encrypt the media program M with a control word CW, thus producing and encrypted program E cw [M] , and transmit the encrypted media program E cw [M] and an encrypted version of the control word E[CW] to the receiver 110.
  • the receiver 110 receives both the encrypted program E cw [M] and the encrypted control word E[CW] .
  • the transport module 202 analyzes the incoming data stream and passes the encrypted control E[CW] to the CAM 206, which decrypts the control word CW and returns the decrypted control word CW to a security module 204 or similar device in the transport module 202.
  • the security module 204 uses the control word CW to decrypt the encrypted media program E cw [M] to produce the media program M for presentation to the subscriber.
  • This system assures that only those who are in possession of a valid CAM 206 can receive and decode media programs. However, it does not prevent the use of the CAM 206 in any other STB 110. Hence, if the CAM 206 is compromised or duplicated, unauthorized access to media programs is possible.
  • FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating a multiple broadcaster Conditional Access Subscriber Administration System (CASAS) 200.
  • the MB system 200 is similar to that which is disclosed in FIG. 1, but includes a pairing broker 304, which can communicate with the broadcast facilities 152 via a communications medium 302 such as the Internet.
  • a communications medium 302 such as the Internet.
  • FIGs. 4A-4D are diagrams illustrating one embodiment of how the pairing broker 304 cooperatively operates with multiple service providers 102 and equipment at the subscriber stations 104 to implement a conditional access system.
  • FIGs. 4A-4D will be described in connection with and with reference to FIGs. 5 and 6, which illustrate one embodiment of the service provider 102 elements and STB 110 elements, respectively.
  • FIG. 4A begins with a potential customer 112 who has decided to subscribe a media program service offered by a service provider 102. To do so, the subscriber contacts the service provider 102 and transmits information sufficient to identify the STB and the CAM to the service provider 102, as shown in block 402.. In one embodiment, this information includes an STB 110 unique identifier (ID) (such as a serial number or other designation) and a CAM 206 unique identifier (CAM ID). In a preferred embodiment, this is accomplished by transmitting the information via the Internet 302 or similar network.
  • ID STB 110 unique identifier
  • CAM ID CAM 206 unique identifier
  • the subscriber's web browser can include the appropriate references to the URL where the request and STB ID and CAM ID should be transmitted.
  • the potential subscriber in addition to the STB ID, the potential subscriber also transmits his/her credit card information (e.g. the account number) as well. This allows for services to be automatically billed for monthly subscription fees without further interaction.
  • Credit card payment administration can be performed by the service provider 102 or by a third party such as PAYPAL. These functions can be performed by the subscriber administration module (SAM) 504.
  • SAM subscriber administration module
  • the SAM 504 can also comprise or be integrated with a customer relationship management (CRM) system or systems. If access is approved (e.g. if the supplied credit card information has been verified), the subscriber administration module 504 directs the web transaction module 502 to request a pairing key K p from the pairing broker 304.
  • CRM customer relationship management
  • the potential customer 112 can contact the service provider 102 via telephone or other means and provide the service request, STB ID, and CAM ID.
  • the pairing broker 304 can receive the service request (preferably via an appropriate Internet interface) and forward the request for service and the appropriate identifying information to the service provider 102.
  • the service provider 102 receives the service request the identifying information, as shown in block 404.
  • the service provider 102 then transmits an enabling service request and the STB ID to the pairing broker 304, as shown in block 408.
  • the pairing broker 304 receives the service enabling request and the STB ID.
  • a first encrypted version of a pairing key K p is then provided.
  • the pairing key K p wzs generated either in block by the service provider 102, as shown in block 406 or, preferably by the pairing broker 304, as shown in block 406'.
  • the first encrypted version of the pairing key K is provided so as to be decryptable using first information S l securely stored in a first receiver module such as the transport module 202 shown in FIG.
  • the first encrypted version of the pairing key K p therefore described as E s [K p ]
  • this is accomplished by use of a secret that is known to the pairing broker 304, but unknown to the service provider 102.
  • the STB IDs and related first information S can be stored in a table or a database 514 in the pairing broker 304. If desired, the related first encrypted versions of the pairing key E s [K p ] can be stored as well.
  • the first encrypted version of the pairing key E s [K ] is transmitted to the service provider 102. If the pairing key K p was generated by the pairing broker 304, the pairing key K p is also transmitted to the service provider 102. One of both of the first encrypted version of the pairing key E s [K p ] and the pairing key K p can be securely transmitted to the service provider 102 via a shared secret, a private key, or a public/private key security paradigm, if desired.
  • the foregoing process can be used to request all services from a service provider with a single pairing key K or repeated to request other services from the service provider 102, with each service enabled and controlled via a different pairing key K p .
  • the service provider 102 may provide both general services (e.g. access to a number of channels as a part of a baseline fee service) and pay-per-view services (e.g. access to a particular program or set of programs on a pay-per-view basis).
  • FIG. 5B is a diagram showing a table that might be used to store and relate the STB ID to first information S 1 3 a service provider 102 identifier (BDCST ID), and pairing keys for general services, IPPV, and multiple OPPV services.
  • the service provider 102 receives the first encrypted version of the pairing key K , and generates a second encrypted version of the pairing key K such that it is decryp table by second information S 2 securely stored in a second receiver module such as the conditional access module 206 (the second encrypted version of the pairing key K p therefore described as E s ⁇ [K p ] ).
  • the service provider 102 can store a table or database relating STB IDs and the pairing keys K p for each of the provided services.
  • FIG. 5C is an example of how such information may be stored. Note that the BRDCST ID column is not necessary in this case, because the identity of the service provider 102 is inherently known.
  • the service provider 102 transmits an entitlement control message (ECM) or an entitlement management message (EMM) to the subscriber station.
  • ECM entitlement control message
  • EMM entitlement management message
  • the ECM is transmitted to the STB 110 in response to a subscriber request for access to general media programs from the service provider 102, while the EMM is transmitted in response to a subscriber request for a specific program (e.g. an impulse or order ahead pay-per-view).
  • the ECM/EMM includes the first encrypted version of the applicable pairing key E s [K ] , the second encrypted version of the pairing key E s [K ] , and the ID of the service provider 102 (BRDCST ID) which is providing the services related to the pairing key K .
  • the transport module 304 receives the first encrypted version of the pairing key E s [K p ] and the second encrypted version of the pairing key E s ⁇ [K p ] , and the service provider ID.
  • the second encrypted version of the pairing key E s [K p ] is provided to the conditional access module
  • FIG. 6 shows an exemplary embodiment of how the data relating services, broadcasters, and pairing keys K p might be stored in the transport module and the conditional access module.
  • the pairing key K p is used to encrypt communications between the conditional access module 206 and the transport module 202.
  • conditional access module 206 cannot be used a different STB 110, although if desired, more than one STB 110 can be provided to a customer, each having the same first information the conditional access module to be used with different STBs 110 in the same household.
  • the broadcast module 506 and/ or the broadcast headend 516 encrypts media programs M 510 according to a control word (CW), encrypts the control word (CW) itself, and broadcasts a program stream comprising the encrypted program material E cw [M] and the encrypted control word E[CW] to the STBs 100, as shown in blocks 450, 452 and 454.
  • the program stream may also comprise program guide information from the program guide module 508.
  • the transport module 202 in the STB 110 receives the program stream, separates out the packets of information by channel (typically according to a packet ID), and provides the encrypted control word E[CW] to the conditional access module 206.
  • the conditional access module 206 receives the encrypted control word E[CW] decrypts it to recover the control word ⁇ CW), encrypts the control word ⁇ CW) with the pairing key K , and provides the encrypted pairing key E K [CW] to the transport module 202, as shown in blocks 460-466.
  • the transport module 202 decrypts the encrypted control wordEj f [CW] using the pairing key K p thus recovering the control word ⁇ CW), as shown in block 472, and uses the decrypted control word ⁇ CW) to decrypt the encrypted media program E cw [M] to produce the media program M, as shown in block 474.
  • the foregoing system can be used to modify or change the provision of services from the service provider 102 as well. This can be accomplished by the service provider 102 deleting, adding, or modifying the pairing keys K in cooperation with the pairing broker 304 in essentially the same way as described above. Such modification can occur at the subscriber's behest (e.g. the subscriber desires either more, less, or different services than previously), or that of the service provider 102 (e.g. if the offered services change or the subscriber's credit card is no longer valid).
  • the modules described above can be implemented as one or more software modules comprising instructions being performed by one or more special or general purpose processors, or may be implemented with hardware modules having dedicated circuitry, or with both hardware and software modules.
  • the pairing broker 304 is implemented by a pairing server, and the program guide module 508, broadcast module 506, subscriber administration module 504 and web transaction module 502 are all implemented as servers, the transport module 202 and security module 204 are implemented in a secure, tamperproof electronic circuit, and the conditional access module is implemented on a smart card.
  • the system and method described above uses unique secrets S-L and S 2 into the transport module 202 and CAM 206.
  • the unique secrets S-L and S 2 can be derived from a hardware root of trust that is programmed into the device itself.
  • the transport module 202 or CAM may be at least partially implemented using System-on-Chip (SoC) architectures that permit hardware root of trust values to be programmed into the SoC at the SoC manufacturing site using black-box techniques.
  • SoC System-on-Chip
  • SoC programming can also occur at the packaging or product manufacturing facility by execution of an in-field programming sequence on the SoC.
  • a security provider independent architecture can support multiple concurrent or serial CAS and DRM
  • This "derived key" security architecture implementation can provide a means for instantaneous switching between security profiles offered by different and independent CAS and DRM security providers.
  • security providers may use black box OTP resources as the basis to derive security keys to enable different security schemes by altering the key generation inputs based on CAS and DRM vendor software and possibly vendor unique OTP inputs.
  • the key generation inputs can be provided in the CAS and DRM application that could be loaded at CE device manufacturing or downloaded over the air for a fielded CE device.
  • Key derivation can be accomplished in a number of ways, for example, by taking the black box programmed secret OTP keys, CAS/DRM vendor (security provider) software input and possible CAS/DRM vendor unique OTP values and combining in a series of crypto graphic calculations using AES, DES or Triple DES. Where the black box programmed secret OTP keys are used as the key and the software input and CAS/DRM vendor unique OTP values are the data in the crypto graphic operation. .
  • the SoC can derive unique key outputs for each CAS and DRM security provider used for a given content provider or broadcaster.
  • CAS unique inputs such as their assigned conditional access identifier (CA ID) maybe used to differentiate derived keys for different conditional access systems CAS1 versus CAS2.
  • CA ID conditional access identifier
  • These security provider unique key generation outputs enable support for multiple security providers for fielded CE devices typically found in STBs 110, televisions (TVs), Smart TVs and mobile devices such as smartphones.
  • the black box security provider provides compatible headend applications to each content provider, so that the media programs are encrypted or otherwise protected using the CAS and DRM implementation used.
  • Another advantage of using a derived key database is that the black box programmed OTP key secrets programmed into the SoC OTP do not have to be divulged to the multiple CAS and DRM security providers, since these security providers would use the derived key databases for their content protection systems, not the OTP value. This means that if a derived key database were compromised, it only affects the specific CAS/DRM security provider that was using that specific derived key database, i.e. such compromise would not affect the fielded CE devices or derived key databases of any other such CAS/DRM security provider.
  • the keys and programming infrastructure provided by an independent black box security provider enables fielded CE devices to add additional revenue baring applications to the CE device manufacturer or content provider giving these entities more flexibility in managing their business and offering new services. Besides switching out a CAS/DRM vendor for any number of reasons, enabling the ability to add applications supporting new CAS/DRM vendors in fielded CE devices can result in generating significantly higher content sale revenues without requiring consumers to upgrade their CE devices. Consumer savings are realized by extending the field life of the CE device by allowing the consumer to download new software images to enable the purchase of new content services without having to replace their fielded CE devices.
  • Extending Fixed Secrets with Key Derivation can be used to extend the fixed secret, S 1 , shown in FIGs. 5A and 5B to decrypt either of the encrypted paring keys E Si [K P ], E Sz [K P ] to with secrets S t and S 2 , respectively produce the pairing key Kp that is used to decrypt the ECW shown in FIG. 4C.
  • the extension provides the ability to: (1) Use derived root keys to produce S 1 and alternately or in addition, using such root keys to produce S 2 and (2) Use this derivation process as a means of renewing key material for a fielded system.
  • hardware root of trust values can provide the basis for security providers such as the pairing broker 304 and/ or one or more of the broadcasters 102 to derive a plurality of different security keys. Such keys can be used to add new security procedures or modify procedures already implemented. This can be accomplished, for example, by altering the key generation inputs based on security provider software (CAS or DRM) and possibly inputs vendor-unique hardware root of trust values.
  • the key generation inputs can be provided in the CAS and DRM application software that could be loaded at into consumer electronics (CE) devices such as the transport module 2002 or CAM 206 when the devices are manufacture, or remotely downloaded over the air for a fielded CE device. This permits cryptographic separation of the CE devices at both S 1 and S 2 .
  • CE consumer electronics
  • Such hardware root of trust values can include one-time-programmable (OTP) values programmed into the transport module 202 and or CAM 206 using, for example, black box techniques also described in U.S. Patent
  • OTP values may be held secret from other entities as necessary.
  • the pairing broker 304 or third party security provider may provide a black box to the broadcaster 102 or manufacturer of the STB, permitting the storage of an OTP value without disclosing that value to the security provider or broadcaster.
  • Another advantage of using a derived key database is that the black box programmed OTP key secrets programmed into the SoC OTP may be held secret from (do not have to be released to) the CAS or DRM security provider, since these security providers would use the OTP key secrets to derive the keys required for their content protection system. This permits supporting multiple security provider vendors.
  • FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating an exemplary embodiment of the transport module 202 and the CAM 206, wherein the transport module 202 includes a hardware root of trust value OTPl 702A and/ or the CAM 206 has another hardware root of trust value OTP2 702B, thus permitting at least one of the first information S x and second information S 2 to be derived from a hardware root of trust secret stored in at least one of the transport module 202 and the CAM 206.
  • the transport module 202 has a SoC with a processor that can perform processor instructions 704A.
  • the processor has access to OTP 1 702 and can use deriving information such as the processor instructions 704A to derive or generate the first value S x via one or more operations 708A.
  • the CAM 206 comprises a SoC with a processor that can perform processor instructions 704B.
  • the processor has access to OTP 1 702 and can use the processor instructions 704A to generate the first value S l via one or more operations 708B.
  • the transport module 202 may also store one or more further hardware root of trust values OTPl 706A1 and OTP2 706A2 that can also be used as deriving information to generate the first value S x .
  • OTPl 706A1 and OTP2 706A2 are security provider -unique, with each allocated to different security providers, allowing the transport module 202 to support CAS/DRM procedures of multiple security providers, allowing each such security provider to use their own OTP value 706A to generate first information S x .
  • security providers may be provided multiple OTP values as well.
  • the CAM 206 may also store one or more further hardware root of trust values OTPl 706B1 and OTP2 706B2 that can also be used to generate the second value S 2 .
  • OTPl 706B1 and OTP2 706B2 may be allocated to the same security provider, or different security providers, allowing the CAM 206 to support CAS/DRM procedures of multiple security providers.
  • FIG. 8 illustrates an exemplary computer system 800 that could be used to implement the servers or the subscriber computer 512 of the present invention.
  • the computer 802 comprises a processor 804 and a memory, such as random access memory (RAM) 806.
  • the computer 802 is operatively coupled to a display 822, which presents images such as windows to the user on a graphical user interface 818B.
  • the computer system 802 may be coupled to other devices, such as a keyboard 814, a mouse device 816, a printer, etc.
  • keyboard 814 a keyboard 814
  • a mouse device 816 a printer, etc.
  • the computer 802 operates under control of an operating system 808 stored in the memory 806, and interfaces with the user to accept inputs and commands and to present results through a graphical user interface (GUI) module 818A.
  • GUI graphical user interface
  • the instructions performing the GUI functions can be resident or distributed in the operating system 808, the computer program 810, or implemented with special purpose memory and processors.
  • the computer 802 also implements a compiler 812 which allows an application program 810 written in a programming language such as COBOL, C++, FORTRAN, or other language to be translated into processor 804 readable code.
  • the application 810 accesses and manipulates data stored in the memory 806 of the computer 802 using the relationships and logic that was generated using the compiler 812.
  • the computer 802 also optionally comprises an external communication device such as a modem, satellite link, Ethernet card, or other device for communicating with other computers.
  • instructions implementing the operating system 108, the computer program 810, and the compiler 812 are tangibly embodied in a computer-readable medium, e.g., data storage device 820, which could include one or more fixed or removable data storage devices, such as a zip drive, floppy disc drive 824, hard drive, CD-ROM drive, tape drive, etc.
  • the operating system 808 and the computer program 810 are comprised of instructions which, when read and executed by the computer 802, causes the computer 802 to perform the steps necessary to implement and/ or use the present invention.
  • Computer program 810 and/ or operating instructions may also be tangibly embodied in memory 806 and/ or data communications devices 830, thereby making a computer program product or article of manufacture according to the invention.
  • the terms "article of manufacture,” “program storage device” and “computer program product” as used herein are intended to encompass a computer program accessible from any computer readable device or media.

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  • Two-Way Televisions, Distribution Of Moving Picture Or The Like (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé et un appareil pour négocier l'activation de la communication de programmes multimédias chiffrés à partir d'une pluralité de diffuseurs indépendants vers une pluralité de récepteurs. Le système utilise une clé d'appariement pour chaque service fourni, qui est chiffré de manière différente par un serveur d'appariement et par le diffuseur fournissant le service. Les versions chiffrées de la clé d'appariement sont décryptées dans un premier module récepteur à l'aide d'informations connues du service d'appariement mais pas du diffuseur et dans un second module récepteur à l'aide d'informations connues du diffuseur. La clé d'appariement est utilisée pour lier de manière cryptographique les premier et second modules de récepteur.
PCT/US2018/042542 2017-07-17 2018-07-17 Procédé et appareil de prendre en charge de multiples diffuseurs indépendamment à l'aide d'un système d'accès conditionnel unique Ceased WO2019018431A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US15/652,082 2017-07-17
US15/652,082 US10477151B2 (en) 2004-10-18 2017-07-17 Method and apparatus for supporting multiple broadcasters independently using a single conditional access system

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WO2019018431A1 true WO2019018431A1 (fr) 2019-01-24

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Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5940504A (en) * 1991-07-01 1999-08-17 Infologic Software, Inc. Licensing management system and method in which datagrams including an address of a licensee and indicative of use of a licensed product are sent from the licensee's site
US20030061477A1 (en) * 2001-09-21 2003-03-27 Kahn Raynold M. Method and apparatus for encrypting media programs for later purchase and viewing
US20150113278A1 (en) * 2012-03-02 2015-04-23 Syphermedia International, Inc. Blackbox security provider programming system permitting multiple customer use and in field conditional access switching
US20170012952A1 (en) 2015-07-10 2017-01-12 Syphermedia International, Inc. Method and apparatus for a blackbox programming system permitting downloadable applications and multiple security profiles providing hardware separation of services in hardware constrained devices

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5940504A (en) * 1991-07-01 1999-08-17 Infologic Software, Inc. Licensing management system and method in which datagrams including an address of a licensee and indicative of use of a licensed product are sent from the licensee's site
US20030061477A1 (en) * 2001-09-21 2003-03-27 Kahn Raynold M. Method and apparatus for encrypting media programs for later purchase and viewing
US20150113278A1 (en) * 2012-03-02 2015-04-23 Syphermedia International, Inc. Blackbox security provider programming system permitting multiple customer use and in field conditional access switching
US20170012952A1 (en) 2015-07-10 2017-01-12 Syphermedia International, Inc. Method and apparatus for a blackbox programming system permitting downloadable applications and multiple security profiles providing hardware separation of services in hardware constrained devices

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