WO2020062073A1 - Procédé et système de prévention d'attaque par brouillage dans un réseau de communication alimenté sans fil - Google Patents

Procédé et système de prévention d'attaque par brouillage dans un réseau de communication alimenté sans fil Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2020062073A1
WO2020062073A1 PCT/CN2018/108439 CN2018108439W WO2020062073A1 WO 2020062073 A1 WO2020062073 A1 WO 2020062073A1 CN 2018108439 W CN2018108439 W CN 2018108439W WO 2020062073 A1 WO2020062073 A1 WO 2020062073A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
throughput
user
probability
target user
trusted
Prior art date
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Ceased
Application number
PCT/CN2018/108439
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English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
谢宁
胡吉
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Shenzhen University
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Shenzhen University
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Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Shenzhen University filed Critical Shenzhen University
Priority to PCT/CN2018/108439 priority Critical patent/WO2020062073A1/fr
Publication of WO2020062073A1 publication Critical patent/WO2020062073A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
    • H04K3/45—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by including monitoring of the target or target signal, e.g. in reactive jammers or follower jammers for example by means of an alternation of jamming phases and monitoring phases, called "look-through mode"
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/20—Countermeasures against jamming
    • H04K3/22—Countermeasures against jamming including jamming detection and monitoring
    • H04K3/224—Countermeasures against jamming including jamming detection and monitoring with countermeasures at transmission and/or reception of the jammed signal, e.g. stopping operation of transmitter or receiver, nulling or enhancing transmitted power in direction of or at frequency of jammer
    • H04K3/226—Selection of non-jammed channel for communication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/20—Countermeasures against jamming
    • H04K3/22—Countermeasures against jamming including jamming detection and monitoring
    • H04K3/224—Countermeasures against jamming including jamming detection and monitoring with countermeasures at transmission and/or reception of the jammed signal, e.g. stopping operation of transmitter or receiver, nulling or enhancing transmitted power in direction of or at frequency of jammer
    • H04K3/228—Elimination in the received signal of jamming or of data corrupted by jamming
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
    • H04K3/41—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by the control of the jamming activation or deactivation time
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
    • H04K3/43—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by the control of the jamming power, signal-to-noise ratio or geographic coverage area
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
    • H04K2203/10—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application
    • H04K2203/16—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application for telephony

Definitions

  • the transmitting device calculates a security interrupt probability, a second trusted throughput, and a cost-performance ratio based on the received data signal, and compares the cost performance of the target user device. Comparing with the third threshold, and comparing the second trusted throughput of the target user device with the second threshold required by the system to improve the security of the entire system. In this case, the attack behavior of the attack device can be prevented, the security level can be controlled purposefully and effectively, and the network security can be improved.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic structural diagram illustrating a lenders attack defense system of a wireless energy transmission communication network according to an example of the present disclosure.
  • the bedrooms attack defense method may further include that in the process of broadcasting the distribution result to the base station by the base station, the attacker monitors and selects the user with the longest transmission time period as the target user.
  • Set the preset interference power step S200.
  • the attacker in the process of broadcasting the allocation result by the base station, the attacker may intercept the allocation result. That is, in the TA phase, the attacker can intercept the allocation result (that is, the allocation information of the transmission time period of each user). The attacker then selects the user with the longest transmission period among the multiple users as the target user.
  • Set the preset interference power P J, 1 based on the transmission time period of the target user.
  • the preset interference power P J, 1 can be regarded as the ability of the attacker to attack the user.
  • the data signal x i may include a pilot signal p i and an information signal m i , and it is assumed with Therefore, the data signal received by the base station can be expressed as
  • U i represents the i-th user. In this case, it is possible to judge the security of the wireless energy transmission communication network.
  • step S600 the attack behavior of the attacker can be predicted by comparing the second trusted throughput of the target user with the second threshold ⁇ 2 required by the system, and comparing the cost-performance ratio of the target user with the third threshold ⁇ 3 .
  • the second trusted throughput does not reach the second threshold ⁇ 2 and the cost-performance ratio does not reach the third threshold ⁇ 3
  • the user is attacked, that is, the target user receives the interference signal, and the base station does not perform the data signal of the target user. Decoding, reallocating the transmission time period and reducing the corresponding transmission time period of the target user.
  • the base station decodes the received data signal of the target user, and the second throughput of the target user is included in the total throughput.
  • corresponding measures are taken for users in different situations in order to better maintain the overall performance of the wireless energy transmission communication network.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
  • Remote Sensing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un procédé de prévention d'attaque par brouillage dans un réseau de communication alimenté sans fil, comprenant les étapes suivantes : une station de base effectue une estimation de canal, calcule un premier débit de confiance, attribue une période de temps d'émission pour chaque utilisateur, et notifie aux utilisateurs le résultat d'attribution par diffusion ; un attaquant écoute le résultat d'attribution, prend comme utilisateur cible l'utilisateur ayant la période de temps d'émission la plus longue, et règle une puissance de brouillage prédéfinie sur la base de la période de temps d'émission de l'utilisateur cible ; quand le premier débit de confiance atteint un premier seuil, la station de base transmet de l'énergie à l'utilisateur ; l'utilisateur reçoit l'énergie et émet un signal de données à destination de la station de base ; lorsque l'utilisateur cible émet le signal de données, l'attaquant émet un signal de brouillage ; la station de base calcule une probabilité d'interruption de sécurité, un deuxième débit de confiance et un rapport coût-performance sur la base du signal de données reçu, compare le deuxième débit de confiance de l'utilisateur cible à un deuxième seuil requis par un système, compare le rapport coût-performance de l'utilisateur cible à un troisième seuil de façon à effectuer une prédiction d'attaque, et seulement si les deux seuils sont atteints, décode le signal reçu.
PCT/CN2018/108439 2018-09-28 2018-09-28 Procédé et système de prévention d'attaque par brouillage dans un réseau de communication alimenté sans fil Ceased WO2020062073A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/CN2018/108439 WO2020062073A1 (fr) 2018-09-28 2018-09-28 Procédé et système de prévention d'attaque par brouillage dans un réseau de communication alimenté sans fil

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/CN2018/108439 WO2020062073A1 (fr) 2018-09-28 2018-09-28 Procédé et système de prévention d'attaque par brouillage dans un réseau de communication alimenté sans fil

Publications (1)

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WO2020062073A1 true WO2020062073A1 (fr) 2020-04-02

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PCT/CN2018/108439 Ceased WO2020062073A1 (fr) 2018-09-28 2018-09-28 Procédé et système de prévention d'attaque par brouillage dans un réseau de communication alimenté sans fil

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WO (1) WO2020062073A1 (fr)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN121078460A (zh) * 2025-11-05 2025-12-05 武汉大学 一种无线供电网络吞吐量优化方法及系统

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN102223637A (zh) * 2011-07-20 2011-10-19 北京邮电大学 一种基于无线信道特征的身份认证方法及系统
US20140241196A1 (en) * 2012-03-28 2014-08-28 Apple Inc. Adaptive Generation of Channel Quality Indicators (CQIs) Based on a Current Communication Scenario
CN106130935A (zh) * 2016-06-30 2016-11-16 西安交通大学 一种基于随机bpsk序列辅助的自适应抗导频欺骗攻击信道估计方法
WO2016181861A1 (fr) * 2015-05-08 2016-11-17 シャープ株式会社 Dispositif terminal et dispositif de station de base

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN102223637A (zh) * 2011-07-20 2011-10-19 北京邮电大学 一种基于无线信道特征的身份认证方法及系统
US20140241196A1 (en) * 2012-03-28 2014-08-28 Apple Inc. Adaptive Generation of Channel Quality Indicators (CQIs) Based on a Current Communication Scenario
WO2016181861A1 (fr) * 2015-05-08 2016-11-17 シャープ株式会社 Dispositif terminal et dispositif de station de base
CN106130935A (zh) * 2016-06-30 2016-11-16 西安交通大学 一种基于随机bpsk序列辅助的自适应抗导频欺骗攻击信道估计方法

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN121078460A (zh) * 2025-11-05 2025-12-05 武汉大学 一种无线供电网络吞吐量优化方法及系统

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