WO2020136628A1 - Joint inviolable - Google Patents

Joint inviolable Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2020136628A1
WO2020136628A1 PCT/IB2019/061424 IB2019061424W WO2020136628A1 WO 2020136628 A1 WO2020136628 A1 WO 2020136628A1 IB 2019061424 W IB2019061424 W IB 2019061424W WO 2020136628 A1 WO2020136628 A1 WO 2020136628A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
tamper
seal
loop
count value
status
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/IB2019/061424
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Paul Abner NORONHA
Darshan Dhruman GANDHI
Dattaprasad Narayan KAMAT
Murad NATHANI
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Sepio Products Private Ltd
Original Assignee
Sepio Products Private Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Sepio Products Private Ltd filed Critical Sepio Products Private Ltd
Priority to CN201980091822.6A priority Critical patent/CN113424189B/zh
Publication of WO2020136628A1 publication Critical patent/WO2020136628A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G09—EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
    • G09F—DISPLAYING; ADVERTISING; SIGNS; LABELS OR NAME-PLATES; SEALS
    • G09F3/00—Labels, tag tickets, or similar identification or indication means; Seals; Postage or like stamps
    • G09F3/02—Forms or constructions
    • G09F3/03—Forms or constructions of security seals
    • G09F3/0305—Forms or constructions of security seals characterised by the type of seal used
    • G09F3/0329—Forms or constructions of security seals characterised by the type of seal used having electronic sealing means
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/86—Secure or tamper-resistant housings
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/077—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier
    • G06K19/07749—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier the record carrier being capable of non-contact communication, e.g. constructional details of the antenna of a non-contact smart card
    • G06K19/07798—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier the record carrier being capable of non-contact communication, e.g. constructional details of the antenna of a non-contact smart card part of the antenna or the integrated circuit being adapted for rupturing or breaking, e.g. record carriers functioning as sealing devices for detecting not-authenticated opening of containers

Definitions

  • the present disclosure relates generally to the field of electronic security seals. More particularly, the present disclosure relates to a tamper indicating bolt-seal. BACKGROUND
  • NFC Near Field Communication
  • RFID Radio Frequency Identification
  • RFID+RFID security tags use the technology of inductive coupling, which is a process that transfers energy through a shared magnetic field between an RFID tag and an RFID reader.
  • the RFID reader uses magnetic induction to create a radio-wave field that the RFID tag detects. Therefore, when a tag is placed in close proximity to the reader, the field from the reader's antenna coil couples with the tag's antenna coil and induces a voltage in the tag, which is then rectified and used to power the tag's internal circuitry.
  • Existing passive RFID security tags/seals are capable of checking and recording the status of the tamper loop only in presence of a radio frequency (RF) field of the RFID reader.
  • RF radio frequency
  • Such chips derive their power from the RF field to send a pulse around the tamper loop. If the pulse is successfully sent and received, a tamper check flag is set as non-tampered and seal is declared non-tampered. In the absence of such an RF field, a skilled counterfeiter can open and close the tag/seal without changing the status of the tamper check flag. Flence, under such a condition, when the tamper check flag is read by an RFID reader, it will show non- tampered even though the scal/tag has been tampered with.
  • An object of the present disclosure is to provide a tamper indicating seal.
  • Another object of the present disclosure is to provide a tamper indicating seal that can record number of times it is open and closed.
  • Yet another object of the present disclosure is to provide a tamper indicating seal that can identify tampering even if the seal is not damaged/broken.
  • Still another object of the present disclosure is to provide a tamper indicating seal that identifies tampering even if the seal is opened in the absence of a radio frequency (RF) field.
  • RF radio frequency
  • the present disclosure envisages a tamper indicating seal.
  • the tamper indicating seal comprises a tamper loop and a tamper detection chip.
  • the tamper loop includes a first portion and a second portion.
  • the tamper loop is configured to close when an electrical connection is established between the first portion and the second portion.
  • the tamper detection chip is provided in the first portion.
  • the tamper detection chip is configured to detect events corresponding to opening and closing of the tamper loop, and is further configured to facilitate detection of tampering of the seal based on the count of either the detected closing events or the detected opening and closing events.
  • the tamper indicating seal is in the form of a bolt seal comprising a bolt member and a housing.
  • the housing is configured to receive the bolt member, and is further configured to facilitate snap-locking of the bolt member therewithin.
  • the first portion of the tamper loop is embedded within the bolt member and the second portion is embedded within the housing, wherein locking of the bolt member with the housing causes the tamper loop to close and unlocking of the bolt member from the housing causes the tamper loop to open.
  • the tamper detection chip comprises a control unit, a memory, a tamper switch, a counter, and a comparator.
  • the control unit is configured to detect events corresponding to opening and closing of the tamper loop, and is further configured to generate a closed event signal upon detecting closing of the tamper loop and an open event signal upon detecting opening of the tamper loop.
  • the memory comprises an identification register, a tamper flag register, and a pre-determined threshold tamper value.
  • the identification register stores a unique identification code associated with the tamper indicating seal.
  • the tamper switch is configured to cooperate with the control unit to receive the closed event signal and the open event signal, and is further configured to toggle between an open state position and a closed state position based on the received closed event and open event signals.
  • the counter is configured to store a tamper count value, and is further configured to cooperate with the tamper switch to increment the tamper count value by one based on detection of change in the position of the tamper switch.
  • the default value of the tamper count value stored in the counter is zero.
  • the counter is a 3-bit memory and can count up to 7.
  • the counter is configured to increment tamper count value by one every time the tamper switch toggles between the open state and closed state positions.
  • the counter is configured to increment tamper count value by one every time the tamper switch toggles to the closed state position.
  • the comparator is configured to cooperate with the memory and the counter to receive the pre-determined threshold tamper value and the tamper count value respectively, and is further configured to change the status of the tamper flag register, when the tamper count value becomes equal to the pre-determined threshold tamper value, thereby indicating tampering of the seal.
  • the comparator is configured to change at least one status bit of the identification code stored in the memory, when the tamper count value becomes equal to the pre-determined threshold tamper value, thereby indicating tampering of the seal.
  • the control unit, the counter, and the comparator are implemented using one or more processor(s).
  • the tamper loop includes at least one antenna, a battery, and a capacitor.
  • the antenna is electrically connected to the tamper detection chip and is configured to cooperate with the memory to transmit the identification code, status of the tamper loop, the count value, and status of the tamper flag register upon receiving a radio frequency signal from a reader.
  • the antenna is selected from a group consisting of a high frequency antenna, an ultrahigh frequency antenna, and a low frequency antenna.
  • the identification code, status of the tamper loop, the count value, and status of the tamper flag register are transmitted to the reader using communication protocols selected from Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), Long Range Wide Area Network (LoRaWAN), Global Positioning System (GPS), and Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi).
  • RFID Radio Frequency Identification
  • LiRaWAN Long Range Wide Area Network
  • GPS Global Positioning System
  • Wi-Fi Wireless Fidelity
  • the battery is configured to supply power to the control unit to facilitate generation of the closed event and the open event signals.
  • the capacitor is configured to supply power to the control unit to facilitate generation of the closed event and open event signals in absence of power supply from the battery.
  • the tamper indicating seal is assumed to be tampered if the reader is unable to read the unique identification code correctly.
  • the identification code facilitates automatic identification of a container or a transport vehicle to which the seal is attached.
  • the status of the tamper flag register facilitates determining whether the seal is tampered or not.
  • the status bit of the identification code facilitates determining whether the seal is tampered or not.
  • control unit is configured to generate the open event signal when the battery is removed without opening the tamper loop.
  • Figure 1 illustrates a sectional view of a tamper indicating seal of the present disclosure
  • Figure 2 illustrates a block diagram of a tamper detection chip of the tamper indicating seal of Figure 1.
  • Embodiments are provided so as to thoroughly and fully convey the scope of the present disclosure to the person skilled in the art. Numerous details, are set forth, relating to specific components, and methods, to provide a complete understanding of embodiments of the present disclosure. It will be apparent to the person skilled in the art that the details provided in the embodiments should not be construed to limit the scope of the present disclosure. In some embodiments, well-known processes, well-known apparatus structures, and well-known techniques are not described in detail.
  • Existing passive RFID security seals are capable of checking and recording the status of the tamper loop only in presence of a radio frequency (RF) field of the RFID reader.
  • RF radio frequency
  • a skilled counterfeiter can open and close the seal without changing the status of the tamper check flag. Under such a condition, when the tamper check flag is read by an RFID reader, it will show a non-tampered status even though the seal has been tampered with.
  • a tamper indicating seal hereinafter referred to as“seal 100” of the present disclosure is now being described with reference to Figure 1 through Figure 3.
  • the tamper indicating seal 100 records the number of tamper status changes to identify tampering.
  • the tamper indicating seal 100 comprises a tamper loop and a tamper detection chip 106.
  • the tamper loop includes a first portion and a second portion.
  • the tamper loop is configured to close when an electrical connection is established between the first portion and the second portion.
  • the tamper detection chip 106 is provided in the first portion.
  • the tamper detection chip 106 is configured to detect events corresponding to opening and closing of the tamper loop, and is further configured to facilitate detection of tampering of the seal 100 based on the count of either the detected closing events or the detected opening and closing events.
  • the tamper indicating seal 100 is in the form of a bolt seal comprising a bolt member 110 and a housing 116.
  • the housing 116 is configured to receive the bolt member 110, and is further configured to facilitate snap-locking of the bolt member 110 there within.
  • the first portion of the tamper loop is embedded within the bolt member 110 and the second portion of the tamper loop is embedded within the housing 116 such that locking of the bolt member 110 with the housing 116 causes the tamper loop to close and unlocking of the bolt member 110 from the housing 116 causes the tamper loop to open.
  • the tamper loop includes the tamper detection chip 106.
  • the tamper detection chip 106 is configured to detect the number of times the tamper loop opens and closes to facilitate detection of tampering of the seal 100.
  • the housing 116 includes a wire having two terminals 114.
  • the terminals 114 of the wire are configured to connect with terminals 112 of the tamper detection chip 106 located in the bolt member 110 to form a continuous tamper loop when the seal 100 is in locked state.
  • the tamper detection chip 106 comprises a control unit 118, a memory 122, a tamper switch 120, a counter 124, and a comparator 126.
  • the control unit 118 is configured to detect events corresponding to opening and closing of the tamper loop, and is further configured to generate a closed event signal upon detecting closing of the tamper loop and an open event signal upon detecting opening of the tamper loop.
  • the memory 122 comprises an identification register, a tamper flag register, and a pre-determined threshold tamper value.
  • the identification register stores a unique identification code associated with the tamper indicating seal 100.
  • the tamper switch 120 is configured to cooperate with the control unit 118 to receive the closed event signal and the open event signal, and is further configured to toggle between an open state position and a closed state position based on the received closed event and open event signals.
  • the counter 124 is configured to store a tamper count value, and is further configured to cooperate with the tamper switch 120 to increment the tamper count value by one based on detection of change in the position of the tamper switch 120.
  • the default value of the tamper count value stored in the counter 124 is zero.
  • the counter 124 is a 3-bit memory and can only count up to 7. In an alternate embodiment, the counter 124 is a 4 or higher bit memory.
  • the counter 124 does not reset to zero once the maximum count is reached.
  • the counter 124 is configured to increment tamper count value by one every time the tamper switch 120 toggles between the open state and closed state positions.
  • the counter 124 is configured to increment tamper count value by one every time the tamper switch 120 toggles to the closed state position.
  • the comparator 126 is configured to cooperate with the memory 122 and the counter 124 to receive the pre-determined threshold tamper value and the tamper count value respectively, and is further configured to change the status of the tamper flag register, when the tamper count value becomes equal to the pre-determined threshold tamper value, thereby indicating a tampered seal.
  • the tamper flag register may be configured to store a single bit indicating whether or not the seal 100 is tampered.
  • a bit value of ’ may indicate a ‘non-tampered status and a bit value of‘ may indicate a‘tampered status’.
  • the comparator 126 is configured to change at least one status bit of the identification code stored in the memory 122, when the tamper count value becomes equal to the pre-determined threshold tamper value, thereby indicating a tampered seal.
  • control unit 118, the counter 124, and the comparator 126 are implemented using one or more processor(s).
  • the processor may be a general-purpose processor, a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), a Digital Signal Processor (DSP), and/or the like.
  • the processor may be configured to retrieve data from and/or write data to a memory.
  • the memory can be for example, a random access memory (RAM), a memory buffer, a hard drive, a database, an erasable programmable read only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable programmable read only memory (EEPROM), a read only memory (ROM), a flash memory, a hard disk, a floppy disk, cloud storage, and/or so forth.
  • RAM random access memory
  • EPROM erasable programmable read only memory
  • EEPROM electrically erasable programmable read only memory
  • ROM read only memory
  • flash memory a hard disk, a floppy disk, cloud storage, and/or so forth.
  • the tamper loop further includes at least one antenna 102, a battery 108, and a capacitor 104.
  • the antenna 102 is electrically connected to the tamper detection chip 106.
  • the antenna 102 is configured to cooperate with the memory 122 to transmit the identification code, status of the tamper loop, the count value, and status of the tamper flag register upon receiving a radio frequency signal from a reader 304.
  • the antenna 102 is selected from a group consisting of a high frequency antenna, an ultrahigh frequency antenna, and a low frequency antenna. In an embodiment, the antenna 102 is a dual frequency RFID/NFC antenna.
  • the identification code, status of the tamper loop, the count value, and status of the tamper flag register can be transmitted to the reader 304 using communication protocols selected from Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), Long Range Wide Area Network (LoRaWAN), Global Positioning System (GPS), and Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi).
  • RFID Radio Frequency Identification
  • LiRaWAN Long Range Wide Area Network
  • GPS Global Positioning System
  • Wi-Fi Wireless Fidelity
  • the battery 108 drives a current through the tamper loop and supplies power to the control unit 118 of the tamper detection chip 106.
  • the control unit 118 detects the closed status of the tamper loop and generates a closed event signal.
  • the control unit 118 transmits the generated closed event signal to a tamper switch 120.
  • the tamper switch 120 changes state upon receiving the closed event signal.
  • the change in state of the tamper switch 120 drives the counter 124 to increase the count value by one.
  • the tamper loop is opened, i.e.
  • the battery 108 is still connected to the control unit 118 and supplies power to the control unit 118.
  • the control unit 118 detects opened status of the tamper loop (i.e. no current in the tamper loop) and generates an open event signal.
  • the control unit 118 transmits the generated open event signal to the tamper switch 120.
  • the tamper switch 120 goes back to its initial state. The change in state of the tamper switch 120 drives the counter 124 to increase the count value by one.
  • the counter 124 increments tamper count value by one every time the tamper switch 120 toggles to the closed state position. In other words, the counter 124 increments tamper count value only during lock events i.e. when the tamper loop is closed and the bolt member 110 is locked with the housing 116, and ignores unlock events as it will be between two lock events and can be detected at the time of scan. This way the number of lock/unlock events that can be counted by the counter 124 is doubled using the same amount of counter memory.
  • the reader 304 may be communicatively coupled to a server 306. Each reader 304 is associated with a unique account identifier (ID).
  • ID unique account identifier
  • the reader 304 is configured to transmit the identification code, the status of the tamper loop at the time of scan, the count value, and the unique account ID to the server 306 upon scanning of the tamper seal 100.
  • the seal 100 can be used as a reusable seal with each event being stored on blockchain or the server 306. For example, a first user locks the seal 100. This increments the count value by 1. He then scans the seal 100 using a secure access account (account ID) to validate the transaction. At this stage, the identification code, the status of the tamper loop at the time of scan, the count value, and the unique account ID are transmitted to the server 306. At the reader end, the expected count value is 1. Upon receipt, the receiver scans the seal 100 and checks the count value.
  • the seal 100 is declared non-tampered.
  • the scan records his account ID, the identification code, the status of the tamper loop, and the count value, on the server 306. For the next use, he simply locks the seal 100 again, thus increasing the count to 2.
  • the seal 100 is declared tampered.
  • the default condition of the tamper loop is open and the count value of the counter 124 is set at 0.
  • the manufacturer tests the seal 100 by closing the tamper loop. At this stage, the count value increases to 1. After successful testing, the loop is opened again and the count value increases to 2.
  • the tamper seal 100 is supplied to an end user in this condition.
  • the seal 100 is declared as tampered.
  • the identification code facilitates automatic identification of a container or a transport vehicle (302) to which the seal 100 is attached.
  • the reader 304 is configured to read the unique identification code and cooperate with the server 306 to enable automatic identification of any container or transport vehicle (302), to which the seal 100 is attached.
  • the seal 100 is assumed to be tampered if the reader 304 is unable to read the unique identification code correctly.
  • the status of the tamper flag register facilitates determining whether the seal 100 is tampered or not. In another embodiment, the status bit of the identification code facilitates determining whether the seal 100 is tampered or not.
  • control unit 118 is configured to generate the open event signal when the battery 108 is removed without opening the tamper loop, i.e. without unlocking the bolt member 110 from the housing 116.
  • the capacitor 104 provides a sufficient power to the control unit 118 to facilitate generation of the open event signal.
  • the tamper switch 120 changes its state upon receiving the open event signal, thereby incrementing the count value of the counter 124 and changing the status of the tamper flag register or the status bit of the identification code, the moment the battery 108 is disconnected.
  • the tamper indicating seal 100 facilitates identification of tampering even when the seal 100 is opened without damaging it or when the seal 100 is opened in the absence of a radio frequency (RF) field. Thus, tamper detection is ensured even if the seal 100 is tampered by a skilled counterfeiter.
  • RF radio frequency

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Burglar Alarm Systems (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne le domaine des systèmes de sécurité et concerne un joint inviolable (100) comprenant une boucle d'inviolabilité et une puce de détection d'inviolabilité (106). La boucle d'inviolabilité comprend une première partie et une seconde partie. La boucle d'inviolabilité se ferme lorsqu'une connexion électrique est établie entre les première et seconde parties. La première partie est incorporée à l'intérieur d'un élément boulon (110) et la seconde partie à l'intérieur d'un logement (116) de sorte que le verrouillage de l'élément boulon (110) avec le logement (116) amène la boucle d'inviolabilité à se fermer et le déverrouillage de l'élément boulon (110) amène la boucle d'inviolabilité à s'ouvrir. La puce de détection d'inviolabilité (106) détecte le nombre d'événements de fermeture de la boucle d'inviolabilité ou d'événements d'ouverture et de fermeture de la boucle d'inviolabilité pour faciliter la détection d'une manipulation frauduleuse du joint (100). Ainsi, une manipulation frauduleuse est identifiée même si le joint (100) est ouvert en l'absence d'un champ RF.
PCT/IB2019/061424 2018-12-28 2019-12-30 Joint inviolable Ceased WO2020136628A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201980091822.6A CN113424189B (zh) 2018-12-28 2019-12-30 篡改指示封章

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
IN201821049564 2018-12-28
IN201821049564 2018-12-28

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2020136628A1 true WO2020136628A1 (fr) 2020-07-02

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PCT/IB2019/061424 Ceased WO2020136628A1 (fr) 2018-12-28 2019-12-30 Joint inviolable

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WO (1) WO2020136628A1 (fr)

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US20230127682A1 (en) * 2021-10-21 2023-04-27 Hart Intercivic, Inc. Systems, Tamper-Evident Assemblies And Methods To Detect Tampering And/Or Provide Cryptographic Evidence Of Tampering
WO2024167402A1 (fr) * 2023-02-08 2024-08-15 Martin Jan Peter Eversdijk Procédé de stockage et de transport de preuves médico-légales, et récipient contenant des preuves médico-légales
US12422458B2 (en) 2023-09-18 2025-09-23 Yms Tech Co., Ltd. Electronic seal device for electronic meter and smart electronic seal system including the same

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KR102881770B1 (ko) * 2022-09-06 2025-11-04 주식회사 와이엠에스텍 전자 봉인 장치 및 그것을 포함하는 전력량계 전자 봉인 시스템
KR102894661B1 (ko) * 2023-09-18 2025-12-03 주식회사 와이엠에스텍 전자 계량기의 전자 봉인 장치 및 그것을 포함하는 스마트 전자 봉인 시스템

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US20150254961A1 (en) * 2014-03-10 2015-09-10 Nxp B.V. Tamper/damage detection
US20170363673A1 (en) * 2016-06-17 2017-12-21 Thin Film Electronics Asa Wireless Mechanism For Detecting an Open or Closed Container, and Methods of Making and Using the Same

Cited By (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20230127682A1 (en) * 2021-10-21 2023-04-27 Hart Intercivic, Inc. Systems, Tamper-Evident Assemblies And Methods To Detect Tampering And/Or Provide Cryptographic Evidence Of Tampering
US12425222B2 (en) * 2021-10-21 2025-09-23 Hart Intercivic, Inc. Systems, tamper-evident assemblies and methods to detect tampering and/or provide cryptographic evidence of tampering
WO2024167402A1 (fr) * 2023-02-08 2024-08-15 Martin Jan Peter Eversdijk Procédé de stockage et de transport de preuves médico-légales, et récipient contenant des preuves médico-légales
NL2034111B1 (en) * 2023-02-08 2024-08-29 Jan Peter Eversdijk Martin A method for storing and transporting forensic evidence, and container comprising forensic evidence
US12422458B2 (en) 2023-09-18 2025-09-23 Yms Tech Co., Ltd. Electronic seal device for electronic meter and smart electronic seal system including the same

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Publication number Publication date
CN113424189B (zh) 2025-07-18
CN113424189A (zh) 2021-09-21

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