WO2020146955A1 - Procédé de génération de nombres aléatoires dans des contrats intelligents à chaîne de blocs - Google Patents

Procédé de génération de nombres aléatoires dans des contrats intelligents à chaîne de blocs Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2020146955A1
WO2020146955A1 PCT/CA2020/050056 CA2020050056W WO2020146955A1 WO 2020146955 A1 WO2020146955 A1 WO 2020146955A1 CA 2020050056 W CA2020050056 W CA 2020050056W WO 2020146955 A1 WO2020146955 A1 WO 2020146955A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
user
random
random number
block
seed
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Ceased
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PCT/CA2020/050056
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English (en)
Inventor
Francois Dumas
Yuming QIAN
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Zeu Crypto Networks Inc
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Zeu Crypto Networks Inc
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Zeu Crypto Networks Inc filed Critical Zeu Crypto Networks Inc
Priority to EP20741818.7A priority Critical patent/EP3912023A4/fr
Priority to KR1020217025655A priority patent/KR20210135495A/ko
Priority to CN202080014780.9A priority patent/CN113853578A/zh
Priority to JP2021541494A priority patent/JP2022523643A/ja
Priority to CA3126956A priority patent/CA3126956A1/fr
Priority to US17/423,662 priority patent/US20220123947A1/en
Publication of WO2020146955A1 publication Critical patent/WO2020146955A1/fr
Priority to JP2022509682A priority patent/JP2022544321A/ja
Priority to CA3151244A priority patent/CA3151244A1/fr
Priority to CN202080070758.6A priority patent/CN115244526A/zh
Priority to PCT/CA2020/051124 priority patent/WO2021030906A1/fr
Priority to US17/635,547 priority patent/US20220337436A1/en
Priority to KR1020227008187A priority patent/KR20220045025A/ko
Priority to EP20855129.1A priority patent/EP4014129A4/fr
Priority to IL284876A priority patent/IL284876A/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Priority to IL290644A priority patent/IL290644A/en
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F7/00—Methods or arrangements for processing data by operating upon the order or content of the data handled
    • G06F7/58—Random or pseudo-random number generators
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F16/00—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor
    • G06F16/90—Details of database functions independent of the retrieved data types
    • G06F16/901—Indexing; Data structures therefor; Storage structures
    • G06F16/9024—Graphs; Linked lists
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/065—Encryption by serially and continuously modifying data stream elements, e.g. stream cipher systems, RC4, SEAL or A5/3
    • H04L9/0656—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher
    • H04L9/0662—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher with particular pseudorandom sequence generator
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees

Definitions

  • the present application relates generally to a blockchain system, and in particular to a method for generating random numbers in blockchain smart contracts.
  • Random numbers play an important role in privacy technology and cryptography. The importance of random numbers is not only reflected in the establishment of secure communication channels, but also in the confirmation of communications. If multiple people attempt to communicate with each other through a channel of limited bandwidth, a random number can be utilized to determine the reasonable order in which the channel carries the messages.
  • a blockchain is a successful use case in which multiple parties try to reach consensus on a certain update of a global perspective. Updates are usually completed in one round, that is, within a periodic discrete time interval.
  • some physical characteristics can be used to generate random numbers, such as electronic thermal motion, or a user's arbitrary mouse movements.
  • blockchain smart contracts sandbox it is not easy to obtain a unique random number that cannot be anticipated, calculated, or determined. The main reason is that the sandbox application is isolated from the outside, and can only access the data inside the sandbox or in the blockchain, but cannot see data in the physical machine or outside world.
  • the transaction data on the chain has a certain randomness when many users access the blockchain in same period and while it is hard to forecast the human behavior, this is not always the case, especially during low load periods. Also as every user of a blockchain can view the data stored in the blockchain, even data marked as private in a smart contract, is still viewable by external applications.
  • block hash a hash of a block or transaction is used as a random source. Since the hash is deterministic, everyone will get the same result. Once added to the blockchain, a block may remain there forever, so every user can verify the correctness of the generated numbers.
  • a lottery service using this method Players first purchase tickets by placing their number before a certain time, for example, 7:00 PM every night. After 7:00 PM, the ticket-purchasing phase is closed and the agreement moves to the next stage, which is to determine the winning ticket number. This ticket is calculated based on the hash of the first block accessible to everyone on the Bitcoin blockchain after 8:00 PM. We can see that at 7:00 PM, no one can predict the hash of the block at 8:00 PM, which makes the service look reasonable.
  • this hash could be manipulated by the miners of the guardian blockchain.
  • the miner has little incentive to tamper with the block, but as long as the amount is greater than the block reward plus the transaction fee, the miner may begin to influence the block hash to generate the number they want. Therefore, this method is not secure for applications based on high-interval randomness. This approach is also inappropriate for scenarios that require instant generation of random numbers to decide whether to end the game.
  • Oraclize is a data provider that provides data for smart contracts and blockchain applications. Many real-world situations require data to be obtained from outside the blockchain, but the nature of smart contracts does not help solve this problem. Oraclize can help achieve this goal. As an intermediary, Oraclize collects data from external sources (such as Wolfram Alpha, IPFS, etc.) and then passes the data to the required application. Regarding random numbers, Oraclize extracts data from random.org into the blockchain. At the heart of the solution is a centralized data service. It believes that through the so-called authenticity proof, everyone can verify that the extracted numbers are real and have not been tampered with.
  • the present invention provides a method for generating fair and effective random numbers for smart contracts, which can effectively avoid the problems of the aforementioned methods while achieving verifiable and non-tamperable random number generation.
  • a method for generating random numbers for a smart contract on a blockchain among a plurality of users is provided.
  • the method includes: having each user generate a random seed locally; having each user generate a signature by signing the random seed with a private key having a corresponding public key; having each user submit the signature to the smart contract separately; verifying, using the smart contract, the signature of each user, with the corresponding public key of each user; storing the signature to a current block of the blockchain via the smart contract; having each user wait at least a predefined period and then submit the random seed generated by each user; verifying via the smart contract, each the random seed submitted by each user, by ensuring a match with the corresponding signature; and after all the random seeds from each user are received, calculating via the smart contract, a random number with a seed obtained from the seeds of each user and a hash of the current block.
  • FIG. 1 is a simplified schematic diagram of a process, exemplary of an embodiment of the present invention, for generating random number by RND contract;
  • FIG. 2 is simplified schematic diagram of a user verifying the random number generated by RNG contract of FIG. 1.
  • the present invention proposes a method for generating fair and effective random numbers for smart contracts, which can effectively avoid the problems of the aforementioned methods while achieving verifiable and non-tamperable random number generation.
  • a description of various embodiments of the present invention is provided below.
  • the use of the word“a” or“an” when used herein in conjunction with the term “comprising” may mean“one”, but it is also consistent with the meaning of“one or more”,“at least one” and“one or more than one.” Any element expressed in the singular form also encompasses its plural form. Any element expressed in the plural form also encompasses its singular form.
  • plural means more than one, for example, two or more, three or more, four or more, and the like.
  • Directional terms such as“top”,“bottom”, “upwards”,“downwards”,“vertically” and“laterally” are used for the purpose of providing relative reference only, and are not intended to suggest any limitations on how any article is to be positioned during use, or to be mounted in an assembly or relative to an environment.
  • A“blockchain” is a tamper-evident, shared digital ledger that records transactions in a public or private peer-to-peer network of computing devices.
  • the ledger is maintained as a growing sequential chain of cryptographic hash-linked blocks.
  • A“node” is a device on a blockchain network.
  • the device is typically be a computer having a processor interconnected to a processor readable medium including memory, having processor readable instructions thereon.
  • the concept behind the exemplary method embodies the principles that“miners are not trustworthy” and the number of miners in the blockchain is limited. With sufficient motivation, miners can reach a consensus to manipulate the block. Therefore, the goal is to create a verifiable fair RNG (random number generator). Under this condition, as long as at least one of the parties to the smart contract is credible and the person does not misuse the confidential information, a trusted blockchain random number can be generated. After the last disclosure of the random number, we can also use the verification signature submitted by the parties to confirm that the random number calculation process is credible.
  • RNG random number generator
  • the whole process may be defined using the following steps: [0032] Each user generates a random seed locally, and signs this random seed with their local private key.
  • the contract verifies the signature submitted with user’s public key, ensuring it is generated by the correct user. Then the contract stores the signatures to the block.
  • Each user waits at least one block period and submits the random seed. This is to make sure the random seed will not appear in same block as its signature.
  • the contract will verify the random seed submitted, ensuring it is matches the signature.
  • the contract calculates the random number with Seed (EiSER A, EiSER B .... EiSER N) and the Block Hash of current block.
  • Seed EiSER A, EiSER B .... EiSER N
  • Block Hash the random number with Seed (EiSER A, EiSER B .... EiSER N)
  • STEP 101 BANKER notifies the smart contract to start a new round of random number generation.
  • STEP 103 USER A generates a local random seed by local software or hardware devices.
  • STEP 104 USER A signs the random seed and Block ID with USER A’s private key.
  • STEP 105 USER A calls the RNG smart contract, and submits the signature to the smart contract.
  • STEP 106 Smart contract verifies the signature with USER A’s public key, and stores the signature to the chain’s block.
  • STEP 107 USER A waits a period of time greater than one block period. This is to ensure the signature storage is at least one block ahead of the random seed.
  • STEP 108 USER A submits the random seed and Block ID it used to generate the signature to the RNG smart contract.
  • STEP 109 Smart contract verifies the random seed, ensuring it matches the signature which was submitted previously.
  • STEP 111 USER N generates a local random seed by local software or hardware devices.
  • STEP 113 USER N call the RNG smart contract, and submits the signature to the smart contract.
  • STEP 114 Smart contract verifies the signature with USER N’s public key, and stores the signature to chain’s block.
  • USER N waits a period of time greater than one block period. This is to ensure the signature storage is at least one block ahead of random seed.
  • STEP 116 USER N submits the random seed and Block ID it used to generate the signature to the RNG smart contract.
  • STEP 117 the smart contract verifies the random seed, ensuring it matches the signature which was submitted previously. To prevent a package replication attack, we also need to verify the block ID, ensuring it is within 5 blocks from the current block.
  • Scenario 1 User verification of the blockchain random number generation process
  • Any user on the blockchain can obtain the random number seed and the signature contributed by each user in the RNG contract through the data on the blockchain. They can obtain the hash value of the last block. By using the formula, RAND(N+1) it can be calculated, and the random number calculated by the smart contract can be compared and verified.
  • FIG. 2 depicts USER A verifying the random number generated by RNG contract.
  • Scenario 2 Preventing miners from jointly tampering with blockchain records [0060] A miner attempting to discard the random number seed block containing a user contribution will be discovered. As the user has submitted the random number seed signature in the previous block, the random number seed re-submitted by the user must be consistent with the last submitted signature to pass the verification. In addition, the random number of each step is calculated and saved in real time. If the final verification result is inconsistent with the calculation result of the random number seed at each step, it means that at least one or more users records may have been discarded or tampered with, and the malfeasance will be discovered in time.
  • Scenario 3 Preventing a USER B from submitting a fake random number seed by replaying USER A 's request
  • Scenario 4 Prevent a user from finding a random number that meets their intentions by accident
  • the last user who contributes a random number seed can theoretically obtain the seed and signature of all other users, and try to find the random number that meets their intentions by accident. After the last user has contributed his own random number, the smart contract will also grab the HASH value of the current block to participate in the random number operation. Since the user does not exit the block when calculating the random number (the user must submit the signature first and then submit the random number seed), the user cannot predict the hash value of the current block, and thus cannot find the desired random number seed by accident
  • the program was validated in accordance with a proposed blockchain betting game. This is an auction bidding game where everyone can bid in a round of games, with the restriction that each round must be greater than the previous round. The game ends after a random N rounds or N hours.
  • This game requires each user's bid to generate a real-time random number to determine whether the game can end.
  • the random number of the lottery must be generated after all the user bets are completed or calculated using the block information following the current block. In light of this, the random number generated in advance may transpire without randomness. Therefore, in this game it will be difficult to generate random numbers that meet the requirements of the game.
  • This method can effectively generate random numbers that meet the requirements of the game rules. As the game starts, the initiator contributes a random number seed.
  • Each round of players bids according to the following rules: first, obtain the local random number seed, and then employ the user's private key to place the signature together with the current round of bidding.
  • the client needs to call the contract twice, once to report the current round of bidding and signature. Then, after a delay of one block, the contract is again called to report the random number seed.
  • contract verification is performed to ensure that the seed is generated by the user and paired with the offer.
  • step 2 If the game-ending condition is not met, the game proceeds to step 2 for the next round of offers.
  • This Random Number Generator is ideal for use in secure bank transactions as it can help prevent 51% attacks.
  • a corrupt miner attempts to reverse transactions to realize a benefit, for example, the ability to spend the same cryptocurrency twice or to cast doubt on the integrity of the blockchain.
  • the contract calculates the random number with Seed (USER A, USER B...USER N) and the block hash of the current block. It is not possible to manipulate the block content any longer as the random number seeds have already been generated nor is it possible to ask each participant to send the random number seed again. The seed is revealed after the transaction is completed thereby verifying that the transaction is correct. Attempts to modify the content will result in the failure of the transaction.
  • a standard defence against a 51% attack is to wait N blocks to release the object of the transaction. This RNG requires a waiting period of at least one block but no more than six blocks, thereby ensuring the integrity of the transaction. Blocks that do not demonstrate the requisite random number seed consistency will not pass verification causing the transaction to fail. Transactions that do not occur within the required time frame also fail. Block tampering can be assumed when the final verification result is inconsistent with the calculation result of the random number seed at each step. As blockchain democracy dictates that the longest blockchain is the correct blockchain, a malevolent actor would require unequalled hashing power to stay ahead of the legitimate blockchain.

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Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé de génération de nombres aléatoires équitables et efficaces pour des contrats intelligents, qui atténue efficacement certains problèmes associés aux procédés classiques tout en obtenant une génération de nombres aléatoires vérifiables et inviolables. Le concept associé au procédé décrit traite les mineurs comme n'étant pas dignes de confiance, et suppose que le nombre de mineurs dans la chaîne de blocs est limité. Avec une motivation suffisante, les mineurs peuvent atteindre un consensus pour manipuler le bloc. L'objectif est ainsi de créer un générateur de nombres aléatoires équitables vérifiables. Dans cette condition, tant qu'au moins l'une des parties au contrat intelligent est fiable et n'utilise pas à mauvais escient les informations confidentielles, un nombre aléatoire de chaîne de blocs de confiance peut être généré. Après la dernière description du nombre aléatoire, la signature de vérification soumise par des parties au contrat peut être utilisée pour confirmer que le processus de calcul de nombre aléatoire est fiable.
PCT/CA2020/050056 2019-01-18 2020-01-20 Procédé de génération de nombres aléatoires dans des contrats intelligents à chaîne de blocs Ceased WO2020146955A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (15)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP20741818.7A EP3912023A4 (fr) 2019-01-18 2020-01-20 Procédé de génération de nombres aléatoires dans des contrats intelligents à chaîne de blocs
KR1020217025655A KR20210135495A (ko) 2019-01-18 2020-01-20 블록체인 스마트 컨트랙트들에서 난수들을 발생하기 위한 방법
CN202080014780.9A CN113853578A (zh) 2019-01-18 2020-01-20 用于在区块链智能合约中生成随机数的方法
JP2021541494A JP2022523643A (ja) 2019-01-18 2020-01-20 ブロックチェーンスマートコントラクトにおいて乱数を生成する方法
CA3126956A CA3126956A1 (fr) 2019-01-18 2020-01-20 Procede de generation de nombres aleatoires dans des contrats intelligents a chaine de blocs
US17/423,662 US20220123947A1 (en) 2019-01-18 2020-01-20 A Method for Generating Random Numbers in Blockchain Smart Contracts
EP20855129.1A EP4014129A4 (fr) 2019-08-16 2020-08-17 Procédé et système pour un protocole de communication transactionnelle décentralisé
JP2022509682A JP2022544321A (ja) 2019-08-16 2020-08-17 非中央集権型トランザクション通信プロトコルのための方法およびシステム
CA3151244A CA3151244A1 (fr) 2019-08-16 2020-08-17 Procede et systeme pour un protocole de communication transactionnelle decentralise
CN202080070758.6A CN115244526A (zh) 2019-08-16 2020-08-17 用于去中心化事务通信协议的方法和系统
PCT/CA2020/051124 WO2021030906A1 (fr) 2019-08-16 2020-08-17 Procédé et système pour un protocole de communication transactionnelle décentralisé
US17/635,547 US20220337436A1 (en) 2019-08-16 2020-08-17 Method and System for a Decentralized Transactional Communication Protocol
KR1020227008187A KR20220045025A (ko) 2019-08-16 2020-08-17 탈중앙화된 트랜잭션의 통신 프로토콜을 위한 방법 및 시스템
IL284876A IL284876A (en) 2019-01-18 2021-07-15 A method for generating random numbers in smart contracts on the blockchain
IL290644A IL290644A (en) 2019-08-16 2022-02-15 Method and system for a distributed business communication protocol

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US201962794336P 2019-01-18 2019-01-18
US62/794,336 2019-01-18

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2020146955A1 true WO2020146955A1 (fr) 2020-07-23

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PCT/CA2020/050056 Ceased WO2020146955A1 (fr) 2019-01-18 2020-01-20 Procédé de génération de nombres aléatoires dans des contrats intelligents à chaîne de blocs

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EP (1) EP3912023A4 (fr)
JP (1) JP2022523643A (fr)
KR (1) KR20210135495A (fr)
CN (1) CN113853578A (fr)
CA (1) CA3126956A1 (fr)
IL (1) IL284876A (fr)
WO (1) WO2020146955A1 (fr)

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CN112118107A (zh) * 2020-08-12 2020-12-22 北京大学 一种实现数据可信的自适应执行方法
CN112527244A (zh) * 2020-12-18 2021-03-19 上海万向区块链股份公司 基于可验证延迟函数的分布式抽签系统和方法
CN112702323A (zh) * 2020-12-14 2021-04-23 杭州溪塔科技有限公司 一种区块链软件的许可签发验证方法、装置和电子设备
CN112910643A (zh) * 2021-03-03 2021-06-04 中国人民银行数字货币研究所 一种区块链中随机数的生成方法及装置
CN113935737A (zh) * 2021-12-15 2022-01-14 支付宝(杭州)信息技术有限公司 基于区块链的随机数生成方法及装置
GB2597955A (en) * 2020-08-11 2022-02-16 Nchain Holdings Ltd Pseudo-ramdom selection on the blockchain
CN114205087A (zh) * 2021-08-30 2022-03-18 深圳时空云科技有限公司 一种基于区块链随机数产生的方法
CN114338051A (zh) * 2022-03-15 2022-04-12 北京百度网讯科技有限公司 区块链获取随机数的方法、装置、设备和介质
CN114362968A (zh) * 2022-03-15 2022-04-15 北京百度网讯科技有限公司 区块链获取随机数的方法、装置、设备和介质
WO2022241571A1 (fr) * 2021-05-21 2022-11-24 Zeu Technologies, Inc. Système et procédé pour le gardiennage sécurisé de données privées utilisant une chaîne de blocs
US20220410017A1 (en) * 2019-11-27 2022-12-29 Nchain Licensing Ag Provably fair games using a blockchain
KR20230025968A (ko) * 2021-08-17 2023-02-24 한일석 난수 생성 방법
WO2024065217A1 (fr) * 2022-09-27 2024-04-04 Wormholes Lab Pte. Ltd. Génération de nombres aléatoires dans un système de chaîne de blocs
CN119512504A (zh) * 2024-11-20 2025-02-25 深圳前海微众银行股份有限公司 一种随机数生成方法、装置及电子设备
US12603760B2 (en) 2021-03-03 2026-04-14 Digital Currency Institute, The People's Bank Of China Method and apparatus for generating random number in blockchain

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CN114362968A (zh) * 2022-03-15 2022-04-15 北京百度网讯科技有限公司 区块链获取随机数的方法、装置、设备和介质
CN114338051A (zh) * 2022-03-15 2022-04-12 北京百度网讯科技有限公司 区块链获取随机数的方法、装置、设备和介质
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