EP1321901B1 - Méthode pour contrôler les droits d'accès à un objet - Google Patents
Méthode pour contrôler les droits d'accès à un objet Download PDFInfo
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- EP1321901B1 EP1321901B1 EP02406101A EP02406101A EP1321901B1 EP 1321901 B1 EP1321901 B1 EP 1321901B1 EP 02406101 A EP02406101 A EP 02406101A EP 02406101 A EP02406101 A EP 02406101A EP 1321901 B1 EP1321901 B1 EP 1321901B1
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- stationary
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- mobile
- key
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Images
Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00571—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by interacting with a central unit
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00896—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys specially adapted for particular uses
- G07C9/00904—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys specially adapted for particular uses for hotels, motels, office buildings or the like
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
- G07C9/21—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass having a variable access code
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
- G07C9/215—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass the system having a variable access-code, e.g. varied as a function of time
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
- G07C9/27—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass with central registration
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00182—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
- G07C2009/00238—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks the transmittted data signal containing a code which is changed
- G07C2009/00253—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks the transmittted data signal containing a code which is changed dynamically, e.g. variable code - rolling code
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C2009/00634—Power supply for the lock
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method for controlling the access regime to an object, a locking system, a mobile unit, a stationary unit, a computer program and a computer program product according to the independent claims.
- Such locking systems are certainly the best choice if many participants with centrally accessible access have access to an object that is protected by relatively few locks. This is the case, for example, in a company building, where some doors are used by many employees.
- Variable assignments of access authorizations also increasingly relate to different systems. So there are applications where a few key owners should have access to different objects that belong to different systems. For example, a supplier might have access to warehouses of various companies, and of course each company has its own locking system.
- Base stations of a, for example, contactless system act as a locking cylinder.
- the base stations are updated via a communication medium, for example the Internet.
- the mobile units can then be initialized via a base station.
- this approach requires that the locks are networked and, depending on the design as a fixed station, are also technically complex in design and large.
- the U.S. Patent 6,317,025 shows a security system for load transports with programmable locks and mobile electronic keys, wherein the authorization to access the transported load is assigned by a central shipping unit.
- the European patent application EP 1 024 239 shows an electronic access control system in which data between the Locks are not transmitted through fixed data lines but through the keys.
- the international Publication WO 93/21712 shows an electronic security system for payphones and other coin-operated machines.
- the problem arises that different people are responsible for collecting the accumulated money.
- key management is time-consuming. Therefore, according to the cited patent publication, a portable key is connected to the key Housing is presented, which is assigned via the public telephone network and a modem connection, a list of ID codes; If one of the ID codes corresponds to an ID code of a lock cylinder, a release takes place.
- the transmission of the ID codes can be encrypted.
- the memory in the key can be assigned a time window during which the key is authorized to operate the lock cylinder.
- the key can be powered by the portable housing and also power the lock cylinders.
- This system solves the problem of expensive key management. However, it is relatively cumbersome and primarily suitable only for telephone booths, but it requires the immediate presence of a public telephone line. In addition, the system is very susceptible to manipulation, and therefore not suitable for applications requiring higher security. A person who wants to manipulate the key only has to prevent once stored ID codes from being deleted again and then assigning the key a current time slot.
- the invention selects a fundamentally different approach compared to the prior art.
- the mobile units (“keys") are variably programmable and equipped with means of communication as well as with storage means. In them, the information, which decides on valid, missing or wrong authorization, can be stored and reprogrammed.
- the mobile units are the active, communication-capable components and have, for example, even energy supply means.
- the mobile units can be sent a certificate from a central office. This includes, for example, a code which is to be passed to the fixed unit and is verified by this on the basis of stored information.
- the fixed units (“lock cylinders"), however, are relieved of the task of managing the information about access authorizations, etc.
- the handover of a code, which decides on the access authorization, from the mobile unit to the stationary unit takes place offline. That it is not necessary for the fixed or mobile unit to be in communication with a control center during verification.
- the invention thus includes security elements in three components involved: the central office, which manages the access authorizations, the key, which is provided with characteristic information and the lock cylinder, in which information is stored, on the basis of which consistency is checked. All these three security elements are relevant. For example, you can not proceed without the current authorization of the central office. You can not transfer a once transmitted certificate by manipulating another key and obtain access with this. Finally, one can not use a certificate in any way to obtain access to a locking cylinder other than the intended one. There must be coherence - not just of volatile codes, but of the physical elements - of all three components.
- the invention combines maximum flexibility of systems with purely electronic keys - such as that of the international Publication WO 93/21712 - with a high security against manipulation attempts. Due to the requirement that release can only take place if the correct key is physically present, the invention also has, in particular, a security element of traditional mechanical locking systems. In contrast to these, however, the security element can not be circumvented by mechanical copying.
- the offline regulation of the release has massive advantages.
- a supply of the stationary unit with current data is not mandatory.
- the whole system can easily be extended by additional units.
- the stationary units also need not be connectable online to a central unit. Nevertheless, a dynamic management of the access authorizations adapted to the circumstances can be carried out. This is an advantage in view of the application examples mentioned at the outset, where access to possibly very many objects with possibly difficult accessibility has to be regulated.
- the condition that the verification is key-specific is an important prerequisite for ensuring the security of the system.
- the information present on one key can be copied to another data carrier and this information can then be manipulated, for example in order to overcome the "time window" condition.
- a manipulator must have had access to a key at least once, in order to be able to carry out manipulations much later and undetected. This is not possible with an inventive approach. If the information on one key is copied to another, such as a stolen other key, it will be worthless.
- the key-specific verification also allows unambiguous locking cylinder-side logging of access.
- the keys are the active units of the system according to the invention
- the security is not based solely on a code transmitted to the key which must be correct and then authorized by virtue of its consistency, as known in the art.
- the lock cylinder must determine on the basis of data characteristic of the key and on the basis of a certificate whether authorization exists.
- the security elements are either programmed unilaterally in the lock cylinder or unilaterally in the key
- the concept of 'networked' or 'entangled' security applies here: there must be consistency between the key - as physically existing entity - certificate and Lock cylinder present: only then can be released.
- the inventive method and the corresponding system bring advantages in terms of variability.
- the system as a whole can be continuously adapted to the circumstances without any restructuring.
- Access authorizations can also be assigned to mobile units that were not part of the system before. This immediately gives another advantage: scalability.
- the system allows the management of very few or very many fixed and mobile units without having to change the system architecture.
- the system also allows the transmission and management of very simple access certificates as well as of complex, hierarchical certificates.
- the fixed units can be made very simple and always the same and programmed on the basis of always the same algorithms.
- the system is inherently dynamic. Although, or just because the certification, ie the transfer of the certificate to the fixed unit, takes place offline, access permissions can be re-issued or revoked at any time.
- Fixed units of the inventive system can be designed so that they are easily installed in existing doors or cabinets, which were previously provided with standard lock cylinders. This represents a major and decisive advantage compared to existing methods and systems that attempt to introduce a variable, dynamic control of the access regime.
- the invention thus offers a solution that is very simple in terms of implementation and handling for its task.
- the stationary units do not have to be updateable to current access authorization information and therefore not networked at all.
- the mobile units are additionally equipped with energy supply means, for example a battery.
- the power supply of the stationary units during the access control can then be done by the keys.
- the mobile units do not even have to be connected to the power grid. Even a maintenance of the stationary units, for example, a replacement of batteries, etc. is hardly necessary.
- the certificates to be transmitted by a central unit can be designed differently. In a simple version of the invention, they consist only of the code which the stationary unit must recognize, as well as, for example, a time slot or an access quota. A time window defines a certain time during which access is possible. An access contingent determines a certain number of entrances, which are granted (for example, a single access is granted). The code is bswp. Encrypted pass to the fixed unit, with key-specific data (ID) are used as the 'Seed Number' for decryption.
- ID key-specific data
- the certificate may contain additional information.
- An example of such data is an authorization hierarchy for more complex systems, which, unlike conventional systems, is not implemented by the key mechanics.
- an access authorization may also be automatically associated with assigned objects of a lower hierarchy level.
- the certificate may also include an object identification and a key identification.
- An object identification can be embodied as unchangeable and unique object identification character, which can be uniquely assigned to the object or the stationary unit. It is, for example, set so that it can not even be changed by a central unit.
- the object identification symbol can serve to prevent manipulations of the locking cylinders which, for example, can not be monitored by a central unit.
- a key identifier serves to identify the keys and to ensure that the certificates are transmitted to the desired mobile unit.
- the key identification must not necessarily be transferred to the lock cylinder.
- no information from the lock cylinder must flow to the key.
- the key After receiving the certificate, the key then transmits an encrypted code associated with the lock cylinder and stored therein together with the key-specific data (ID).
- ID the key-specific data
- the code may also be transmitted instead of a fixed character as a function value f ID (A, t) a substantially irreversible function of time and a functional parameter A may be present, wherein A characterizes the lock cylinder.
- the key is only for ID (A, t) transmitted, he has no way of determining from A.
- the verification ID f (A, t) calculated at a consistency release takes place.
- the key-specific data (ID) - they are used here as a kind of 'seed number' for the data encryption - may have been determined by the central unit when the key was issued, but they are by no means changeable.
- the regulation of the access regime is carried out in a two-stage authorization process.
- the key gets a certificate from the central entity that authorizes it to access an object or group of objects.
- the certificate can additionally regulate that the key is assigned only a limited access window or access quota. If the key has contact with a lock cylinder, in a first stage, a lock-identifying character is transmitted from the lock cylinder to the key. This then checks on the basis of the existing certificates in it - he can have received more than one certificate and save - if he is entitled to access the object with this lock cylinder. If this is not the case, the key remains passive and transmits, for example, no further information to the lock cylinder. If a certificate of the key affirms an authorization, the key transmits the code to the locking cylinder as the second stage of the procedure, whereupon the latter releases the access in case of consistency.
- the system according to FIG. 1 has several components: the central unit 1 is the control instance. It may, for example, be identical to a control center of a surveillance company applying the system according to the invention, a distribution company, etc. It may be operated by persons or implemented as software. It has means of communication with the mobile units 2 (hereinafter: key).
- the mobile units each have an energy source or energy storage as well as data processing and data storage means. In addition, they are equipped with communication means for transmitting data to the fixed units 3 (locking cylinders).
- the term 'stationary' means Incidentally, in the context of this application, the units are substantially stationary in operation in relation to an object to be secured. The term does not exclude that the lock cylinders are attached to a mobile object (vehicle, ship, etc.) nor that they can be transported from one object to another for assembly.
- the object in which the stationary units are integrated is symbolized by a box 4 in the drawing.
- the stationary units 3 can, for example, be designed externally like conventional locking cylinders and take their place. They have storage means as well as a data processing and transmission unit for communication with the keys.
- both the integration of energy sources or storage and the writability of the memory is optional and only depending on the design of the system available.
- Each key 2 has, for example, an identification character K.
- This identification character K can also be used as a key-specific data record (ID) in the manner described at the beginning; but he can also be different from this.
- ID key-specific data record
- this key is transmitted from the key.
- At the headquarters it is determined or determined whether the owner of the key has or should be authorized to access the object. If access is to take place, then a certificate Z with the authorization code A (hereinafter referred to as code for short) is subsequently transmitted to the key.
- the code A in the certificate is always contained in a fixed packet together with the key identifier K. (Then this is preferably not identical to the key-specific data record (ID)). This ensures that the code A can authorize access only if the key identification is consistent.
- the code A is transferred to the locking cylinder and verified there. Then, if necessary, a release takes place.
- the code is always transmitted together with an object identifier O.
- This serves as a unique and unchangeable object identifier and is passed to the lock cylinder together with the code A for verification. It is hardware implemented in the object so that it can not be changed by reprogramming.
- FIG. 2 is schematic in addition to the components of FIG. 1 a mobile transmission device 5 drawn.
- This has a modem or other communication means for communication over a data network, such as the Internet. It may, for example, be designed as a battery-operated, portable device or be installed in a vehicle or the like. It can exchange information contactlessly with the key via a radio-frequency connection. Alternatively, there may also be direct (cable etc.) connection between the key 2 and the transmission device 5.
- the transmission device can also be integrated in the key 2.
- FIG. 2 It is also shown how the aforementioned object identifier O is handled, and of course the transmitter can not be used only in systems that use the object identifier.
- FIG. 3 is yet another example of a key 2 shown schematically.
- the key has a key blade 2.1, which can be worked out as in conventional keys and, for example, has the mechanical coding of a passkey. It can also be configured differently, and, for example, have no mechanical coding at all. Depending on the configuration of the lock cylinder, the locking system could also operate without contact and the key thus have no key blade.
- the key has a printed circuit board 2.2, on which processor means 2.3 and traces 2.4 and possibly additional electronic components are attached.
- the key power supply means 2.5 that is arranged a battery.
- the battery, circuit board and the tracks are arranged so that the battery can supply the processor means with electrical energy.
- the key still has a contact path 2.6 for communication, with a lock cylinder and / or its power supply. Furthermore, communication means 2.7 are still available with which data can be exchanged contactlessly with a transmission device or cylinder.
- FIG. 4 a scheme is shown, which represents some elements of a system according to the invention and their interaction. Shown in the figure are a central unit 1, a transmission device 5, a key 2 and a lock cylinder 3.
- the data transmission device, the key and the lock cylinder each have a processor unit 5.3, 2.3 respectively. 3.3. and a data storage and encryption unit 5.9, 2.9 resp. 3.3.
- the processor unit and / or the data storage and encryption unit can, for example, be manufactured in a manner known per se. For example, you may want to include a LEGIC® security module, which is mentioned here as an example only.
- To this data storage and encryption unit 5.9, 2.9 resp. 3.3 are connected means 5.7, 2.7 resp. 3.7 for contactless communication.
- the key has power supply 2.5 as already described.
- the power supply means supply the microprocessor unit 2.3 and a timer 2.8 connected thereto.
- the transmission of data from the central unit to the transmission device takes place, for example, with known and common data transmission lines, interface protocols, etc. with the aid of the Internet.
- the data transmission is preferably encrypted.
- the channel for transferring data between the software 1.1 of the central unit 1 and the Transmission device 5 is symbolized in the figure by a double arrow 11.
- the microprocessor interface 12 is used to synchronize the microprocessors 5.3, 2.3 of the transmission device and the key.
- Time is an important parameter in the regulation of the access regime, for example if only one time slot is available for access. It can also be significant in terms of data and tamper resistance, as will be explained by way of examples.
- the program interface 13 is used to exchange the mentioned data.
- the program interface and the microprocessor interface need not physically use different data transmission channels.
- the data interface 14 serves to transfer data from the key to the lock cylinder and possibly also in the reverse direction from the lock cylinder to the key.
- About the power interface 15 of the lock cylinder is supplied with the required during the transfer of the certificate to the lock cylinder and during verification electrical energy. This can be done continuously or at the beginning of the action in a short-term energy storage of the lock cylinder.
- FIG. 5 shows a central unit 1, some keys 2 and some objects 4 with lock cylinders 3.
- the central unit 1 has information enabling it to control the whole system.
- two databases 1.1 and 1.2 are shown symbolically.
- the first database contains continuously updated information about the objects, the second database 1.2 about the keys.
- Each key and each lock cylinder can be identified by means of a corresponding identification character K i or P i .
- the data about the objects may have a data structure which reflects relationships of the objects with each other.
- a very simple example is shown in the figure:
- the objects with the identification P 3 , P 4 and P 9 are, for example, parts of a higher-level structure.
- the object P 9 is arranged in a simple model an inner circle (parent), the objects P 3 and P 4 in an outer circle (subordinate).
- the object P 9 may be a vault standing in a space to be reached by doors P 3 and P 4 .
- An access to the object in the inner circle requires an access authorization to an object in the outer circle, but not vice versa. This hierarchical relationship is reflected in the data in the central unit.
- a security service employee may only have access to subordinate objects, but in many different structures, a branch manager has access to all the objects in a single entity.
- the object database 1.1 contains hierarchy archetypes B ;.
- the hierarchy archetypes can, for example, directly contain the code A of the hierarchically subordinate objects.
- Hierarchies corresponding to the hierarchy archetypes are transferred to the certificates.
- the key database 1.2 contains certificate archetypes C i .
- a security guard always gains access to the same items, but only once a night.
- the certificates Z are produced on the basis of the archetypes and possibly current data. For example, the certificate archetypes contain references to hierarchy archetypes rather than the entire contents of the certificate archetypes.
- individual elements of the archetypes may even be created in the key itself. However, they must be activated in any case by a certificate transmitted by the central unit.
- Steps a, cf, i and j for example.
- the certificate does not contain the actual code A but a value f ID (A, t 0) where t 0 is a time point to the right the key holder access is.
- the processor means of the closing cylinder are supplied by a timer 2.8 in the key with the current time t. The adjustment then takes place between f ID (A, t 0 ) and f ID (A, t).
- condition to be fulfilled for a release may be that the difference of the values f ID (A, t 0 ) and f ID (A, t) does not exceed a certain threshold value, wherein the function f must then be continuous and normalizable.
- Example 2 but instead of a value f ID (A, t 0 ), a value f ID (A, n) is transmitted, where n represents the number of entries of the key holder so far.
- f ID A, n
- the certificate is transmitted from the central unit without a previous request signal. This may be useful, for example, if the key holder belongs to a security service or a supplier and an order is issued at the same time as the authorization from the central unit.
- the owner of the key goes to the object to which he wants access.
- a first step he puts the key in the lock cylinder of this object.
- the key will not have a certificate that entitles it to access the object, and there will be no release.
- the lock cylinder transfers an indication characterizing it - for example an object identification sign O - to the key.
- This transmits the characterizing information to the control center, for which, if necessary, a communication module such as the mobile transmission device 5 is used.
- a decision is made as to whether the key holder should be entitled to one-time access at this time. This can be done in an unmanned center based on table values or other characteristics.
- control center can - possibly automatically - call the suspected owner of the key, for example on his mobile phone, and verify his identity and intentions.
- An unmanned center can verify the identity by interrogating a certain statement - for example, an agreed code word - and comparing the voice of the called party with stored voice recordings.
- the central office then sends a certificate to the key and it proceeds as in one of the examples explained above.
- the access or attempt to access the object can be logged in any of the examples during the release / non-release or after this. This follows, for example, in a memory in the key.
- the key can transmit the log to the central unit where it is stored and / or evaluated in a database.
- Logs of successful access / access attempts can, of course, be used when creating new certificates.
- an access / access attempt can also be logged in non-volatile data memories of the stationary units.
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- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
- Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
- Two-Way Televisions, Distribution Of Moving Picture Or The Like (AREA)
Claims (22)
- Procédé de régulation du régime d'accès à un objet ou à un groupe d'objets, dans lequel une unité mobile (2) entre en contact avec une unité fixe (3), cette dernière libérant l'objet en fonction d'une vérification ou déclenchant un événement de non-libération, une unité centrale transmettant à l'unité mobile un certificat avant le contact entre l'unité fixe et l'unité mobile et la vérification s'effectuant hors ligne sur base des données que contient le certificat,
caractérisé en ce que
l'unité mobile présente un code d'identification (ID) conservé en mémoire permanente et spécifique à chaque unité mobile et
en ce qu'un code qui autorise la libération de l'objet ou du groupe d'objets est déterminé sur base de ce code d'identification spécifique et du certificat. - Procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce que le code d'identification spécifique (ID) sert de "nombre-germe" dans le cryptage de données que contient le certificat.
- Procédé selon les revendications 1 ou 2, caractérisé en ce que le certificat contient un code qui est transmis par l'unité mobile (2) à l'unité fixe (3) et en ce que la vérification est une vérification que le code correspond à des données qui sont déterminées sur base de données conservées en permanence dans des moyens de mémoire de l'unité fixe (3).
- Procédé selon la revendication 3, caractérisé en ce qu'aucun flux direct d'informations n'a lieu entre l'unité centrale et l'unité fixe.
- Procédé selon l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que la libération ou la non-libération peuvent être rendues dépendantes d'une fenêtre temporelle ou d'un contingent d'accès que contient le certificat.
- Procédé selon l'une des revendications dépendantes, caractérisé en ce que le code qui autorise la libération de l'objet ou du groupe d'objets dépend du temps et/ou d'une information de statut.
- Procédé selon la revendication 6, caractérisé en ce que le certificat contient un paramètre fonctionnel, en ce que le code est calculé comme fonction essentiellement non inversible du temps et de ce paramètre fonctionnel et en ce que le code est vérifié par des moyens à processeur prévus dans l'unité fixe par évaluation d'une fonction également essentiellement non inversible du temps.
- Procédé selon l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce qu'aucune information utilisée par le certificat n'est transmise des unités fixes (3) aux unités mobiles.
- Procédé selon l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que la transmission du certificat à l'unité mobile s'effectue en ligne.
- Procédé selon l'une des revendications 1 à 8, caractérisé en ce que le certificat est transmis à un appareil de transmission (5) et est ensuite transmis à l'unité mobile par cet appareil de transmission.
- Procédé selon l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce qu'avant la vérification et/ou pendant la vérification, de l'énergie est transférée de l'unité mobile à l'unité fixe.
- Procédé selon l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que pour l'autorisation, l'unité fixe transmet à l'unité mobile un symbole qui identifie l'objet ou le groupe d'objets et en ce que la vérification sur base du certificat s'effectue par des moyens à processeur de l'unité mobile.
- Système de serrure électronique doté
d'unités fixes (3) et d'unités mobiles (2), les unités mobiles pouvant être codées et les unités fixes possédant des moyens de libération qui libèrent un objet ou un groupe d'objets si une unité mobile leur est reliée et si une vérification consistant en une comparaison de données a ensuite été exécutée, les unités mobiles étant dotées de moyens de communication qui leur permettent de communiquer avec une unité centrale (1), et
de moyens de mémoire qui conservent en mémoire un certificat transmis par l'unité centrale, des moyens étant prévus dans les unités mobiles et dans les unités fixes pour exécuter hors ligne la vérification qui consiste en une comparaison de données que contient le certificat et de données que contiennent les moyens de mémoire des unités fixes,
caractérisé en ce que
chaque unité mobile présente un code d'identification (ID) conservé en mémoire permanente et spécifique à chaque unité mobile et
en ce qu'un code qui autorise la libération de l'objet ou du groupe d'objets peut être déterminé sur base de ce code d'identification spécifique et du certificat. - Système de serrure selon la revendication 13, caractérisé en ce que les unités mobiles contiennent des moyens (2.5) d'alimentation en énergie et en ce qu'une interface de puissance (15) est prévue pour transmettre de l'énergie aux unités fixes pendant que les unités fixes et les unités mobiles sont en liaison, de telle sorte que les unités fixes (3) puissent être alimentées en énergie électrique par les unités mobiles (2) en vue de la vérification.
- Système de serrure selon les revendications 13 ou 14, caractérisé en ce que les unités fixes ne présentent pas de conduit de communication installé fixement ni de moyen d'alimentation en énergie.
- Unité mobile (2) en vue de la mise en oeuvre du procédé selon l'une des revendications 1 à 12 en tant que partie d'un système selon l'une des revendications 13 à 15 et présentant des moyens de communication et à processeur qui échangent des informations avec une unité centrale, des moyens de mémoire qui conservent en mémoire des certificats reçus de l'unité centrale, une interface (14, 15) d'échange hors ligne d'informations avec une unité fixe (3) et un code d'identification (ID) conservé en mémoire permanente et spécifique à chaque unité mobile,
caractérisée en ce que
l'unité mobile présente des moyens de code de programme qui lui permettent d'exécuter avec l'unité fixe un procédé selon l'une des revendications 1 à 12. - Unité mobile selon la revendication 16, caractérisée par des moyens (2.5) d'alimentation en énergie ainsi que par une interface de puissance (15) qui lui permet de transférer de l'énergie à une unité fixe.
- Unité fixe (3) en vue de la mise en oeuvre du procédé selon l'une des revendications 1 à 12 en tant que partie d'un système selon l'une des revendications 13 à 15, présentant des moyens de mémoire permettant la mise en mémoire permanente d'informations caractéristiques de l'unité fixe, une interface (14) permettant l'échange hors ligne d'informations avec une unité mobile (2) qui communique avec elle et des moyens d'actionnement d'un mécanisme de libération en fonction d'une vérification d'informations échangées par l'interface et conservées en mémoire dans les moyens de mémoire,
caractérisée en ce que
l'unité fixe présente des moyens de code de programme qui lui permettent d'exécuter avec l'unité mobile un procédé selon l'une des revendications 1 à 12. - Unité fixe selon la revendication 18, caractérisée par une interface de puissance (15) qui lui permet de recevoir de l'énergie électrique d'une unité mobile en vue de l'exécution de la vérification.
- Unité fixe selon la revendication 19, caractérisée en ce que les moyens d'actionnement d'un mécanisme de libération sont configurés et raccordés de manière à pouvoir être actionnés également par l'énergie électrique reçue de l'unité fixe.
- Programme informatique doté
de moyens de code de programme qui permettent à un ordinateur apte à être relié par des moyens de communication à une unité mobile d'un système selon l'une des revendications 13 à 15 de former une unité centrale dans un procédé selon l'une des revendications 1 à 12 et
de moyens de code de programme qui permettent à l'ordinateur d'établir un certificat en fonction d'un signal de requête émis par une unité mobile (2) et de l'envoyer sous forme cryptée à l'unité mobile. - Produit de programme informatique contenant des moyens de code de programme lisibles par ordinateur et qui permettent à un ordinateur qui peut être relié par l'intermédiaire de moyens de communication à une unité mobile d'un système selon l'une des revendications 13 à 15 de former une unité centrale dans le procédé selon l'une des revendications 1 à 12, les moyens de code de programme lisibles par ordinateur permettant également à l'ordinateur d'établir un certificat en fonction d'un signal de requête émis par une unité mobile et de l'envoyer sous forme cryptée à l'unité mobile.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CH234701 | 2001-12-21 | ||
| CH23472001 | 2001-12-21 |
Publications (3)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| EP1321901A2 EP1321901A2 (fr) | 2003-06-25 |
| EP1321901A3 EP1321901A3 (fr) | 2005-09-07 |
| EP1321901B1 true EP1321901B1 (fr) | 2010-04-07 |
Family
ID=4568704
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP02406101A Expired - Lifetime EP1321901B1 (fr) | 2001-12-21 | 2002-12-16 | Méthode pour contrôler les droits d'accès à un objet |
Country Status (3)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| EP (1) | EP1321901B1 (fr) |
| AT (1) | ATE463810T1 (fr) |
| DE (1) | DE50214332D1 (fr) |
Families Citing this family (14)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE202004021790U1 (de) * | 2004-10-04 | 2011-01-20 | Simonsvoss Technologies Ag | Schließanlagensystem zum Betreiben einer elektronischen Schließanlage |
| AT502458B1 (de) * | 2005-03-03 | 2010-10-15 | Evva Sicherheitssysteme Gmbh | Zutrittskontrollanlage |
| EP2348490B1 (fr) * | 2009-12-22 | 2020-03-04 | 9Solutions Oy | Système de contrôle d'accès |
| EP2821972B1 (fr) | 2013-07-05 | 2020-04-08 | Assa Abloy Ab | Dispositif à clé et procédé associé, programme informatique et produit de programme informatique |
| ES2577882T5 (es) | 2013-07-05 | 2020-03-12 | Assa Abloy Ab | Dispositivo de comunicación de control de acceso, método, programa informático y producto de programa informático |
| DE102016218473A1 (de) * | 2016-09-26 | 2018-03-29 | Aug. Winkhaus Gmbh & Co. Kg | Elektronische Schließanlage und Verfahren zum Betrieb einer elektronischen Schließanlage |
| EP3506216A1 (fr) * | 2017-12-28 | 2019-07-03 | Netatmo | Serrure intelligente à économie d'énergie présentatn une clé électromécanique |
| FR3094389B1 (fr) | 2019-03-29 | 2021-07-09 | Antoine Decayeux | Dispositif d’ouverture et de fermeture de porte avec contrôle d’accès, système intégrant un tel dispositif, et procédé correspondant |
| AT522608A1 (de) * | 2019-05-16 | 2020-12-15 | Evva Sicherheitstechnologie | Verfahren zum Betreiben eines Zutrittskontrollsystems sowie Zutrittskontrollsystem |
| SE546800C2 (en) | 2019-10-03 | 2025-02-18 | Swedlock Ab | Eletromechanical padlock assembly with programmable key and position sensing device, and method |
| NL2024201B1 (en) * | 2019-11-08 | 2021-07-20 | Kibba Ip B V | Space access control module and remote key provisioning system |
| FR3132374B1 (fr) | 2022-02-03 | 2024-02-16 | Cogelec | Procédé de contrôle d’accès à des bâtiments |
| FR3132373B1 (fr) | 2022-02-03 | 2024-01-05 | Cogelec | Procédé de contrôle d’accès à des bâtiments |
| FR3132372B1 (fr) | 2022-02-03 | 2023-12-22 | Cogelec | Procédé de contrôle d’accès à des bâtiments |
Family Cites Families (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US5506905A (en) * | 1994-06-10 | 1996-04-09 | Delco Electronics Corp. | Authentication method for keyless entry system |
| CA2167631A1 (fr) * | 1995-01-20 | 1996-07-21 | W. Dale Hopkins | Methode et appareil d'authentification d'utilisateurs et de dispositifs de securite |
| US6097306A (en) * | 1996-12-03 | 2000-08-01 | E.J. Brooks Company | Programmable lock and security system therefor |
| DE69924349T2 (de) * | 1999-01-28 | 2006-02-09 | International Business Machines Corp. | Elektronisches Zugangskontrollsystem und Verfahren |
-
2002
- 2002-12-16 AT AT02406101T patent/ATE463810T1/de active
- 2002-12-16 EP EP02406101A patent/EP1321901B1/fr not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2002-12-16 DE DE50214332T patent/DE50214332D1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| DE50214332D1 (de) | 2010-05-20 |
| EP1321901A2 (fr) | 2003-06-25 |
| EP1321901A3 (fr) | 2005-09-07 |
| ATE463810T1 (de) | 2010-04-15 |
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