EP1686036A1 - Système de surveillance et de commande d'objets - Google Patents

Système de surveillance et de commande d'objets Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1686036A1
EP1686036A1 EP05001889A EP05001889A EP1686036A1 EP 1686036 A1 EP1686036 A1 EP 1686036A1 EP 05001889 A EP05001889 A EP 05001889A EP 05001889 A EP05001889 A EP 05001889A EP 1686036 A1 EP1686036 A1 EP 1686036A1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
layer
network
cell
data
stw
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP05001889A
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German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Markus Kuhn
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens Schweiz AG
Original Assignee
Siemens Schweiz AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens Schweiz AG filed Critical Siemens Schweiz AG
Priority to EP05001889A priority Critical patent/EP1686036A1/fr
Priority to DE502005006723T priority patent/DE502005006723D1/de
Priority to PCT/EP2005/011827 priority patent/WO2006081849A1/fr
Priority to EP05800660A priority patent/EP1843929B1/fr
Priority to AT05800660T priority patent/ATE423715T1/de
Publication of EP1686036A1 publication Critical patent/EP1686036A1/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a guidance system for the control and / or monitoring of objects operating on a traffic network subdivided into a number of network cells.
  • the invention relates to a guidance system for controlling and / or monitoring rail vehicles running on a railway network divided into regional areas.
  • railway networks are still subject to the national sovereignty of the state on which this railway network is located.
  • Several regionally effective control centers - hereafter referred to more generally as network cells - are provided for the control of train traffic on such a national railway network. These network cells therefore control the train traffic on their respective assigned geographical areas.
  • network cells therefore control the train traffic on their respective assigned geographical areas.
  • a data exchange between the individual network cells is restricted to the exchange of train numbers at the boundaries between two adjacent network cells.
  • the individual systems running on the network cells are proprietary and therefore the respective operating software can differ from network cell to network cell.
  • trains are controlled by means of a cell software executed on a cell computer system, that is to say the control technology programs executed on the computer network of the cell, by setting routes and optimizing and optimizing the train runs. For example, if there is an update to the cell software, changes in the railroad regulations can be made and / or in the configuration data, for example due to changes in the track topology, implemented in the network cell and taken over into the operationally active operation.
  • the present invention is therefore based on the object to provide a control system of the type mentioned that is constructed in terms of its architecture and task distribution so that the parent control and / or monitoring of the circulating on the network objects is possible.
  • control system provides the network-wide control and / or monitoring of the circulating objects as well as the peripheral systems required for determining their traffic route.
  • the separation of the tasks of information processing for the control center and representation in the control center allows a complete encapsulation of this representation process of the configuration and operation of the individual network cells.
  • the architecture therefore also permits the process control operation of each network cell for itself if the data connection to the control center and its workstations should be interrupted.
  • external systems can also exchange data with the control system in that the merging layer can additionally comprise an interface via which data can be output to other surrounding systems in a manner similar to the display layer and / or via the data of further peripheral systems, Similar to data obtained from the display layer, the corresponding further treatment can be obtained.
  • Such external systems may, for example, be passenger and / or customer information systems, which, for example, evaluate train data that differs from the timetable for display by the passenger and / or customer.
  • these can also be external systems acting directly on the productive process, such as maintenance systems, which, for example, cause the control system to temporarily unavailable a traffic route in this way Report maintenance or failure of critical systems.
  • an aggregator is provided in the merging layer, which is configured identically for all operator stations and can be executed on an operator station computer which is part of the central computer system.
  • This approach allows the software to be built uniformly for the aggregator and executed in units with a clear interface and definable but limited interaction.
  • the last-mentioned feature makes it possible to work on different tasks in the control center at different workstations, without having to directly exchange data between the operator stations at the level of the operator stations.
  • the aggregator may include a selection logic with which specifically specifiable data groups and / or data derived from specially specifiable peripheral systems can be selected for their processing at the operator stations.
  • the data group may relate, for example, exclusively to the group of train number data or the data on unoccupied track sections and the like.
  • the specifiable peripheral systems can be any type of components that are relevant in the traffic process for the control and monitoring, such as interlockings, switches, signals, axle counter, track vacancy and so on.
  • a database with global network data can be provided which exchanges this network data with the merging layer and / or the working layer.
  • the operator stations use their association layer to access this global data.
  • the single network cell can access this global data directly from within its working layer.
  • Typical global data is, for example, the entire network topology data and data that clarifies how data from individual network cells are to be interconnected, e.g. Cross track field tables.
  • data connections for cross-communication are also provided from the working layer.
  • QK cross-communication
  • train number data can be exchanged between adjacent network cells when a train changes from one network cell to another network cell.
  • this cross-communication can be advantageous if, for example, a connection to a particular network cell, but to fulfill a higher-level task and data from other network cells are needed.
  • the interface layer can have a Data dispatcher can be provided, which is configurable for the assignment of the data received from the peripheral systems to different cell molecules within a network cell.
  • Figure 1 shows a schematic view of the architecture of a control system, hereinafter referred to as network NW, for a railway network.
  • NW a control system
  • the rail network of the Swiss Federal Railways (SBB) today is divided into approximately 15 isolated control systems.
  • the split is a geographical breakdown in which each system is responsible for a given area.
  • the Communication between these systems in the prior art is limited to the exchange of train numbers at the boundaries between the systems.
  • a network workstation AP1 to AP3 can communicate with a plurality of network cells NWZ each responsible for a geographical area. This results in the following new architectural elements compared to the large number of former independent control systems:
  • the workstation AP1 to Apn summarizes the information from the configuration of the individual network cells NWZ and generates an overall view for the user.
  • the network cells NWZ become for the user a single large system of the network NW.
  • the system is transparent to the user, so that the overall system, which consists of several smaller subsystems, behaves in exactly the same way as a single, large-scale control system across the entire rail network.
  • the network NW therefore gives the user the impression that there is only one network control system for the entire rail network. For a part of the control system functions, this can be realized via the integration of the information on the workstation AP1 to AP3.
  • the network cells exchange information with one another by way of a cross-communication QK. Examples include the control system tasks train number administrator (ZV), train control (ZL) and overfill prevention (UeV).
  • ZV train number administrator
  • ZL train control
  • UeV overfill prevention
  • a classic three-layer architecture is provided.
  • Information in working objects BO such as points, signals, balises or trains, is stored in a working layer BL.
  • the processing in this layer the work logic executed by a business server BS, prepares this information.
  • the origin of the information is an interface layer Layer IL, which primarily represents the interface S to the web process.
  • a display layer converts the work objects BO and their states into a user-friendly representation, such as a magnifying glass image.
  • the display layer VL comprises the entire user interface, which is placed primarily at the work stations AP1 to AP3 for the visual display for the dispatcher Fd1, Fd2 and temporarily also for the examiner P.
  • other peripherals such as printers, storage media and multimedia devices are included in this interface.
  • Today's VL according to the prior art includes the Presentations logic as well as the actual View logic.
  • the presentation logic is deliberately strongly dependent on the control system configuration data of the individual network cells NWZ and therefore also remains new in the network cell NWZ.
  • the Workplace AP1 to AP3 in the new network according to the invention NW no longer contain precisely this presentation layer PL, these workstations AP1 to AP3 are a so-called "thin client".
  • the software for the network NW thus has a "thin-client" structure, ie the presentation which converts the work objects BO into a view for the user already takes place in the network cell NWZ.
  • the presentation layer PL prepares the information for the display layer VL. This processing depends on the parameters that can be individually selected for each workstation in the display layer VL, such as language, information area, and the configuration data of the network cell NWZ.
  • the merging layer AL adds the information from the individual network cells NWZ into a whole by means of an aggregator AG and sends them to the view client VC in the display layer VL, which is now no longer logically located within a network cell NWZ but the workstations AP1 to AP3 served.
  • the information from the view client VC to the network cell NWZ, which are issued from the workstations AP1 to AP3 recordable by the Dispatcher Fd1 and Fd2 and the inspector P are divided by the aggregator AG in the union layer AL and forwarded to the corresponding network cells NWZ ,
  • presentation logic converts the current state of interlocking elements (switches, tracks, etc.) into a geometric representation of a magnifying glass image.
  • the merging layer AL adds the individual geometric representations from the individual network cells NWZ to a comprehensive one geometric representation together, which is displayed in the display layer VL the user as an overview image.
  • the display layer VL does not require any configuration data for this task.
  • the merging layer AL has only the information how the individual geometric representations are combined to form a comprehensive geometric representation.
  • the display logic is realized by a display server MXVS in the network cell NWZ.
  • the MXVS display server completely processes the view for the View Client VC. So that the View Client VC can communicate with several servers, the Aggregator AG is provided between the View Client VC and the MXVS display server. The View Client VC only communicates with the Aggregator AG via the Aggregator AG corresponding display servers MXVS of multiple network cells NWZ.
  • the display server MXVS prepares the information as needed for a View Client VC. From a display server MXVS exists one instance per View Client VC and network cell NWZ.
  • the server of the View Client VC is stateful, i. his condition is dependent on the workstation AP1 to AP3, for which he prepares the data.
  • the MXVS display server is therefore a rebuilt task of the prior art single control systems known in the prior art and mentioned above.
  • the access point AP provides a general interface to the network NW with respect to a function, such as train data and train numbers.
  • the access point AP is therefore largely stateless in the context of a client, i. its state is independent of the workstations connected to it AP1 to AP3, and stores per client primarily what information this wishes.
  • the access point AP can thus take over part of the display logic (presentation). It thus provides access to a defined set of information which is not specifically prepared for a workstation AP1 to AP3.
  • the View Client VC which is logically located in the display layer, exists once per user session.
  • the display server MXVS exists once per user session and network cell NWZ and prepares the information for the corresponding user.
  • the aggregator AG exists individually for each user session, since different information must be assembled for each view client VC.
  • the access point AP exists once per network cell NWZ, and thereby in two redundant instances to increase the availability.
  • NWZ network cell NWZ Many of the information processed by the NWZ network cell is obtained from other systems (Stelltechnik STW, Reasonanlagen UA1 to Un2)). When the network cell NWZ is started, this information will be obtained from these external systems via a general poll. But there is also information that is stored only in the network cell NWZ and which can not be obtained from an external system. This information must still be present after a restart of the NWZ network cell or individual tasks. Therefore, this information is often stored persistently (in database, files) and / or adjusted between main, mirror and passive running states of the tasks. When a cell molecule pZM is started in the nonoperatively active state, the data managed by the network cell NWZ are obtained from the operatively active cell molecule aZM. The interface with which the data managed by the network cell (i.e., global data accessed by the network cell but not stored in its instance) is matched between the cell molecules is designed to be release-independent.
  • the network NW provides cross-cell interfaces SA.
  • the interfaces SA to the external systems ES are defined by means of general services.
  • a service represents a defined interface via which a set of information is exchanged bidirectionally between the external systems and the network NW. This ensures that the same service can be used by various external systems.
  • An example is a train number service via which all train number advances are sent to interested external systems or train number operations are accepted by the external systems.
  • These services are specified in the network NW and the external system ES has to implement the interface SA specified by the network NW. Since this is not always possible, the network NW continues to support specific interfaces for certain external systems ES, if an already existing interface should work across cells and / or if the network should support an interface specified by an external system ES.
  • the adapter accesses the network NW via the services.
  • Such an interface is connected via a proxy server if the external system is not part of the closed network NW.
  • the network software must not be confused with the network cell software.
  • changes are saved to old statuses, which makes it possible to go back to an old state in the event of a mishandling of an administrator.
  • the global configuration data can be created offline and then imported into the global data GD. Therefore, to allow for soft migration as well as non-disruptive update, various levels of global configuration data are available which result in different cell configurations, i. to different versions of the cell software incl. The required data fit.
  • Each network cell NWZ has its own Ethernet LAN. Connected to the Ethernet are cell servers, cell-local workplaces L, cell-local printers, terminal servers, ISDN routers to the ILOK and external systems. On this Ethernet LAN, IP, DECnet, and LAT are used as protocols.
  • This set of components which are logically arranged within a network cell NWZ, forms a cell computer system Z-RS A, Z-RS B.
  • the workstations AP1 to AP3 and printers at a control center location LT and in the regional control center RCC are each at one or connected to several Ethernet LANs. On this workstation LAN only IP is used, so no DECnet and no LAT.
  • This set of components, which are logically assigned to the control center location forms a control center computer system LT-RS.
  • a cell-local workstation L is configured to operate only with the corresponding network cell NWZ and is used as the last fall-back element in the event of a failure of the network NW. This workstation L is therefore configured so that it can be used as a cell-local workstation L.
  • a plurality of cell LANs and normally a workstation LAN can be present at a control center location LT.
  • the RCC has one or more workstation LANs.
  • the individual sites are connected to an IP network.
  • the routers that are available at each site are redundantly equipped to compensate for failures of such components immediately.
  • the thus formed IP network with all LANs together is a network NW closed according to the railway standard EN50159-1. This requirement makes it possible that the data traffic between the individual network cell NWZ and the control center LT and other components arranged within the network NW need not be encrypted.
  • the network NW also offers interfaces SA for external systems ES. These interfaces SA are realized by an interface server. If the external systems ES are located within the closed network NW, they can access the interface server directly. On the other hand, if the external systems ES are outside the closed network NW, this is not possible without further ado.
  • an additional interface proxy server is provided, which enables communication with the interface server from an insecure network.
  • the interface server is connected to the closed network NW and offers the cross-cell interfaces as universally valid services. Trusted external systems ES, which are located within the closed network NW, can directly access the interface server.
  • the interface proxy server is connected to the insecure network. This offers the services of the interface server as a proxy, i. It looks like the interface server to the outside, but only forwards the messages to the interface server.
  • the Proxy Server interface only offers a well-defined subset of the interfaces of the interface server. The interface subset includes only the components that may be used by potentially untrusted external systems.
  • the interface server and the proxy server interfaces each include two network cards.
  • a network card connects the interface server with the closed network NW or the interfaces proxy server with the insecure network.
  • the other network card connects the interface server and the proxy server interfaces via a separate Ethernet LAN.
  • the external system ES is connected to the interface proxy server via a firewall. This firewall only releases the absolutely necessary communication services, and only allows connections to known computers.
  • a message filter is used between the interface proxy and the actual interface. This message filter understands the meaning of the messages, leaving only messages classified as non-hazardous. Which messages are classified as harmless, is freely configurable. Every occurrence of a potentially dangerous message is logged.
  • the message filter is implemented both in the interface server and in the interface proxy server. The message filter is the same in both servers, and both servers monitor each other for the correct functioning of the message filter. In this case, it is provided in the present exemplary embodiment that any errors in the message filter which have occurred are disclosed within a publication exposure time of one hour.
  • the network NW and / or its architecture described above for a network-wide railway control system and the various logical groupings and methods for secure data exchange implemented within the architecture, in particular with external systems ES arranged outside the secure network NW, can also be found in the fields of telecommunications, Use network control technology in energy distribution and in road and air traffic as well as all more complex processes to control the overall process.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
  • Burglar Alarm Systems (AREA)
EP05001889A 2005-01-31 2005-01-31 Système de surveillance et de commande d'objets Withdrawn EP1686036A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (5)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP05001889A EP1686036A1 (fr) 2005-01-31 2005-01-31 Système de surveillance et de commande d'objets
DE502005006723T DE502005006723D1 (de) 2005-01-31 2005-11-04 Leitsystem für die steuerung und/oder überwachung von objekten
PCT/EP2005/011827 WO2006081849A1 (fr) 2005-01-31 2005-11-04 Systeme de commande pour la regulation et/ou la surveillance d'objets
EP05800660A EP1843929B1 (fr) 2005-01-31 2005-11-04 Systeme de commande pour la regulation et/ou la surveillance d'objets
AT05800660T ATE423715T1 (de) 2005-01-31 2005-11-04 Leitsystem für die steuerung und/oder überwachung von objekten

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP05001889A EP1686036A1 (fr) 2005-01-31 2005-01-31 Système de surveillance et de commande d'objets

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1686036A1 true EP1686036A1 (fr) 2006-08-02

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EP05001889A Withdrawn EP1686036A1 (fr) 2005-01-31 2005-01-31 Système de surveillance et de commande d'objets
EP05800660A Expired - Lifetime EP1843929B1 (fr) 2005-01-31 2005-11-04 Systeme de commande pour la regulation et/ou la surveillance d'objets

Family Applications After (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP05800660A Expired - Lifetime EP1843929B1 (fr) 2005-01-31 2005-11-04 Systeme de commande pour la regulation et/ou la surveillance d'objets

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EP (2) EP1686036A1 (fr)
AT (1) ATE423715T1 (fr)
DE (1) DE502005006723D1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2006081849A1 (fr)

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP2261801A1 (fr) 2009-06-12 2010-12-15 Siemens Schweiz AG Procédé de mise à jour sans interruption d'une base de données maître et des bases de données esclaves associées
CN114574495A (zh) * 2020-12-01 2022-06-03 上海交通大学医学院附属仁济医院 核苷类衍生物改性的核酸适体r50

Families Citing this family (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN113627955B (zh) * 2021-08-11 2023-06-20 中国城市规划设计研究院 一种铁路溯源分析系统及方法

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Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP2261801A1 (fr) 2009-06-12 2010-12-15 Siemens Schweiz AG Procédé de mise à jour sans interruption d'une base de données maître et des bases de données esclaves associées
CN114574495A (zh) * 2020-12-01 2022-06-03 上海交通大学医学院附属仁济医院 核苷类衍生物改性的核酸适体r50
CN114574495B (zh) * 2020-12-01 2024-04-09 上海交通大学医学院附属仁济医院 核苷类衍生物改性的核酸适体r50

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
EP1843929B1 (fr) 2009-02-25
EP1843929A1 (fr) 2007-10-17
ATE423715T1 (de) 2009-03-15
DE502005006723D1 (de) 2009-04-09
WO2006081849A1 (fr) 2006-08-10

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