WO1996020439A1 - Systeme assiste par ordinateur pour detecter l'incident a l'origine d'une panne dans une installation technique - Google Patents

Systeme assiste par ordinateur pour detecter l'incident a l'origine d'une panne dans une installation technique Download PDF

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Publication number
WO1996020439A1
WO1996020439A1 PCT/DE1995/001792 DE9501792W WO9620439A1 WO 1996020439 A1 WO1996020439 A1 WO 1996020439A1 DE 9501792 W DE9501792 W DE 9501792W WO 9620439 A1 WO9620439 A1 WO 9620439A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
decision
accident
steb
computer
decision tree
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/DE1995/001792
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German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Heinrich Reiner
Heinrich Pfadler
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens AG
Siemens Corp
Original Assignee
Siemens AG
Siemens Corp
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens AG, Siemens Corp filed Critical Siemens AG
Publication of WO1996020439A1 publication Critical patent/WO1996020439A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B23/00—Testing or monitoring of control systems or parts thereof
    • G05B23/02—Electric testing or monitoring
    • G05B23/0205—Electric testing or monitoring by means of a monitoring system capable of detecting and responding to faults
    • G05B23/0218—Electric testing or monitoring by means of a monitoring system capable of detecting and responding to faults characterised by the fault detection method dealing with either existing or incipient faults
    • G05B23/0243—Electric testing or monitoring by means of a monitoring system capable of detecting and responding to faults characterised by the fault detection method dealing with either existing or incipient faults model based detection method, e.g. first-principles knowledge model
    • G05B23/0245—Electric testing or monitoring by means of a monitoring system capable of detecting and responding to faults characterised by the fault detection method dealing with either existing or incipient faults model based detection method, e.g. first-principles knowledge model based on a qualitative model, e.g. rule based; if-then decisions
    • G05B23/0248—Causal models, e.g. fault tree; digraphs; qualitative physics
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B19/00—Program-control systems
    • G05B19/02—Program-control systems electric
    • G05B19/418—Total factory control, i.e. centrally controlling a plurality of machines, e.g. direct or distributed numerical control [DNC], flexible manufacturing systems [FMS], integrated manufacturing systems [IMS] or computer integrated manufacturing [CIM]
    • G05B19/4184—Total factory control, i.e. centrally controlling a plurality of machines, e.g. direct or distributed numerical control [DNC], flexible manufacturing systems [FMS], integrated manufacturing systems [IMS] or computer integrated manufacturing [CIM] characterised by fault tolerance, reliability of production system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B23/00—Testing or monitoring of control systems or parts thereof
    • G05B23/02—Electric testing or monitoring
    • G05B23/0205—Electric testing or monitoring by means of a monitoring system capable of detecting and responding to faults
    • G05B23/0259—Electric testing or monitoring by means of a monitoring system capable of detecting and responding to faults characterized by the response to fault detection
    • G05B23/0275—Fault isolation and identification, e.g. classify fault; estimate cause or root of failure
    • G05B23/0278—Qualitative, e.g. if-then rules; Fuzzy logic; Lookup tables; Symptomatic search; FMEA
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B2219/00—Program-control systems
    • G05B2219/30—Nc systems
    • G05B2219/33—Director till display
    • G05B2219/33303—Expert system for diagnostic, monitoring use of tree and probability
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02P—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN THE PRODUCTION OR PROCESSING OF GOODS
    • Y02P90/00—Enabling technologies with a potential contribution to greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions mitigation
    • Y02P90/02—Total factory control, e.g. smart factories, flexible manufacturing systems [FMS] or integrated manufacturing systems [IMS]

Definitions

  • Computer-aided device for recognizing a cause of an accident in a technical installation
  • the invention relates to a computer-aided device for recognizing a cause of an accident in a technical system that triggers a malfunction, the malfunction possibly triggering a shutdown of the technical system into an operationally safe system state.
  • a technical plant such as a fossil-fueled or nuclear power plant, or a production plant or a process plant, usually has a system for processing process data.
  • a system can be part of a distributed real-time process information system in which large amounts of data have to be recorded, processed and processed and are to be represented visually.
  • a real-time process information system is usually integrated in the control system of the technical system.
  • a malfunction can occur, which triggers the shutdown of a production line in a manufacturing plant or, for example, even a rapid reactor shutdown in a nuclear power plant.
  • the plant operator is willing to identify and control one or more causes of the malfunction which cause the malfunction particularly quickly, so that the malfunction caused by the malfunction Damage to materials and / or people and the environment remains as low as possible.
  • the strategy of accident management e.g. According to the operating manual of the technical system, it is usually designed in such a way that there are basically two ways in which the technical system can be brought into a safe operating state in the event of an accident.
  • the first, event-oriented way is to identify a fault failure with the help of a fault decision tree and then to bring the system into a long-term safe state in accordance with the assigned description in the operating manual.
  • the second, protection-goal-oriented path is only followed if the accident cannot be clearly classified according to the first event-oriented path, or if a criterion for the violation of a particularly important protection target is reached.
  • the event-oriented driving style is relieved to a certain degree by the possibility of a protection-oriented driving style, because it is no longer the only way to master accidents.
  • it has so far been customary for an operator of the technical system to make the decision in the event of a fault using the fault decision tree described in the operating manual as to which cause of the fault is or has existed.
  • the operator usually has to read individual displays in the control room of the technical system in a relatively short time and use them, for example, to answer yes / no decisions.
  • the time required for this is relatively large and can increase if an advertisement is disrupted by a loss of air and / or has to be replaced by other advertisements.
  • the invention is therefore based on the object of providing the operator in the control room of a technical system particularly well with means for detecting and controlling faults.
  • This object is achieved according to the invention by a computer-aided device for recognizing a cause of an accident causing a malfunction in a technical system, the malfunction possibly triggering a shutdown of the technical system in an operationally reliable system state, with the following components: a) a system-specific system stored in a memory
  • Plant top signals that can be measured in the event of an accident with decision criteria arranged in a logical hierarchy in the accident decision tree
  • the computer-aided device provides the operator with a complete diagnosis in the event of a malfunction
  • interference-free, measurable system top signals ie measured values with particular relevance for system safety
  • time-differentiated manner can also be a time-based and only time-related limits the occurrence of an accident and the cause of the accident. It can also be achieved by this time differentiation that, in the case of inferences made from two specific measured values, a distinction can be made as to which of the inferences is to be drawn depending on the arrival of the two measured values, ie in particular also a classification depending on which of the two or more further measured values occurred first.
  • Decision criteria arranged in a logical hierarchy mean that the cause of the accident can be narrowed down more and more when decision criteria which are increasingly arranged further down in the logical hierarchy are reached in the accident decision tree.
  • triggering a decision limiting the cause of the accident is understood to mean that such decisions are triggered, for example, fully automatically by the computer of the device.
  • the operator has to make a specific decision here, the data required for such a decision being measured and made available in an accident-proof manner.
  • Means for displaying the accident decision tree are understood to mean, for example, a data display device in the control room of the technical system, in which an image of the accident decision tree is shown and by appropriate color or other optical classification of the symbols arranged in the accident decision tree, the decision path determined by the facility and along this decision path the cause of the accident is displayed.
  • means for measuring the system top signals are provided, which are, for example, of redundant design. In this way it is possible, for example, to make "two out of three" decisions and, moreover, to recognize the failure of a single measuring point or a single measuring path which is triplicate.
  • system top signals can be stored in a memory provided for this purpose. In this way, it is possible to use the system top signals required to identify the cause of the accident, which were measured in the past and / or were only present for a short time, for the detection of the accident.
  • FIG. 1 shows the schematic structure of a device for detecting an accident triggering an accident
  • FIG. 2 shows a schematic diagram of an accident decision tree.
  • a system bus 4 can be recognized, by means of which the measured values coming from the system and signals affecting the system are transported.
  • a measured value evaluator 6 accesses the plant bus 4 and detects so-called plant top signals 8a to 8c, the data acquisition and structure of which are triple redundant. The measured value evaluator 6 forwards the system top signals 8a to 8c, which are only briefly present on the system bus, to a redundant data memory 10 for storage.
  • the measured value evaluator 6 can also read data from the data memory 10 into the process in the opposite direction.
  • the measured value evaluator 6 transmits the triple redundant system top signals 8a to 8c to the computer module 12, which here has three microprocessor subunits 14a to 14c working independently of one another.
  • a routine is routinely run independently, which checks the system top signals 8a to 8c coming from the measured value evaluator 6 for limit values or other criteria that are important for system operation.
  • a system top signal 8a to 8c is now present on two of three microprocessor subunits 14a to 14c, which triggers a particularly relevant criterion for triggering the shutdown of the technical system, that is to say a serious fault, the system may be shutdown by a control system (not shown).
  • the computer module 12 loads from a further memory 16 a fault decision tree STEB which is specific to the system and outputs this to a data display device 18 which is located, for example, in the control room (not shown further here).
  • a fault decision tree STEB which is specific to the system and outputs this to a data display device 18 which is located, for example, in the control room (not shown further here).
  • the cause of the fault is limited and determined step by step with the aid of the program running in the microprocessor subunits from 14a to 14c.
  • decision criteria arranged at certain points in the accident decision tree STEB are linked with the system top signals 8a to 8c assigned according to this criterion.
  • the microprocessor subunits 14a to 14c By means of this link, the microprocessor subunits 14a to 14c, provided that two of the microprocessor subunits 14a to 14c come to the same result, trigger a decision that limits the cause of the disturbance.
  • the accident decision tree SFEB displayed in the data display device 18 has a decision path, in the course of which three decisions can be measured using the link between the accident-proof measure Ren plant top signals 8a to 8c had to be felled so that the cause of the accident causing the accident could be determined.
  • an input unit 20 it is also possible, for example, for the operator of the technical installation to make certain decisions himself on a case-by-case basis and thus trigger the further decision-making path which follows the logical hierarchy.
  • the content and the representation of the interference decryption tree STEB in the data display device 18 have a transparency which allows the operator to check certain decision-making paths in a way that the operator remains involved in the process, which is the case, for example, with the sole representation of an analysis Result would not be the case.
  • commands implemented by the operator can be processed in the computer module 12 and corresponding data can be output to the system bus 4.
  • FIG. 2 shows an accident decision tree STEB as it is displayed, for example, on the data display device 18 m in the control room of a nuclear power plant in the presence of a cause of an accident that triggers a failure.
  • the incidents and causes of accidents dealt with in the accident decision tree SFEB according to the decision-making paths result from the design, ie the nuclear power plant is for this stor cases designed. This also means that the plant top signals required to determine certain decision criteria are measured in a fail-safe manner and generally in triplicate redundancy.
  • the decision path triggered in the present accident decision tree SFE3 is shaded.
  • the top field in the drawing with the inscription “RESA” stands for the triggering of a reactor cutoff due to an accident.
  • the reactor is shut down until it reaches a safe operating state.
  • To the side of the R marineSA field is the field “t”, in which the actual time at which a reactor fast shutdown (RESA) is triggered is recorded.
  • the "Dew point T loop 1/2/3/4" field is triggered when two of three of the dew point temperature measurements or "one of three” of these dew point temperature measurements and a dew point temperature measurement on the corresponding circulating air coolers respond.
  • the "Kond AR” field is triggered when the amount of condensate that exceeds a certain limit value is measured on the loop 1/2 or the Lopp 3/4 air cooler and at the same time the level in one of the two sumps of the air cooler rises above a maximum value.
  • the "Betr Ra” field is triggered when the amount of condensate in the operating rooms of the nuclear power plant on two out of four circulating air coolers exceeds a maximum value. Likewise, the water level in one of the two swamps
  • the next step is to query whether the emergency cooling criterion is present.
  • the emergency cooling criterion there is no emergency cooling criterion based on the measured plant top values, so that the decision criterion "No" and the field "Leak in the reactor cooling system” following in the decision path are triggered. Because there was no emergency cooling criterion, a mini leak in the reactor cooling system is identified as the cause of the accident. This means that the "Minileck" field with the associated description in the operating manual, here in Chapter 3-1.1, will be drawn.
  • the "No” decision is triggered. It is then checked next whether the pressure holder maintaining the reactor pressure maintains the prescribed level. If there is a “Yes” decision here , the "Kl / M RKL” field is triggered, which means that there is a small to medium leak in the reactor cooling system. If the "No” decision is drawn above, there is a leak in the pressure holder, which is indicated by triggering the "DH leak” field.
  • the device 2 explained above thus contributes in an almost fully automatic manner to the control of system accidents for which the system and, accordingly, the accident decision tree are designed. Because the measured value acquisition and processing are designed to be accident-proof in relation to the design accidents, the described device fully supports the event-oriented driving style of the technical system and completely safeguards its operation. In addition, once the cause of the accident causing the malfunction has been identified, a therapeutic procedure that eliminates the malfunction can be started automatically.
  • the device 2 triggers a decision by analyzing the criteria relevant to the system top signals 8a to 8c. By analyzing the chronological order of arrival and / or the length of time that system top signals 8a to 8c are present, a decision is drawn and, in particular, a time differentiation of these variables for decision-making.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
  • Quality & Reliability (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Manufacturing & Machinery (AREA)
  • Fuzzy Systems (AREA)
  • Mathematical Physics (AREA)
  • Testing And Monitoring For Control Systems (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un système assisté par ordinateur servant à détecter l'incident à l'origine d'une panne dans une installation technique, la panne éventuelle déclenchant une décélération de l'installation technique dans un état de fonctionnement fiable. Ce système comprend les éléments suivants: a) un arbre de décision en cas de panne (STEB) propre à l'installation, stocké dans une mémoire (16), b) des éléments (14a à 14c) pour la liaison de signaux de crête émanant de l'installation (8a à 8c) qui peuvent être mesurés même en cas de panne, avec des critères de décision disposés en hiérarchie logique dans l'arbre de décision de panne (STEB), c) des éléments (14a à 14c) permettant de déclencher une décision localisant l'incident à l'origine de la panne, d'après le résultat de la liaison effectuée précédemment et d'un autre chemin de décision qui s'y rattache éventuellement en hiérarchie logique, dans l'arbre de décision en cas de panne (STEB), et d) des éléments (18) de visualisation de l'arbre de décision en cas de panne (STEB) correspondant.
PCT/DE1995/001792 1994-12-27 1995-12-14 Systeme assiste par ordinateur pour detecter l'incident a l'origine d'une panne dans une installation technique Ceased WO1996020439A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE4446863 1994-12-27
DEP4446863.6 1994-12-27

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WO1996020439A1 true WO1996020439A1 (fr) 1996-07-04

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Cited By (9)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR2772880A1 (fr) * 1997-12-24 1999-06-25 Alpes Systeme Automation Dispositif et procede de controle du fonctionnement d'une installation industrielle
WO2001009694A1 (fr) * 1999-07-28 2001-02-08 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procede et systeme de diagnostic pour une installation technique
EP1243988A1 (fr) * 2001-03-23 2002-09-25 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procédé pour réduire les efforts de programmation dans une commande programmable avec une unité centrale et un dispositif d'entré de commandes
EP1243989A1 (fr) * 2001-03-23 2002-09-25 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procédé pour réduire les efforts de programmation dans une commande programmable avec une unité centrale et un dispositif d'entrée de commande
WO2005036290A1 (fr) * 2003-09-19 2005-04-21 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Mise a disposition d'informations de diagnostic
EP1394759A3 (fr) * 2002-08-23 2007-06-27 Link Systemtechnik GmbH Analyse des défaillances et/ou d'état
FR2987690A1 (fr) * 2012-03-05 2013-09-06 Schneider Electric Ind Sas Procede et dispositif de maintenance d'une installation electrique
US20230092472A1 (en) * 2020-02-27 2023-03-23 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd Method and System for Intelligent Monitoring of State of Nuclear Power Plant
US20240202625A1 (en) * 2020-10-29 2024-06-20 Michael P. Simeone Systems and methods for failure detection tools in large scale maintenance operations

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EP0428135A2 (fr) * 1989-11-13 1991-05-22 Komatsu Ltd. Appareil et méthode de diagnostic de fautes
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EP0263636A2 (fr) * 1986-09-29 1988-04-13 Westinghouse Electric Corporation Système mis en oeuvre dans une machine pour déterminer la concordance d'une installation d'un processus complexe avec les spécifications techniques
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Cited By (18)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0926430A1 (fr) * 1997-12-24 1999-06-30 Alpes Systeme Automation Dispositif et procédé de contrÔle du fonctionnement d'une installation industrielle
US6288650B2 (en) 1997-12-24 2001-09-11 Alpes Systeme Automation Device and method for monitoring the operation of an industrial installation
FR2772880A1 (fr) * 1997-12-24 1999-06-25 Alpes Systeme Automation Dispositif et procede de controle du fonctionnement d'une installation industrielle
US6910156B2 (en) 1999-07-28 2005-06-21 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method and system for diagnosing a technical installation
WO2001009694A1 (fr) * 1999-07-28 2001-02-08 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procede et systeme de diagnostic pour une installation technique
EP1243988A1 (fr) * 2001-03-23 2002-09-25 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procédé pour réduire les efforts de programmation dans une commande programmable avec une unité centrale et un dispositif d'entré de commandes
EP1243989A1 (fr) * 2001-03-23 2002-09-25 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procédé pour réduire les efforts de programmation dans une commande programmable avec une unité centrale et un dispositif d'entrée de commande
EP1394759A3 (fr) * 2002-08-23 2007-06-27 Link Systemtechnik GmbH Analyse des défaillances et/ou d'état
WO2005036290A1 (fr) * 2003-09-19 2005-04-21 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Mise a disposition d'informations de diagnostic
US7774167B2 (en) 2003-09-19 2010-08-10 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft System and method for providing diagnosis information
FR2987690A1 (fr) * 2012-03-05 2013-09-06 Schneider Electric Ind Sas Procede et dispositif de maintenance d'une installation electrique
EP2637071A1 (fr) * 2012-03-05 2013-09-11 Schneider Electric Industries SAS Procédé et dispositif de maintenance d'une installation électrique
AU2013201193B2 (en) * 2012-03-05 2014-09-18 Schneider Electric Industries Sas Electric installation maintenance method and device
US9517534B2 (en) 2012-03-05 2016-12-13 Schneider Electric Industries Sas Electric installation maintenance method and device
RU2622473C2 (ru) * 2012-03-05 2017-06-15 Шнейдер Электрик Эндюстри Сас Способ и устройство обслуживания электрической установки
US20230092472A1 (en) * 2020-02-27 2023-03-23 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd Method and System for Intelligent Monitoring of State of Nuclear Power Plant
US20240202625A1 (en) * 2020-10-29 2024-06-20 Michael P. Simeone Systems and methods for failure detection tools in large scale maintenance operations
US12488298B2 (en) * 2020-10-29 2025-12-02 Arizona Board Of Regents On Behalf Of Arizona State University Systems and methods for failure detection tools in large scale maintenance operations

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