EP2090946A1 - Procédé d'enregistrement et d'émission de signaux dans des composants d'automatisation protégés contres les erreurs et dispositif - Google Patents

Procédé d'enregistrement et d'émission de signaux dans des composants d'automatisation protégés contres les erreurs et dispositif Download PDF

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Publication number
EP2090946A1
EP2090946A1 EP08002772A EP08002772A EP2090946A1 EP 2090946 A1 EP2090946 A1 EP 2090946A1 EP 08002772 A EP08002772 A EP 08002772A EP 08002772 A EP08002772 A EP 08002772A EP 2090946 A1 EP2090946 A1 EP 2090946A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
switch
signal path
interface
signals
signal
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP08002772A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP2090946B1 (fr
Inventor
Tobias Gramolla
Mathias KÖNIG
Mario Maier
Reinhard Mark
Edgar Sigwart
Monika Singer
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens AG
Siemens Corp
Original Assignee
Siemens AG
Siemens Corp
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens AG, Siemens Corp filed Critical Siemens AG
Priority to EP08002772A priority Critical patent/EP2090946B1/fr
Priority to DE200850003088 priority patent/DE502008003088D1/de
Publication of EP2090946A1 publication Critical patent/EP2090946A1/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP2090946B1 publication Critical patent/EP2090946B1/fr
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B19/00—Program-control systems
    • G05B19/02—Program-control systems electric
    • G05B19/04—Program control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers
    • G05B19/042—Program control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers using digital processors
    • G05B19/0423—Input/output
    • G05B19/0425—Safety, monitoring
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B9/00—Safety arrangements
    • G05B9/02—Safety arrangements electric
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B2219/00—Program-control systems
    • G05B2219/20—Pc systems
    • G05B2219/21—Pc I-O input output
    • G05B2219/21163—Test I-O if functional or safe value
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B2219/00—Program-control systems
    • G05B2219/20—Pc systems
    • G05B2219/24—Pc safety
    • G05B2219/24035—Superpose testsignal on normal I-O lines, through transfo and rectifier

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a device for detecting a first and second type of signals via a common interface, wherein the interface is connected via a first signal path to a first evaluation unit for detecting the first type of signals and wherein the interface via a second signal path with a second Evaluation unit for detecting the second type of signals is connected.
  • the invention relates to a method for detecting and transmitting signals in fail-safe automation components, preferably for operation of the above-mentioned device.
  • the invention relates to a circuit arrangement for monitoring the switching state of a switch.
  • a safety technology is supposed to bring automated processes to a safe state or to hold them when "impermissible states" occur. If, for example, a protective door opens or a boiler heats above a permissible limit, this must be reliably detected.
  • limit values are detected by transducers, which are connected to an automation device via an analog input module. This automation device runs a fail-safe automation program. The measured values of the transducers are communicated via the analog module to the program of the programmable controller designed to safely acquire the measured values. For example, the transducers are connected via a two-wire cable, a so-called 4 ...
  • a switching means for connecting a third signal path with the interface is present, wherein the switching means the third signal path such with the interface connects that this connection can be monitored by a testable separation of the third signal path. Since this testable separation acts like a controlled shut-off mechanism, a third type of signal can be transmitted safely and controlled via the interface and thus via a common data line by means of a controlled connection and disconnection of a third signal path.
  • the first type of signal is, for example, the measured values of a temperature sensor.
  • the second type of signals are, for example, status data of the transducer, which are sent from the process to the fail-safe automation component. These Signals can be evaluated or logged in the form of data in an observation process.
  • the first type of signal and the second type of signal are called safe signals. These signals can only be received and evaluated. You can not change an adjusted process. However, if signals are sent into the process which, for example, reparameterize a transducer in its measuring range, these could influence the safety of the automation system. By testable separation of the third signal path, via which, for example, the parameter data for a transducer are sent, this signal path can be monitored and designed for safety automation program can follow these changes and respond accordingly in its program flow, so that the security is guaranteed.
  • a third type of signals can be output via the interface by means of a signal source connected to the third signal path.
  • These third types of signals represent the unsafe signals.
  • the transmission of these unsafe signals via the signal source can be switched on and off by the fail-safe user program of the programmable controller or a corresponding configuration tool.
  • the switching means has a fifth switch in the second signal path and a fourth switch in the third signal path, which are arranged such that either the second or the third signal path can be connected to the interface.
  • the second signal path with its fifth switch is designed, for example, as a received signal path, which can permanently receive status signals that come from the process, for example from the measured value converters. Since these status signals are considered safe signals, the reception of these signals need not be monitored.
  • the third signal path is regarded as a transmission signal path and must be taken into account to be monitored for safety. If unsafe signals are sent into the automation process with knowledge of the automation program, the fourth switch must be closed, with the fifth switch being open.
  • the switching means on a third switch which is arranged in a series circuit to the fourth switch within the third signal path.
  • This third switch is designed, for example, as an opener and allows the additional separation of the third signal path to test the safe operation of the fourth switch.
  • a first switch is arranged such that a connection to a system voltage can be produced to the connection of the third switch with the fourth switch.
  • a defined connection of a system voltage during a test case makes it possible to generate a test signal, for example a read-back signal, in order to check certain switching states of the switches.
  • the first switch and the third switch are designed such that the first switch is in an interaction with the third switch. That is, the third switch and the first switch switch in a forced state.
  • the third switch When the third switch is opened for a test, the first switch for generating a test signal must be closed at the same time.
  • the aforementioned method solves the object of the invention in that by means of a switching means for connecting and disconnecting a third signal path in communication with the interface, the security of the automation system influencing third type of signals is sent through a testable separation of the third signal path controlled via the interface.
  • the controlled transmission of the third type of signals which represent unsafe signals, allows the sharing of a data line for safe and unsafe signals.
  • the controlled transmission of the unsafe signals via the common interface ensures the safety of fail-safe automation components.
  • a third switch is operated within the switching means, which separates the third signal path. This monitorable separation by means of the third switch is controlled and checked by the user program of the fail-safe automation device.
  • the switching means according to the method, a fifth switch, which is closed during the fourth switch, is opened in a correlation with the fourth switch and the second signal path from the interface decoupled.
  • the fourth switch and the fifth switch are operated as a transmit and receive switch. For example, the fourth switch releases the transmission path, whereby at the same time the fifth switch switches the reception path to a receiver.
  • a read-back signal is generated via a first switch having the switching means, wherein the third switch and the first switch are actuated together in an interaction.
  • the series connection of the first switch and the fourth switch is connected via a second switch with a potential different from the read-back signal, thereby testing the separation of the third signal path. Due to the different switch positions of the switches and the connection with different Reference potentials can be generated at a measuring point signals that can be evaluated by the automation device and thus the safe operation of the third signal path can be monitored.
  • the function of the fourth switch is cyclically monitored for safe opening. Depending on the security level of the security-relevant process to be automated, monitoring can take place every minute or even every millisecond. If, for example, safety-related measured values are queried every second, the connection is also monitored at least once a second, because for a fail-safe automation system, for example, the measured value transmitter was accidentally reparameterized between two measured values and a faulty measured value is added to the automation program by a new measuring range Provides.
  • a safety-ensuring action is triggered. If it is determined by the monitoring of the fourth switch that its function is disturbed or impaired, the fail-safe application program in the fail-safe automation system can react to it and drive the system to a safe state or promptly issue a message to the operating personnel.
  • the circuit arrangement comprises a third switch, a second switch, a measuring point and a first switch, wherein the third switch is arranged in a series circuit with the fourth switch, wherein the second terminal of the third switch is connected to the first terminal of the fourth switch and the first switch having its first terminal connected between the third switch and the fourth switch, wherein this connection point forms the measuring point, and wherein the second connection of the first switch is connected to a system voltage.
  • the second switch is connected via its second terminal to the second terminal of the fourth switch and the first terminal of the second switch is connected to a ground potential, furthermore, the first switch, the second switch and the third switch are in an operative relationship, wherein a state signal at the measuring point can be generated by actuating the active in the operative relationship switch, which gives an indication of the switching state of the fourth switch.
  • the device 1 is referred to below as an analog module.
  • the analog module receives measured values via the interface 3, which is connected to a two-wire line, not shown.
  • This two-wire cable is designed as a 4 ... 20 mA circuit.
  • a measuring transducer is connected to this 4 ... 20 mA circuit.
  • the measuring transducer in the form of a temperature resistor supplies measured values which are detected by the analog module and forwarded to an automation system assigned to the analog module.
  • the measured values corresponding to the current values are measurable as a voltage drop across a resistor R and are conducted via a first signal path 2a to a first evaluation unit 4a.
  • the evaluation unit 4a is designed as a digital / analog converter.
  • a second evaluation unit 4b is within the Analog module arranged.
  • the second evaluation unit 4b is designed to evaluate signals which are in the form of a HART protocol. These HART signals correspond to signals that are modulated onto the 4 ... 20 mA DC circuit of the transmitter.
  • Status information that the transducer transmits to the analog module for evaluation in an automation system with subsequent display in an operating and monitoring system are routed via the interface 3 via two coupling capacitors C K to a transformer 8.
  • the status signals arrive via a switching means 9 by means of an amplifier 10 via a modem 11 to the second evaluation unit 4b.
  • the modem 11 is configured as a HART modem.
  • diagnostic information of the measured value converters can be forwarded as modulated HART signals to the user program of the programmable controller via the same interface 3. Since the modulated HART signal corresponds to a zero mean sinusoidal signal, it does not affect the temperature signals.
  • signals can be sent via the interface 3 into the process or to the transducers via the amplifier 10 and via the switching means 9 by means of the transformer 8 via the coupling capacitors CK.
  • These signals are so-called unsafe signals because the parameters of a transducer can be changed with these signals.
  • the measuring range of a transducer can be changed, which means that this transducer now provides measured values to the analog module in comparison to previously scaled measured values. If the user program of the programmable controller was not previously adjusted to these newly scaled measured values, the programmable controller may react incorrectly to certain measured values and the safety of the plant to be automated is at risk.
  • modulated non-safe signals have not previously been used as additional signals in fail-safe programmable controllers.
  • an observable shut-off mechanism is present in the switching means 9, which monitors and checks the signal path of the non-secure parameterization signals.
  • a readback signal is generated via a further signal line, which triggers a safety-ensuring action in the associated automation device.
  • the analog module For example, it is possible to receive measured value signals via a single two-wire data line, which is connected to the interface 3, and to transmit unsafe signals, for example parameterizing signals, for the measuring transducer via one and the same two-wire data line.
  • FIG. 2 is that in the FIG. 1 already described switching means 9 shown in more detail.
  • the strands 2b and 2c form a second and a third signal path, which are connected via a HART modem N1 with an automation device, not shown.
  • the second signal path 2b is connected to the HART modem N1 by means of an amplifier N3.
  • a designed as an opener fifth switch S12 connects the second signal path 2b and thus the HART modem, with a transformer 8, which in turn with the already in FIG. 1 described interface 3 and the two-wire data line is coupled.
  • the second signal path 2b is a reception path for signals directed to the HART modem N1.
  • the third signal path 2c is on Transmission path for signals directed from the HART modem N1 via an amplifier N2 to the process. Parameterizing signals emanating from the HART modem N1 thus reach the transformer 8 in the two-wire data line via the third switch S3, which is designed as a normally closed contact, and via the fourth switch S11, which is designed as a make contact.
  • the fourth switch S11 in the third signal path 2c and the fifth switch S12 in the second signal path 2b work together like a changeover switch. When the fifth switch S12 for receiving data on the second signal path 2b is closed, the fourth switch S11 is open for sending data in the signal path 2b, and vice versa.
  • the fourth switch S11 and the fifth switch S12 are combined to form a transceiver 14.
  • the third switch S3 arranged within the third signal path 2c is designed as an opener and is in operative connection with a first switch S1. If the third switch S3 is opened to check the fourth switch S11 in the third signal path 2c, then the first switch S1 is closed at the same time and thus applies a positive supply voltage via a 10 kOhm resistor R2 to the measuring point MS or to a signal line for a read-back signal RL.
  • the junction of the second signal path 2b and the third signal path 2c behind the fourth switch S11 and the fifth switch S12 via a second switch S2 is connected to a ground potential.
  • the transceiver 14, which consists of the fourth switch S11 and the fifth switch S12, is used to test the fail-safe shutdown of the third signal path 2c by means of the third switch S3.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
  • Arrangements For Transmission Of Measured Signals (AREA)
EP08002772A 2008-02-14 2008-02-14 Procédé et dispositif d'enregistrement et d'émission de signaux dans des composants d'automatisation sécurisés Active EP2090946B1 (fr)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP08002772A EP2090946B1 (fr) 2008-02-14 2008-02-14 Procédé et dispositif d'enregistrement et d'émission de signaux dans des composants d'automatisation sécurisés
DE200850003088 DE502008003088D1 (de) 2008-02-14 2008-02-14 Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Erfassen und Aussenden von Signalen bei fehlersicheren Automatisierungskomponenten

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP08002772A EP2090946B1 (fr) 2008-02-14 2008-02-14 Procédé et dispositif d'enregistrement et d'émission de signaux dans des composants d'automatisation sécurisés

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP2090946A1 true EP2090946A1 (fr) 2009-08-19
EP2090946B1 EP2090946B1 (fr) 2011-04-06

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EP08002772A Active EP2090946B1 (fr) 2008-02-14 2008-02-14 Procédé et dispositif d'enregistrement et d'émission de signaux dans des composants d'automatisation sécurisés

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EP (1) EP2090946B1 (fr)
DE (1) DE502008003088D1 (fr)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN106560396A (zh) * 2015-10-02 2017-04-12 英西图公司 无人驾驶飞行器的空中发射和/或回收以及相关的系统和方法

Citations (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4155116A (en) 1978-01-04 1979-05-15 The Bendix Corporation Digital control system including built in test equipment
EP1034986A2 (fr) * 1999-03-05 2000-09-13 DaimlerChrysler AG Méthode de commande d' un système de retenue pour passager
DE10127056A1 (de) * 2001-06-02 2002-12-05 Bosch Gmbh Robert Vorrichtung zur sicheren Signalerzeugung
DE10127561A1 (de) 2001-06-06 2003-01-16 Bundesrep Deutschland Eigensicheres Feldbussystem
EP1594021A1 (fr) * 2004-05-05 2005-11-09 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Dispositif de circuit et procédé de test de contacts de commutation d'un circuit numérique de sortie
WO2008015096A1 (fr) 2006-08-04 2008-02-07 Endress+Hauser Wetzer Gmbh+Co. Kg Unité de séparation pour une connexion de communication traditionnelle à deux conducteurs qui comprend un capteur, un transformateur de mesure et une unité de commande

Patent Citations (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4155116A (en) 1978-01-04 1979-05-15 The Bendix Corporation Digital control system including built in test equipment
EP1034986A2 (fr) * 1999-03-05 2000-09-13 DaimlerChrysler AG Méthode de commande d' un système de retenue pour passager
DE10127056A1 (de) * 2001-06-02 2002-12-05 Bosch Gmbh Robert Vorrichtung zur sicheren Signalerzeugung
DE10127561A1 (de) 2001-06-06 2003-01-16 Bundesrep Deutschland Eigensicheres Feldbussystem
EP1594021A1 (fr) * 2004-05-05 2005-11-09 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Dispositif de circuit et procédé de test de contacts de commutation d'un circuit numérique de sortie
WO2008015096A1 (fr) 2006-08-04 2008-02-07 Endress+Hauser Wetzer Gmbh+Co. Kg Unité de séparation pour une connexion de communication traditionnelle à deux conducteurs qui comprend un capteur, un transformateur de mesure et une unité de commande

Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN106560396A (zh) * 2015-10-02 2017-04-12 英西图公司 无人驾驶飞行器的空中发射和/或回收以及相关的系统和方法
US10933997B2 (en) 2015-10-02 2021-03-02 Insitu, Inc. Aerial launch and/or recovery for unmanned aircraft, and associated systems and methods
CN106560396B (zh) * 2015-10-02 2021-11-30 英西图公司 无人驾驶飞行器的空中发射和/或回收以及相关的系统和方法
US11858631B2 (en) 2015-10-02 2024-01-02 Insitu, Inc. Aerial launch and/or recovery for unmanned aircraft with submersible devices, and associated systems and methods

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
EP2090946B1 (fr) 2011-04-06
DE502008003088D1 (de) 2011-05-19

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