WO2008015148A1 - Procédé pour commander et surveiller un véhicule se déplaçant le long d'un trajet, notamment pour l'influence signalétique sécurisée d'un train - Google Patents

Procédé pour commander et surveiller un véhicule se déplaçant le long d'un trajet, notamment pour l'influence signalétique sécurisée d'un train Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2008015148A1
WO2008015148A1 PCT/EP2007/057697 EP2007057697W WO2008015148A1 WO 2008015148 A1 WO2008015148 A1 WO 2008015148A1 EP 2007057697 W EP2007057697 W EP 2007057697W WO 2008015148 A1 WO2008015148 A1 WO 2008015148A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
data
software
diagnostic
computer
sensor data
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/EP2007/057697
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German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Detlef Kendelbacher
Fabrice Stein
Detlef Wierth
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens AG
Siemens Corp
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Siemens AG
Siemens Corp
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Application filed by Siemens AG, Siemens Corp filed Critical Siemens AG
Publication of WO2008015148A1 publication Critical patent/WO2008015148A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0081—On-board diagnosis or maintenance
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
    • B61L25/02—Indicating or recording positions or identities of vehicles or trains
    • B61L25/021—Measuring and recording of train speed
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
    • B61L25/02—Indicating or recording positions or identities of vehicles or trains
    • B61L25/026—Relative localisation, e.g. using odometer

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for controlling and monitoring a moving along a route vehicle, in particular for signaling safe train interference on the basis of specifications for themselves within a
  • Train control systems for controlling and monitoring vehicles are known, wherein the vehicles move within a route network along a route.
  • To influence the train there is a technically safe computer in the vehicles on which application software for processing vehicle data recorded as sensor data is implemented.
  • Upon detection of a risk of si ⁇ chere computer for example, initiate an emergency braking of the vehicle.
  • Safe computers are designed as multi-computer systems, whereby the required safety level (for example, Safety Integrity Level SIL> 0 for ETCS) is achieved by means of special measures, for example multichannel processing and a comparison of the output values and a safe shutdown in the event of a fault.
  • special software is also used to run the required safety level (for example, Safety Integrity Level SIL> 0 for ETCS)
  • One way of solving the performance problems is to outsource non-safety-related tasks to a fail-safe computer.
  • diagnosis software is implemented on the secure computer and diagnostic strategy software is implemented on the non-secure computer.
  • diagnostic policy software is used to extract sensor data (as well as process data), which is the diagnostic policy software provides on request the diagnostic strategy software via this interface.
  • the object of the invention is to specify a method for relieving the secure computer, under the boundary condition that the secure computer as tested and approved independent system can not or can hardly be changed.
  • the solution of the task provides that additionally at least one application is implemented on the non-secure computer, which processes sensor data / process data (primarily sensor data and, if necessary, process data) instead of and for relieving the secure computer for non-secure purposes, wherein the sensor data / process data also via the diagnostic Strategy software angefor- changed in the diagnostic policy software and are provided by this ⁇ on the (diagnostic) interface.
  • at least one observation point / trace point is provided in the secure computer on which the diagnostic policy software decouples the requested Sensorda ⁇ th / process data.
  • the diagnostic strategy software provides the Sensorda ⁇ th / process data for multiple applications as a software interface trained trace accesses the diagnostic strategy software.
  • the assessment and the limitation are performed by an additionally provided load manager.
  • the load manager functions and rules for monitoring and limiting the group consisting of Sensor data / process data communication volume be ⁇ riding the basis of which the data transmission at the (diagnostic) is controlled interface by means of control-target / Trace Level ,
  • the method furthermore provides an additional control interface in the load manager of the diagnostic strategy software, with which an application-side request for the currently required data transmission volume takes place.
  • the discharge of the secure computer can be simplified if an application manager is provided for applications with changing / dynamic transmission requirements for sensor data / process data, which is connected via further control interfaces with these applications and the load manager, the current Demand for data transmission volume of the connected applications is determined, monitored and reduced in overload situations on the basis of predetermined rules and the resulting requirements of the applications are transmitted to the load manager as a control specification.
  • an application manager is provided for applications with changing / dynamic transmission requirements for sensor data / process data, which is connected via further control interfaces with these applications and the load manager, the current Demand for data transmission volume of the connected applications is determined, monitored and reduced in overload situations on the basis of predetermined rules and the resulting requirements of the applications are transmitted to the load manager as a control specification.
  • Figure 1 is a system for train control with a safe and connected to this non-secure
  • FIG. 2 shows a system according to FIG. 1 expanded by an application manager.
  • Figure 1 shows a system for controlling and monitoring a vehicle, which moves along a route within a route network.
  • the system has a signal-technically safe computer 1 arranged in the vehicle, which is connected to a plurality of sensors S arranged outside the computer 1 (here S 1, S 2, S 3, S 4), which detect vehicle data and store them as sensor data at the inputs E (FIG. El, E2, E3, E4) of the secure computer 1 make it available for further processing.
  • a signal-technically safe computer 1 arranged in the vehicle, which is connected to a plurality of sensors S arranged outside the computer 1 (here S 1, S 2, S 3, S 4), which detect vehicle data and store them as sensor data at the inputs E (FIG. El, E2, E3, E4) of the secure computer 1 make it available for further processing.
  • the secure computer 1 is two channels with the two identi ⁇ 's channels A and B executed.
  • each running an application software 2 which may consist of several appli ⁇ tion programs and processes the sensor data to form process data.
  • a diagnostic policy- software on the secure computer 1 provided 3 of a diagnostic subsystem 3 has access to non-illustrated trace points (obser ⁇ tung points) of the secure computer 1 to which the A ⁇ transitions E are and where the diagnosis -policy software 3aAccess to the computer-internal data communication has and at the observation points existing diagnostic data, ie process data including sensor data, copy and decouple.
  • the decoupling takes place at the request of a diagnostic strategy software 3b, which is implemented on a non-secure computer 4 operating independently of the secure computer 1 and forms, together with the diagnostic policy software 3a, a complete diagnostic subsystem 3 Diagnostic Strategy Software 3b operating on the basis of the requested diagnostic data.
  • a diagnostic strategy software 3b which is implemented on a non-secure computer 4 operating independently of the secure computer 1 and forms, together with the diagnostic policy software 3a, a complete diagnostic subsystem 3 Diagnostic Strategy Software 3b operating on the basis of the requested diagnostic data.
  • the diagnostic strategy software 3b has mechanisms to switch trace levels (control specifications for the data transmission quantity) of the trace points and thus to decouple more or less data from a trace point via diagnostic policy software 3a
  • both computers 1, 4 are connected to each other via a hardware interface 5.
  • the diagnostic data are respectively decoupled at the request of the diagnostic strategy software 3b from the diagnostic policy software 3a and transferred via the interface 5 to the diagnostic strategy software 3b.
  • an application 6, which in particular sensor data instead and processed to relieve the si ⁇ Chere computer 1 for signaling non-secure purposes, are placed on the low to noriceanforderun ⁇ conditions. If required, any number of applications 6 can be implemented in the non-secure computer 4.
  • the application data (in particular sensor data) required by the application 6 are requested by the diagnostic subsystem 3, such as the diagnostic data via the diagnostic strategy software 3 b, in the diagnostic policy software 3 a and via the trace access T (here T 1, FIG. T2, T3, T4), which are designed as software interfaces, application-6 of the diagnostic strategy software 3bdeterioratge provides ⁇ .
  • the load manager 7 reduces the requested total data volume, so that an overload of the (coupling)
  • the load manager 7 manages rules with which, for example, the requested diagnostic data volume is priority-controlled the maximum available data throughput (transport capacity) can be limited.
  • the processed application data are then output via output channels A (here A1, A2, A3).
  • Figure 2 shows a system (having the functionality "Lastma ⁇ management" Enhanced diagnostic Strategy software 3b) according to Figure 1, wherein a plurality of applications 6 (three applications 6a, 6b, 6c here) running on the non-secure computer 4 whose requested input data provides the diagnostic strategy software 3b to the trace accesses T designed as a software interface.
  • an application manager 8 is provided, which is connected to the applications 6 via further control interfaces.
  • the data provided by the diagnostic policy software 3a are differentiated after transmission into the diagnostic strategy software 3b with respect to their use as diagnostic and application data and further processed accordingly.
  • the diagnostic data are supplied to the plausibility oracle of the diagnostic strategy software 3b for evaluation and the application data is provided to the trace access T in the diagnostic subsystem of the non-secure computer 7 for the applications 6.
  • the application data provided for the applications 6 in the non-secure computer 4 can be data of any desired sensors S of the two channels A, B of the secure computer 1.
  • preprocessed sensor data ie process data, such as filtered and compressed data is transmitted.
  • process data such as filtered and compressed data
  • any other data from the processing in the secure computer 1 such as, for example, calculation results or outputs to the process periphery of the secure computer 1, can be used as input data for the non-secure computer 4.
  • the transmission of the application data into the non-secure computer 4 via diagnostic subsystem 3 can be organized statically (FIG. 1) or dynamically (FIG. 2).
  • the type and scope of the data per trace access T are immutable, ie the trace level of this data is constant.
  • the data load claimed by the application data transmission can be calculated in the diagnostic subsystem 3 as a constant base load.
  • the load manager 7 can dynamically divide the remaining data throughput (the transport capacity) for system diagnostics and intercept load peaks by limiting the diagnostic data transmission.
  • the scope or frequency of the application data to be provided changes at at least one trace access T. This is controlled dynamically by switching the trace level from the diagnostic policy software 3a based on transmission requests.
  • An application manager 8 as an additional component in the non-secure computer 4 should always be introduced if in the non-secure computer 1 at least one application 6 has dynamic transmission requirements.
  • the application manager also has control interfaces to all applications 6 with dynamic transmission requests in the non-secure computer 4; For these applications 6, all three applications 6a, 6b, 6c belong here.
  • the object of the application manager 8 is to identify and ak ⁇ tual data required (communication requirements) of the applications implemented in 6 control commands to the diagnostic road tegy software 3b.
  • Communication request profile are generated, which is passed to the load manager 7 of the diagnostic strategy software 3b.
  • the load manager 7 evaluates the communication profile of the applications 6 requested by the application manager together with the requirements for the transmission of diagnostic data currently determined by the diagnostic strategy software 3b or the plausibility oracle. If the transmission requirements exceed a fixed load limit in total, the amount of data is reduced by the load manager 7. For this purpose, the load manager 7 can manage rules and criteria with which a decision can be made between the competing demands in high-load situations. As a result of the evaluation will be the diagnostic strategy-Soft ⁇ ware the trace level of the diagnostic interface, so the trace points are controlled in safe computer first The control of the trace level for the application data is done indirectly by controlling the trace levels for diagnostic data.
  • the applications 6 in the non-secure computer 4 can use the diagnostic subsystem 3 as a real-time transmission platform, which all required sensor and other input data (process data) from the secure computer 1 in the non-secure computer 4 can reflect.
  • the applications 6 have the possibility of dynamically controlling the communication behavior of the diagnostic subsystem 3 according to their requirements.
  • a priority mechanism can, for example for a time critical application 6, de ⁇ ren input data comprises load peaks, are established, which means that in Hochlastsi ⁇ situations, the diagnostic sub-system 3 restores the transmission of all On the other ren data in favor of this time-critical application. 6
  • An essential feature of the (coupling) interface 5 between diagnostic strategy software 3b and diagnostic policy software 3a is therefore that of the diagnostic and
  • Computer 1, 4 takes place, run the control commands for Anpas ⁇ solution Tracelevel exclusively in the direction of diagnostic policy software 3a.
  • the results of the processing in the non-secure computer 4 can be used directly for the control of the process peripherals.
  • a return transmission of results of the processing from the non-secure computer 4 into the secure computer 1 is also possible in principle.
  • this requires an additional interface, since the existing interface 5 is designed only for the data transmission to the non-secure computer 4.
  • the application of the method is explained in greater detail using the example of the safe (vehicle) computer 1 for a European Train Control System (ETCS train control system), which has to determine and monitor a resulting maximum speed according to trackside driving specifications for the vehicle. If the maximum speed is exceeded, the vehicle must be braked automatically, so that speed limits of the preceding section of the route are maintained.
  • ECS train control system European Train Control System
  • the train control system calculates and monitors a non-safety-relevant operational speed profile which lies below the speed of the safety-relevant profile. If the operating speed profile is exceeded, the service brake is actuated, while emergency braking is initiated if the safe speed profile is exceeded. Service braking is therefore the regular task of vehicle control, while emergency braking technical monitoring function realized, which is only active in case of malfunction of the regular control.
  • the vehicle has a location function based on the data of several independent sensors, such as radars and position encoders.
  • the calculation of the current vehicle location is a prerequisite for the determination of zuläs ⁇ sigen speed profile from the trackside ago ⁇ gave and has responsibility for security.
  • the (tracking) sen- sors S are being Schlos ⁇ sen to secure (vehicle) computer first Furthermore, there is a control of the emergency brake and a control of the service brake by the secure computer. 1
  • the non-secure computer 4 which is coupled to the secure computer 1, has a redundant structure and is interconnected for reasons of availability.
  • the connection of the service brake is shifted from Siche ⁇ ren computer 1 on the non-secure computer. 4
  • non-secure computer 4 in addition to the diagnostic strategy software 3b of the diagnostic subsystem 3, application functionality is implemented, which is outsourced from the secure computer 1 and thereby relieves it. So the obtainedi ⁇ chere computer 1 takes in this case, for example, the calculation and output of non-security service brake ⁇ function.
  • the existing (diagnostic) interface 5 in the secure computing ⁇ ner 1 is used to provide application data.
  • the sensor data of the location of the secure computer 1 are requested.
  • the non-secure computer requires 4 trackside specifications for distance and journey history, wel ⁇ che in the secure computer 1 and are requested.
  • the sensor data of the location are not only stored as diagnostic data in the non-secure computer 4, but also used by the application 6 in the non-secure computer 4.
  • the sensor data has two trace levels. In the lower trace level, only every fifth sensor input is delivered to the (diagnostic) interface 5 - for location applications this is usually sufficient. At the higher trace level, each sensor input on the diagnostic policy software 3a is decoupled, so that with higher transmission costs the complete raw data is mirrored into the non-secure computer.
  • the application 6 in the non-secure computer is provided with a trace access T1 in the diagnostic subsystem 3 per sensor S.
  • a trace access T2 is provided for the provision of route-side specifications of the route and route.
  • the sensor data is transmitted cyclically, while the track-side driving specifications are updated in an event-oriented manner.
  • the transmission of the sensor data should be carried out dynamically depending on the operating behavior and the required locating accuracy of the vehicle.
  • Unbridledigabe ⁇ motion of the vehicle location and Ge ⁇ schwindtechniksverlaufes sensor data with low trace levels are used for the calculation. This is determined by the application manager 8 and requested from the diagnostic strategy software 3b.
  • the diagnostic strategy software 3b modifies the trace level in the diagnostic policy software 3a.
  • the diagnosis- Policy software 3a transmits the sensor data according to the selected ge ⁇ ringeren trace level.
  • sensor raw data is to be used with the highest accuracy in order to achieve a movement sequence to a target point with a low tolerance.
  • the current sensor data requirement is transmitted by the application 6 via the application manager 8 to the diagnostic strategy software 3b, which then increases the corresponding traceability in the secure computer 1.
  • additional data of a location sensor currency ⁇ end of the braking process in the non-secure computer 4 can be transferred, for example, to improve the accuracy of the application 6 on. After completing the braking process, the trace level is reduced again.
  • the transfer of the route specifications is static. As soon as new specifications are available in the secure computer 1, these are updated via the diagnostic interface at the corresponding trace access T in the non-secure computer 4, where the application 6 has in each case all the data currently required for the route specification.
  • the diagnostic subsystem 3 detects any abnormalities on a positioning sensor S, the increase in the tracelevel for this sensor can be triggered for diagnostic reasons.
  • the application 6 receives in this case more sensor data than requested.
  • the data volume is priority-controlled by the Lastmana- 7.
  • the Ap ⁇ carriessrtz be transmitted with the highest trace level, while at times one is ⁇ side set of diagnostic data, the trace level. As a result, fewer are available in this case Diagnostic data available, but the function of the application 6 in non-secure computer 4 is not limited.
  • the behavior of the load manager 7 is subject to other priorities such that the acquisition of high trace level diagnostic data occurs while the low trace level application data transfer is performed.
  • the application 6 can perform the performance-intensive calculation of the operational speed profile and the control of the service brake as a function of operational requirements and the system state and thus relieve the secure computer 1.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Biomedical Technology (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Debugging And Monitoring (AREA)
  • Hardware Redundancy (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé pour commander et surveiller un véhicule se déplaçant le long d'un trajet, notamment pour l'influence signalétique sécurisée d'un train, avec lequel un ordinateur (1) sécurisé au niveau de la signalétique est monté dans le véhicule et sur celui-ci sont mis en oevre un logiciel (2) d'application destiné à traiter des données de capteur ainsi qu'un logiciel (3a) de politique de diagnostic destiné à extraire les données de capteur ainsi que les données de procédé, avec lequel l'ordinateur (1) sécurisé est relié par le biais d'une interface avec un ordinateur (4) non sécurisé du point de vue signalétique sur lequel est mis en oevre un logiciel (3b) de stratégie de diagnostic qui délivre un diagnostic du système. Pour soulager l'ordinateur (1) sécurisé, l'invention propose de mettre en oevre au moins une application (6) supplémentaire sur l'ordinateur (4) non sécurisé, laquelle traite les données de capteur/données de procédé à la place de l'ordinateur (1) sécurisé et en vue de soulager celui-ci. Selon l'invention, les données de capteur/données de procédé sont également demandées par le biais du logiciel de stratégie de diagnostic auprès du logiciel (3a) de politique de diagnostic et sont fournies par celui-ci par le biais de l'interface (5).
PCT/EP2007/057697 2006-08-02 2007-07-26 Procédé pour commander et surveiller un véhicule se déplaçant le long d'un trajet, notamment pour l'influence signalétique sécurisée d'un train Ceased WO2008015148A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102006037153.4 2006-08-02
DE200610037153 DE102006037153A1 (de) 2006-08-02 2006-08-02 Verfahren zur Steuerung und Überwachung eines sich entlang einer Fahrstrecke bewegenden Fahrzeugs, insbesondere zur signaltechnisch sicheren Zugbeeinflussung

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Cited By (4)

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EP2765053A2 (fr) 2013-02-06 2014-08-13 Insight Design Services Limited Système de diagnostic de train ferroviaire
EP3290289A1 (fr) * 2016-09-02 2018-03-07 ALSTOM Transport Technologies Véhicule ferroviaire comportant un système de supervision et procédé d'utilisation d'un tel système de supervision
CN113212501A (zh) * 2021-04-29 2021-08-06 郑州地铁集团有限公司运营分公司 一种基于地铁站务中心用助手板的电话闭塞办理方法
CN114007906A (zh) * 2019-07-12 2022-02-01 日立安斯泰莫株式会社 安全处理装置

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DE202012013193U1 (de) 2012-06-26 2015-05-06 INTER CONTROL Hermann Köhler Elektrik GmbH & Co KG Vorrichtung für eine sicherheitskritische Anwendung
DE102015115074B4 (de) * 2015-09-08 2024-05-16 InfraView GmbH Meldesystem zur Verarbeitung von Meldungen in technischen Anlagen
DE102016215315A1 (de) * 2016-08-17 2018-02-22 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zum Betreiben eines ETCS (European Train Control System)-Bahnfahrzeugs mit einer GSM-R-Kommunikationsanordnung und ETCS (European Train Control System)-Bahnfahrzeug mit einer GSM-R-Kommunikationsanordnung
DE102017210488A1 (de) * 2017-06-22 2018-12-27 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Steuerung für ein Schienenfahrzeug
DE102021004639A1 (de) 2021-09-14 2023-03-16 Hydac Electronic Gmbh Sensorvorrichtung zum Ermitteln einer Größe

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Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP2765053A2 (fr) 2013-02-06 2014-08-13 Insight Design Services Limited Système de diagnostic de train ferroviaire
EP3290289A1 (fr) * 2016-09-02 2018-03-07 ALSTOM Transport Technologies Véhicule ferroviaire comportant un système de supervision et procédé d'utilisation d'un tel système de supervision
FR3055602A1 (fr) * 2016-09-02 2018-03-09 Alstom Transport Technologies Vehicule ferroviaire comportant un systeme de supervision et procede d'utilisation d'un tel systeme de supervision
CN114007906A (zh) * 2019-07-12 2022-02-01 日立安斯泰莫株式会社 安全处理装置
CN114007906B (zh) * 2019-07-12 2024-03-15 日立安斯泰莫株式会社 安全处理装置
CN113212501A (zh) * 2021-04-29 2021-08-06 郑州地铁集团有限公司运营分公司 一种基于地铁站务中心用助手板的电话闭塞办理方法

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