EP0618550A1 - Système de contrôle d'accès ayant des autorisations décentralisées - Google Patents
Système de contrôle d'accès ayant des autorisations décentralisées Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP0618550A1 EP0618550A1 EP94200897A EP94200897A EP0618550A1 EP 0618550 A1 EP0618550 A1 EP 0618550A1 EP 94200897 A EP94200897 A EP 94200897A EP 94200897 A EP94200897 A EP 94200897A EP 0618550 A1 EP0618550 A1 EP 0618550A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- card
- access
- authorization
- information
- processing unit
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 92
- 238000009434 installation Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 10
- 230000000903 blocking effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00857—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
- G07C9/215—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass the system having a variable access-code, e.g. varied as a function of time
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
- G07C9/27—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass with central registration
Definitions
- the invention relates to an access-permitting system for permitting access to for instance buildings, spaces, installations, vehicles, services and/or computer systems, comprising at least one access card whereon or wherein information can be written and at least one access card reader with which information can be read from a card, which information is further processed by the system to determine whether a card can be permitted access.
- cards are used, for instance in the form of magnetic cards, so-called smart cards having contacts according to the standard ISO-7816, contactless chipcards according to the standard ISO-10536, or programmable cards according to European patent number 0242906 in applicant's name, to permit access to a building, a space or, for instance, to the use of equipment.
- two main groups can be distinguished.
- the identification code or the card number of the card presented is transmitted from a card reader, arranged for instance at an entrance such as a door of a space or building, or a terminal of a computer system, to a central processing unit, whereupon it is centrally determined whether the relevant card number has access at the location where the relevant card is presented. If this is the case, a signal is subsequently transmitted from the central processing unit to the relevant entrance, for instance to open the door or to permit the terminal access to the computer system.
- the proper operation of these access-permitting systems depends on the lines of communication between on the one hand the different entrances and/or access card readers and on the other hand the central processing unit. The proper operation of the access-permitting system also depends on the speed at which communication takes place along these lines of communication.
- a processing unit is centrally arranged as well, also connected, via lines of communication, to card readers decentrally arranged at the entrances, the access information being present per card number in these decentrally arranged processing units.
- the advantage of this second group of systems is that for permitting access no communication need take place between the central processing unit and the decentral card reader, so that these systems react much more quickly and, in the event of failures, break down less quickly and not all at the same time. Consequently, a card reader may release an entrance itself after having read a card.
- the central processing unit transmits this information via the lines of communication to all systems connected. If access is permitted by the card readers, is message hereabout is transmitted to the central processing unit. These messages need not be transmitted immediately, but may also be transmitted later, within particular limits.
- the object of the present invention is to provide a solution to this, wherein the above-mentioned costly lines of communication between the central and the decentral systems are required to a much lesser degree, if at all.
- the access-permitting system is characterized in that the card comprises all relevant information relating to the access authorization of the card within the access-permitting system, so that, after reading the card, it can be determined without supplementary information whether the card can be permitted access.
- the invention is based on the fact that the authorization code(s) are taken along decentrally, via the programmable access cards belonging to the system, to the different entrances in the system. Hence, in the system according to the invention, the information whether a particular card has access at a particular entrance at a particular time is contained in the card itself and need not be transmitted, via lines of communication, from a central processing unit to the decentrally arranged access card reader.
- a solution to the above-mentioned problem is the introduction of a time lock or time window, of for instance one day, within which the cards are valid. In that case, the procedure can be as described below.
- each card should once again be provided with all authorizations with regard to the entrances in the system, valid for that day and for that particular card. Hence, this may only take place on a system that is connected to the central processing unit. Consequently, in this manner, cards that are lost or stolen, whose authorization with regard to the entrances should be adapted in the central processing unit, are valid for one day at the most.
- Another possible problem to the solution according the invention is that due to the lack of lines of communication, the information with regard to the movements of cards within the system cannot be reported to the central processing unit and hence to the system administrator. To solve this problem, it is possible to store on or in a particular card the movements of that card as well, in addition to the authorizations of that card.
- the information with regard to the movements of the card within the system for the past period of time can be passed on to the central processing unit. In this manner, this information does become available in the central processing unit and hence to the system administrator, although slightly shifted in time.
- the access card reader after reading the relevant information from the card, determines on the basis of this information whether or not access can be permitted.
- the relevant information of the card comprises at least one point of time or at least one period for which the access authorization of the card is valid. This may further improve the security and fraude insusceptibility of the system, because when the authorization period has ended, authorization should consciously be granted to a card holder once again.
- the access authorization of the card should be rendered valid again for each new authorization period, while after the new authorization period has ended, the access authorization expires again. Consequently, the holder of the card should not be given a new card, while, however, a non-obvious positive decision is required for extending the authorization by a new period.
- the system further comprises a central processing unit having a card reader/writer connected thereto, while the card can be rendered valid for a new authorization period by the central processing unit via this card reader/writer.
- a holder of a card wishing to extend his authorization for a new period should turn to this card reader/writer.
- the system further comprises a central processing unit to which at least one access card reader is connected, wherein, via this access card reader, the card can be rendered valid for a new authorization period by the central processing unit.
- a central processing unit to which at least one access card reader is connected, wherein, via this access card reader, the card can be rendered valid for a new authorization period by the central processing unit.
- the central processing unit passes this information on to the access card readers for which the card holder presently has an authorization and/or to the access card readers for which the card holder is given an authorization for a new period.
- the new authorization can be written on the card.
- these access card readers can also write information to a card.
- each time the central processing unit extends the authorization automatically, unless a system administrator blocks the automatic extension.
- a system administrator should each time indicate via the central processing unit whether an authorization of a card should be extended. This may for instance be entered at the central processing unit for all issued cards at the same time.
- the system is in particular characterized in that the central processing unit each time extends the authorization by a new period for an indefinite time.
- the central processing unit each time extends the authorization period by a new period for a predetermined length of time.
- the length of time can for instance be 1 year, so that for this period a system administrator need not perform any direct operations.
- the automatic extension for 1 year provides an additional security of the system against errors being made, such as, for instance, the omission of inputting into the central processing unit that an employee has resigned, so that his card must no longer be automatically extended. After all, after one year the automatic extension of the authorization by, for instance, an authorization period of one day, expires.
- information about the relevant entrance which information optionally includes the point of time at which the access was permitted, is written on or in the card, this information being read out by the central processing unit when the period of validity of the card is being extended.
- reading out this information may take place both at the centrally arranged card reader/writer and at an access card reader connected to the central processing unit.
- the authorization information of this card is blocked in the central processing unit, so that the authorization of a card cannot be rendered valid again and the card, at the end of an expiring authorization period, loses its validity. Consequently, a holder who is no longer in the possession of his card may turn to the system administrator, who will subsequently block the authorization extension in the central processing unit.
- an authorization will not be automatically extended. A stolen card will then lose its validity one day (length of time of authorization period) after the theft has been reported to the system administrator.
- the access authorization of the card is valid for at least one predetermined entrance at which an access card reader is arranged.
- the system may be provided with a plurality of access card readers, the information on the card comprising an identity code of at least one access card reader for which access can be permitted to the card in question.
- an access card reader compares, among other things, whether an identity code read out from a card corresponds to its own identity code. If this proves to be the case, and, moreover, the authorization for the relevant period is valid, access may be permitted.
- the information on the card comprises an identity code of the card.
- This identity code can be read out by the central processing unit in one of the above-mentioned manners to decide whether the authorization of the relevant card can be extended.
- FIG. 1 shows two possible embodiments of an access-permitting system according to the invention.
- an exemplary embodiment of an access-permitting system is provided with a reference numeral 1.
- access card reader 2.2 is connected to two entrances 4.2, 4.3, while entrances 2.3 and 2.4 comprise a common access card reader 4.4.
- the other entrances each comprise an access card reader.
- an entrance 4.i may be a door of a building, space, installation, a vehicle and/or any other product for which access can be permitted or refused.
- an entrance may also be, for instance, a terminal of a computer, computer network and/or any other type of computer system.
- the system comprises a central processing unit 8 having connected thereto a card reader/writer 10.
- the access cards 6.j may for instance be magnetic cards, smart cards, contactless chipcards, programmable cards or any other type of cards on which information can be stored to be subsequently read out again.
- Each card 6.j comprises all relevant information on the basis of which it can be determined whether the card in question has a valid authorization for gaining access to a specific entrance 4.k.
- the information in question comprises a code indicating for which entrances 2.i authorization has been granted and a period for which this authorization is valid.
- this authorization period is equal for each entrance 4.k registered on a card.
- the information on the card 6.j comprises a unique card number as identification code of the card in question.
- the operation of the system 1 is as follows.
- a card holder of card 6.j wishing to gain access to entrance 4.k goes to a corresponding access card reader 2.i, i.e. an access card reader coupled to an entrance 4.k, and inserts his card into a slot, intended for this purpose, of the access card reader 2.i.
- This card reader 2.i reads from the card the entrances 4.k for which the card is authorized and the corresponding period(s) for which the card is authorized.
- the access card reader 2.i in question is directly capable of determining whether for the entrance 4.k in question access can be permitted to the card or, rather, the holder of the card. Hence, this does not require information from the central processing unit 8.
- each access card reader comprises a real-time clock. If these two conditions have indeed been met, the relevant access card reader 2.i will control the entrance 4.k in such a manner that it is released to the card holder. If a card holder presents himself to access card reader 2.2, in this example, he will have to key in, on a keyboard of this access card reader, for which of the two entrances 4.2 or 4.3 access is requested.
- an access card reader 2.i gives access to an entrance 4.k
- this is registered on the relevant card by the access card reader.
- an identity code belonging to the relevant entrance and the point of time at which the access was given are registered on the card.
- the period for which an authorization of a card is valid will each time have to be extended after expiration thereof. If no extension of the authorization period takes place, the card will lose its validity within the system 1.
- a card holder should turn with his card to the card reader/writer 10. The card is inserted into the card reader/writer and the central processing unit subsequently reads the identity, i.e. the unique consecutive number of the card, via the card reader/writer 10. If all proceeds normally, the central processing unit 8 will write to the card an authorization for a new period for specific entrances 4.k via the card reader/writer 10. In general, this will mean an extension of an authorization for a specific entrance. As this authorization has again only a limited period of validity, the authorization for a specific entrance should each time be extended for a new period. Such a period may for instance be 1 day, so that an optimally safe system 1 is obtained.
- extension may also take place when the old authorization has already expired, for instance because the card holder was on a holiday.
- a system administrator may enter into the central processing unit whether an authorization can be renewed when the old authorization for a specific entrance has already expired, while it may also be indicated for which period an authorization is extended each time. This means that for instance for one year, an authorization is each time extended by one day. Of course, this can also be programmed in such a manner that an authorization is each time automatically extended by a new period for an indefinite period.
- authorizations will prefefably be automatically extended when a card is read out by the card reader/writer 10 without a system administrator having to give a specific command for this to the central processing unit 8.
- the system administrator has entered only once into the central processing unit 8 that the authorization of the card in question can be extended by a new period each time (for an indefinite time or for a predetermined time) when the card is read out, for instance at the expiration of an authorization period, by the central processing unit 8.
- a new authorization period need not connect to an old period. If, for instance, a card holder has a four-day working week, the central processing unit can be programmed in such a manner that renewal of a period by a period of one day can only take place for Monday through Thursday, while no extension is possible for Friday.
- a system administrator may program the central processing unit 8 in such a manner that it is no longer possible to extend the authorization of a card 6.j. If the card in question is for instance inserted into a slot of the card reader/writer 10, the central processing unit 8 establishes that the card 6.j does not qualify for extension, whereupon an alarm signal may automatically be activated by the central processing unit 8. It is also possible that the card reader/writer 10 seizes the card by transporting it to a place inside the card reader/writer 10 closed from the outside.
- an authorization period for a new entrance is written to the card, for instance because the card holder has been given a new work area within a building. This may also be entered into the central processing unit beforehand by a system administrator.
- the central processing unit When a card is presented to the card reader/writer 10, the central processing unit, the central processing unit will also read out the historical data concerning the entrances 4.i and the points of time at which access was permitted to the holder of the card. In order to relieve the information capacity of a card, this information, after having been read out, may be erased from the card.
- access card readers 2.i are connected to the central processing unit 8. In Fig. 1, these connections 12 are shown in stippling.
- the access card readers 2.i connected to the central processing unit 8 can be used for extending an authorization by a new period as described hereinabove in relation to the card reader/writer 10.
Landscapes
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
- Time Recorders, Dirve Recorders, Access Control (AREA)
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| NL9300566 | 1993-03-31 | ||
| NL9300566A NL9300566A (nl) | 1993-03-31 | 1993-03-31 | Toegangsverleningssysteem met decentrale autorisaties. |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| EP0618550A1 true EP0618550A1 (fr) | 1994-10-05 |
Family
ID=19862235
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP94200897A Withdrawn EP0618550A1 (fr) | 1993-03-31 | 1994-03-31 | Système de contrôle d'accès ayant des autorisations décentralisées |
Country Status (2)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| EP (1) | EP0618550A1 (fr) |
| NL (1) | NL9300566A (fr) |
Cited By (19)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EP1024239A1 (fr) * | 1999-01-28 | 2000-08-02 | International Business Machines Corporation | Système de contrôle d'accès électronique et méthode |
| WO2003088166A3 (fr) * | 2002-04-08 | 2004-04-01 | Corestreet Ltd | Commande d'acces physique |
| US7205882B2 (en) | 2004-11-10 | 2007-04-17 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Actuating a security system using a wireless device |
| US7337315B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2008-02-26 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Efficient certificate revocation |
| US7353396B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2008-04-01 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Physical access control |
| US7529928B2 (en) | 1995-10-24 | 2009-05-05 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Certificate revocation system |
| US7600129B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2009-10-06 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Controlling access using additional data |
| US7657751B2 (en) | 2003-05-13 | 2010-02-02 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Efficient and secure data currentness systems |
| US7660994B2 (en) | 1995-10-24 | 2010-02-09 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Access control |
| US7716486B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2010-05-11 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Controlling group access to doors |
| CN101826226A (zh) * | 2010-04-30 | 2010-09-08 | 中山大学 | 一种智能门禁控制方法及装置 |
| US7822989B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2010-10-26 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Controlling access to an area |
| US7966487B2 (en) | 2004-01-09 | 2011-06-21 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Communication-efficient real time credentials for OCSP and distributed OCSP |
| US8015597B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2011-09-06 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Disseminating additional data used for controlling access |
| US8261319B2 (en) | 1995-10-24 | 2012-09-04 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Logging access attempts to an area |
| US20120274444A1 (en) * | 2002-04-08 | 2012-11-01 | Silvio Micali | Physical access control |
| US8707030B2 (en) | 2003-11-19 | 2014-04-22 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Distributed delegated path discovery and validation |
| US8732457B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2014-05-20 | Assa Abloy Ab | Scalable certificate validation and simplified PKI management |
| WO2020083750A1 (fr) * | 2018-10-22 | 2020-04-30 | Dormakaba Schweiz Ag | Mise à jour de droits d'accès à bande ultra large (uwb) |
Citations (9)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US3906447A (en) * | 1973-01-31 | 1975-09-16 | Paul A Crafton | Security system for lock and key protected secured areas |
| EP0043270A1 (fr) * | 1980-06-27 | 1982-01-06 | Omron Tateisi Electronics Co. | Système de déverrouillage utilisant des cartes |
| EP0122244A2 (fr) * | 1983-04-08 | 1984-10-17 | Besam Security Aktiebolag | Sytème de serrure |
| DE3538733A1 (de) * | 1985-10-31 | 1987-05-07 | Hospi Data Gmbh & Co | Verfahren und vorrichtung zum kodieren einer magnetisch kodierbaren karte |
| WO1988006826A1 (fr) * | 1987-03-02 | 1988-09-07 | Mars Incorporated | Systemes d'acces |
| WO1988009541A1 (fr) * | 1987-05-26 | 1988-12-01 | Cogema Compagnie Generale Des Matieres Nucleaires | Systeme d'identification d'individus |
| EP0380377A1 (fr) * | 1989-01-25 | 1990-08-01 | Urba 2000 | Système de paiement électronique de transports et de services publics par cartes à microcircuit |
| WO1991018169A1 (fr) * | 1990-05-11 | 1991-11-28 | Medeco Security Locks, Inc. | Systeme de securite electronique |
| GB2251266A (en) * | 1990-12-03 | 1992-07-01 | Trioving As | Coded lock/key system with override |
-
1993
- 1993-03-31 NL NL9300566A patent/NL9300566A/nl not_active Application Discontinuation
-
1994
- 1994-03-31 EP EP94200897A patent/EP0618550A1/fr not_active Withdrawn
Patent Citations (9)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US3906447A (en) * | 1973-01-31 | 1975-09-16 | Paul A Crafton | Security system for lock and key protected secured areas |
| EP0043270A1 (fr) * | 1980-06-27 | 1982-01-06 | Omron Tateisi Electronics Co. | Système de déverrouillage utilisant des cartes |
| EP0122244A2 (fr) * | 1983-04-08 | 1984-10-17 | Besam Security Aktiebolag | Sytème de serrure |
| DE3538733A1 (de) * | 1985-10-31 | 1987-05-07 | Hospi Data Gmbh & Co | Verfahren und vorrichtung zum kodieren einer magnetisch kodierbaren karte |
| WO1988006826A1 (fr) * | 1987-03-02 | 1988-09-07 | Mars Incorporated | Systemes d'acces |
| WO1988009541A1 (fr) * | 1987-05-26 | 1988-12-01 | Cogema Compagnie Generale Des Matieres Nucleaires | Systeme d'identification d'individus |
| EP0380377A1 (fr) * | 1989-01-25 | 1990-08-01 | Urba 2000 | Système de paiement électronique de transports et de services publics par cartes à microcircuit |
| WO1991018169A1 (fr) * | 1990-05-11 | 1991-11-28 | Medeco Security Locks, Inc. | Systeme de securite electronique |
| GB2251266A (en) * | 1990-12-03 | 1992-07-01 | Trioving As | Coded lock/key system with override |
Cited By (26)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US7716486B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2010-05-11 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Controlling group access to doors |
| US8015597B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2011-09-06 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Disseminating additional data used for controlling access |
| US7600129B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2009-10-06 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Controlling access using additional data |
| US7822989B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2010-10-26 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Controlling access to an area |
| US8732457B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2014-05-20 | Assa Abloy Ab | Scalable certificate validation and simplified PKI management |
| US7337315B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2008-02-26 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Efficient certificate revocation |
| US7353396B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2008-04-01 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Physical access control |
| US7529928B2 (en) | 1995-10-24 | 2009-05-05 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Certificate revocation system |
| US8261319B2 (en) | 1995-10-24 | 2012-09-04 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Logging access attempts to an area |
| US7660994B2 (en) | 1995-10-24 | 2010-02-09 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Access control |
| US20160180614A1 (en) * | 1996-04-23 | 2016-06-23 | Assa Abloy Ab | Physical access control |
| US6981142B1 (en) | 1999-01-28 | 2005-12-27 | International Business Machines Corporation | Electronic access control system and method |
| WO2000045016A1 (fr) * | 1999-01-28 | 2000-08-03 | International Business Machines Corporation | Systeme et procede de commande d'acces electronique |
| EP1024239A1 (fr) * | 1999-01-28 | 2000-08-02 | International Business Machines Corporation | Système de contrôle d'accès électronique et méthode |
| US9230375B2 (en) * | 2002-04-08 | 2016-01-05 | Assa Abloy Ab | Physical access control |
| US20120274444A1 (en) * | 2002-04-08 | 2012-11-01 | Silvio Micali | Physical access control |
| AU2003228468B2 (en) * | 2002-04-08 | 2009-10-01 | Assa Abloy Ab | Physical access control |
| AU2010200020B2 (en) * | 2002-04-08 | 2012-12-13 | Assa Abloy Ab | Physical access control |
| WO2003088166A3 (fr) * | 2002-04-08 | 2004-04-01 | Corestreet Ltd | Commande d'acces physique |
| US7657751B2 (en) | 2003-05-13 | 2010-02-02 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Efficient and secure data currentness systems |
| US8707030B2 (en) | 2003-11-19 | 2014-04-22 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Distributed delegated path discovery and validation |
| US7966487B2 (en) | 2004-01-09 | 2011-06-21 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Communication-efficient real time credentials for OCSP and distributed OCSP |
| US7205882B2 (en) | 2004-11-10 | 2007-04-17 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Actuating a security system using a wireless device |
| CN101826226A (zh) * | 2010-04-30 | 2010-09-08 | 中山大学 | 一种智能门禁控制方法及装置 |
| WO2020083750A1 (fr) * | 2018-10-22 | 2020-04-30 | Dormakaba Schweiz Ag | Mise à jour de droits d'accès à bande ultra large (uwb) |
| US12356189B2 (en) | 2018-10-22 | 2025-07-08 | Dormakaba Schweiz Ag | UWB access rights update |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| NL9300566A (nl) | 1994-10-17 |
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