EP1061479A2 - Dispositif et procédé pour générer un motif destiné à la sécurité - Google Patents

Dispositif et procédé pour générer un motif destiné à la sécurité Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1061479A2
EP1061479A2 EP00250186A EP00250186A EP1061479A2 EP 1061479 A2 EP1061479 A2 EP 1061479A2 EP 00250186 A EP00250186 A EP 00250186A EP 00250186 A EP00250186 A EP 00250186A EP 1061479 A2 EP1061479 A2 EP 1061479A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
data
security
processing unit
dac
code
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP00250186A
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German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP1061479A3 (fr
Inventor
Dirk Rosenau
Andreas Wagner
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Francotyp Postalia GmbH
Original Assignee
Francotyp Postalia GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Francotyp Postalia GmbH filed Critical Francotyp Postalia GmbH
Publication of EP1061479A2 publication Critical patent/EP1061479A2/fr
Publication of EP1061479A3 publication Critical patent/EP1061479A3/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00314—Communication within apparatus, personal computer [PC] system, or server, e.g. between printhead and central unit in a franking machine
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00362—Calculation or computing within apparatus, e.g. calculation of postage value
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00314—Communication within apparatus, personal computer [PC] system, or server, e.g. between printhead and central unit in a franking machine
    • G07B2017/00322—Communication between components/modules/parts, e.g. printer, printhead, keyboard, conveyor or central unit
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00362—Calculation or computing within apparatus, e.g. calculation of postage value
    • G07B2017/0037—Calculation of postage value
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00959—Cryptographic modules, e.g. a PC encryption board

Definitions

  • the invention relates to an arrangement for generating a security imprint with a security module, according to the in the preamble of Claim 1 specified type and for a method for generation a security imprint according to the preamble of claim 9 specified type.
  • a postal security module is part of a Arrangement that is particularly suitable for use in a Franking machine or mail processing machine or computer with Mail processing function is suitable. The procedure serves as a backup manipulation with unpaid frankings on postal items.
  • a security imprint has a machine-readable marker with variable data and a crypto or authentication code.
  • a crypto or authentication code formed from the variable data is compared with the printed crypto or authentication code.
  • the franking machine has a single microprocessor that calculates both a cryptocode or a DAC (DATA AUTHENTIFICATION CODE) to secure the print data, as well as the print image itself.
  • the latter consists of fixed frame pixel data and the window pixel data.
  • Window pixel data is variable and semi-variable print data.
  • the print data must be embedded in advance. If the changes extend over several printing columns, with more than half of the printing columns of the entire printed image having to be changed, this results in a corresponding increase in the computing time. Then, before each franking image printout, a recalculation of the print image with other variable window data and with new DAC print data is necessary. The throughput during franking is significantly reduced in the case of such print images for a security imprint.
  • the invention is based, a method and a task Arrangement to develop the throughput of mail when franking with to increase a security footprint.
  • One technique is used for franking machines with high throughput (system cycle) to develop the franking imprint after each successful settlement is signed by a security code.
  • the Signature can be calculated quickly enough to make it dependent on the system clock the franking machine quickly enough for the print image calculation To make available. Even if the changes in the print data from The throughput is not intended to be a maximum of print to print reduced that a security print is printed.
  • the object is with the features of claim 1 for an arrangement and solved with the features of claim 9 for a method.
  • the security code is calculated by a Separate security module made while the print image data preparation is carried out by the franking machine processor.
  • a recalculation of the security code SC or DAC using a module processor is triggered if the new system data from the module processor of the security module are recognized as valid, the recalculation of the security code is based on preset values.
  • the serial number and the key indicator KI are the fixed system data.
  • the print date, postage value and ascending register value are the variable System data. The print date remains constant for bulk frankings. It is envisaged the first to generate the data authorization code (DAC) require eight bytes according to an algorithm in one to calculate the first round for each day. At a stack equivalent post, the postage remains unchanged. Of the Data for a security imprint changes at least the increasing Value tab.
  • DAC data authorization code
  • the Security footprint meets particularly strict security requirements, because the printed data is verifiable and therefore unmanipulable.
  • a data processing time period T alt is required per franking with a security imprint.
  • the time / control diagram according to the invention - shown in FIG. 1b - for a franking machine requires a data processing time period T new per franking with a security imprint that is shorter than the old data processing time period T alt per franking. This is only possible because in the invention there is a division of tasks for two data processing units, a microprocessor in the meter being provided for the printing tasks and a security module for the security tasks.
  • the printing tasks include an input routine 401 for the postage value a sensor routine 402 to determine the letter system, a prompt routine 403 for billing, a calculation routine 404 for the print image and a print routine 405.
  • the security tasks include a subroutine 406-411 for DAC calculation, a subroutine 412, 413 for accounting and one Deploy subroutine to DAC.
  • the calculation routine 404 for the print image is particularly complex for a security imprint, therefore the print image build-up begins before the end of the billing.
  • the microprocessor in the meter executes the print routine 405, while the security module is already calculating the security code for the next print image as soon as the creation of a further letter at the entrance of the transport route is detected by a letter sensor. This is particularly useful for mass frankings of mail items, especially letters, with the same postage value.
  • the creation of another letter which is detected by a letter sensor at the entrance of the transport route, triggers an interrupt for the microprocessor in the meter, which forwards the letter system to the security module and then continues the calculations that have started for the print image construction.
  • the patent US 5,710,721 under the title: INTERNAL POSTAGE METER MACHINE INTERFACE CIRCUIT, describes in principle how an interrupt for the microprocessor is triggered when a sensor signal is triggered and how the pressure control works.
  • the microprocessor is still working on the print image construction (step 404) or is busy carrying out the print routine (step 405) while the forwarding 412 of another letter system to the security module SM, whereupon the latter already carries out further calculations 316-321 for a next mail piece ( Letter).
  • the security module is prompted to carry out an accounting.
  • the security module SM now carries out the billing (steps 322, 323) and sends (step 324) the security code DAC to the microprocessor 91 of the meter, which is now able to complete the print image construction for the further print image (step 414).
  • FIG. 2 shows a block diagram of a franking machine.
  • the Control device 1 has a microprocessor 91 associated memories 92, 93, 94, 95 equipped motherboard 9.
  • the program memory 92 contains an operating program for printing at least and at least security-relevant components of the program for a predetermined change in format of part of the useful data.
  • the RAM 93 is used for the temporary storage of intermediate results.
  • the non-volatile memory NVM 94 is used for the non-volatile temporary storage of data, for example statistical data, which are arranged according to cost centers.
  • the calendar / clock module 95 likewise contains addressable but non-volatile memory areas for the non-volatile intermediate storage of intermediate results or also known program parts.
  • control device 1 is connected to a chip card read / write unit 70, the microprocessor 91 of the control device 1 being programmed, for example, to load the useful data N from the memory area of a chip card 49 for use in corresponding memory areas of the franking machine .
  • a first chip card 49 inserted into an insertion slot 72 of the chip card read / write unit 70 allows a data record to be reloaded into the franking machine for at least one application.
  • the chip card 49 contains, for example, the postage fees for all the usual postal carrier services in accordance with the tariff of the postal authority and a postal carrier identifier in order to generate a stamp image with the franking machine and to stamp the postal items in accordance with the tariff of the postal authority.
  • the control device 1 forms the actual meter with the means 91 to 95 of the aforementioned main board 9 and also includes a keyboard 88, a display unit 89 and an application-specific circuit ASIC 90 and interface 8 for the postal security module PSM 100.
  • the safety module PSM 100 is connected to the aforementioned ASIC 90 and the microprocessor 91 and via the parallel ⁇ C bus with at least the means 91 to 95 of the main board 9 and connected to display unit 89.
  • the control bus carries cables for the signals CE, RD and WR between the safety module PSM 100 and the aforementioned ASIC 90.
  • the microprocessor 91 points preferably a pin for one from the PSM 100 security module issued interrupt signal i, further connections for the keyboard 88, a serial interface SI-1 for the connection of the chip card read / write unit 70 and a serial interface SI-2 for the optional connection of a MODEM.
  • Using the MODEM can for example in the non-volatile memory of the postal Security funds PSM 100 stored credit can be increased.
  • the postal security device PSM 100 is enclosed in a secure housing. Hardware-based billing is carried out in the PSM 100 postal security module before each franking imprint. Billing takes place independently of cost centers.
  • the ASIC 90 has a serial interface circuit 98 to a device upstream in the mail stream, a serial interface circuit 96 to the sensors and actuators of the printing device 2, a serial interface circuit 97 to the pressure control electronics 16 for the print head 4 and a serial interface circuit 99 to one the printing device 20 in the mail stream downstream device.
  • DE 197 11 997 shows an embodiment variant for the peripheral interface, which is suitable for several peripheral devices (stations). It has the title: Arrangement for communication between a base station and other stations of a mail processing machine and for their emergency shutdown.
  • Interface circuit 96 coupled to that in the machine base located interface circuit 14 provides at least one connection to the sensors 6, 7, 17 and to the actuators, for example to Drive motor 15 for the roller 11 and a cleaning and Sealing station RDS 40 for the inkjet print head 4, as well as for Labeler 50 in the machine base.
  • the basic arrangement and the interaction between inkjet printhead 4 and the RDS 40 can be found in DE 197 26 642 C2, with the title: arrangement for Positioning an inkjet printhead and cleaning and Sealing device.
  • the transport device consists of a conveyor belt 10 and two rollers 11, 11 '.
  • One of the reels is that equipped with a motor 15 drive roller 11, another is idler roller 11 '.
  • the drive roller 11 is as Toothed roller executed
  • the conveyor belt 10 is accordingly as Toothed belt executed, which ensures the clear power transmission.
  • Encoder 5 6 is coupled to one of the rollers 11, 11 '.
  • the drive roller 11 with an incremental encoder 5 sits firmly on one Axis.
  • the incremental encoder 5 is, for example, a slotted disc executed, which interacts with a light barrier 6, and passes line 19 sends an encoder signal to motherboard 9.
  • the individual print elements of the print head are connected to printhead electronics within its housing and that the print head can be controlled for purely electronic printing is.
  • the pressure control is based on the path control, the selected stamp offset is taken into account, which is by keyboard 88 or if necessary, entered via chip card and stored in NVM 94 memory is stored non-volatile.
  • a planned imprint therefore results from Stamp offset (without printing), the franking print image and if necessary additional print images for advertising slogan, shipping information (election prints) and additional editable messages.
  • the non-volatile Memory NVM 94 has a large number of memory areas. Underneath are those that the loaded postage fee tables are non-volatile to save.
  • the chip card read / write unit 70 consists of an associated one mechanical support for the microprocessor card and contact unit 74. The latter allows a secure mechanical mounting of the chip card in reading position and clear signaling of reaching the Reading position of the chip card in the contacting unit.
  • the microprocessor card with the microprocessor 75 has a programmed Readability for all types of memory cards or chip cards.
  • the interface to the franking machine is a serial interface according to RS232 standard.
  • the data transfer rate is min. 1.2 K baud.
  • the power supply is switched on using a on the main circuit board connected switch 71. After switching on the power supply there is a self-test function with readiness message.
  • FIG. 3 is a perspective view of the franking machine from FIG shown at the back.
  • the franking machine consists of a meter 1 and a base 2.
  • the latter is with a chip card read / write unit 70 equipped, which is arranged behind the guide plate 20 and from the Upper housing edge 22 is accessible.
  • a chip card 49 is turned upwards inserted into the slot 72 below.
  • the guide plate is in contact with the input data printed a security imprint 31.
  • the letter feed opening is through a transparent plate 21 and the guide plate 20 laterally limited.
  • the Status display of the plugged onto the main board 9 of the meter 1 Security module 100 is visible from the outside through an opening 109.
  • FIG. 4 shows a representation of a security imprint as it is from the American USPS is required.
  • the security imprint is arranged to the right of the advertising cliché and shows in the upper half Carrier logo and postage value and the date in the lower half, the postage value, a key indicator and a data authentication code DAC in a first line and a manufacturer ID, a machine ID, one Model ID and the ascending register value in a second line, where both lines are machine readable. Both machine readable lines are laterally delimited by marking bars, which the detection and improve the evaluation of the characters using the OCR method. On appropriate evaluation procedure for the aforementioned data, which the Play characters, was already in the European application EP 862 143 A2 proposed for checking a security imprint.
  • the calculation of the DAC for the security imprint performed in the security module.
  • Another acceleration The calculation of the security code is done by choosing one Assembler algorithm chosen and certified for the DES calculation educates.
  • a left out value is defined for these special date values. This is used instead of the date entry. For example, the value 0 is used if the corresponding date parts are not available.
  • Table 1 shows another example of the data resulting from a security imprint.
  • # information Value range Left out Leading zeroes 1.
  • Key indicator 0 9 7.
  • Vendor ID FP 9. Machine ID 0000001 9999999 YES 10th Model ID JMB01 JMB99 11. Ascending register 00000000 FFFFFF YES
  • Table 2 shows the length of the required bytes of individual and all system data that are included in the calculation of the security code.
  • element Byte length Range of values (decimal) 1.
  • 3rd Post date Total 3
  • Table 3 shows an example of system data for a security code.
  • FIG. 5 shows a block diagram of the postal security module PSM 100 in a preferred variant.
  • the negative pole of the battery 134 is grounded and a pin P23 of the contact group 102.
  • the positive pole of the battery 134 is connected via line 193 to one input of voltage changeover switch 180 and line 191 carrying system voltage is connected to the other input of voltage changeover switch 180.
  • the SL-389 / P is suitable as a battery 134 for a lifespan of up to 3.5 years or the SL-386 / P for a lifespan of up to 6 years with a maximum power consumption by the PSM 100 commercially available circuit type ADM 8693ARN can be used.
  • the output of the voltage changeover switch 180 is connected to the battery monitoring unit 12 and the detection unit 13 via the line 136.
  • the battery monitoring unit 12 and the detection unit 13 are in communication with the pins 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the processor 120 via the lines 135, 164 and 137, 139.
  • the output of the voltage changeover switch 180 is also present via the line 136 at the supply input of a first memory SRAM 116, which becomes a non-volatile memory NVRAM of a first technology due to the existing battery 134.
  • the security module is connected to the franking machine via the system bus 115, 117, 118.
  • Processor 120 can communicate with a remote data center through the system bus and modem 83.
  • the ASIC 150 does the billing.
  • the postal accounting data are stored in non-volatile memories of different technologies.
  • System voltage is present at the supply input of a second memory NV-RAM 114.
  • This second technology preferably comprises a RAM and an EEPROM, the latter automatically taking over the data content in the event of a system power failure.
  • the NVRAM 114 of the second technology is connected to the corresponding address and data inputs of the ASIC 150 via an internal address and data bus 112, 113.
  • the ASIC 150 contains at least one hardware accounting unit for the Calculation of the postal data to be saved.
  • PAL 160 is access logic to the ASIC 150 housed.
  • the ASIC 150 is controlled by the PAL 160 logic.
  • An address and control bus 117, 115 from the main board 9 is on corresponding pins of the logic PAL 160 and the PAL 160 generates at least one control signal for the ASIC 150 and one Control signal 119 for the program memory FLASH 128.
  • the processor 120 executes a program that is stored in the FLASH 128.
  • the Processor 120, FLASH 28, ASIC 150 and PAL 160 are one internal system bus interconnected, the lines 110, 111, 126, 119 for data, address and control signals.
  • the RESET unit 130 is connected via line 131 to pin 3 of the Processor 120 and connected to a pin of the ASIC's 150.
  • the Processor 120 and the ASIC 150 are when the Supply voltage through a reset generation in the RESET unit 130 reset.
  • Lines are connected to pins 6 and 7 of processor 120, which only applies to a PSM 100 plugged into the main board 9 Form conductor loop 18.
  • the processor 120 internally has a processing unit CPU 121, one Real time clock RTC 122, a RAM unit 124 and an input / output unit 125 on. I / O ports of the input / output unit are located at pins 8 and 9 125, to which module-internal signaling means are connected, for example colored light emitting diodes LED's 107, 108, which the Signal the status of the safety module 100.
  • the security modules can assume various states in their life cycle. So e.g. be detected whether the module is valid cryptographic Contains key. It is also important to differentiate whether that Module works or is defective. The exact type and number of Module states depend on the functions implemented in the module and on the Implementation dependent.
  • the processor 120 of the security module 100 is via an internal module Data bus 126 with a FLASH 128 and with the ASIC 150 connected.
  • the FLASH 128 serves as program memory and is included System voltage Us + supplied. For example, it is a 128 Kbyte FLASH memory type AM29F010-45EC.
  • the ASIC 150 of the postal security module 100 delivers via an internal module Address bus 110 addresses 0 through 7 to the corresponding address inputs of the FLASH 128.
  • the processor 120 of the security module 100 delivers the addresses 8 to 15 to the via an internal address bus 111 corresponding address inputs of the FLASH 128.
  • the ASIC 150 of the Security module 100 is located above contact group 101 of interface 8 with data bus 118, with address bus 117 and control bus 115 the motherboard 9 in communication connection.
  • the real-time clock RTC 122 and the memory RAM 124 are from one Operating voltage supplied via line 138. This tension will generated by the voltage monitoring unit (Battery Observer) 12. The latter also provides a status signal 164 and responds to one Control signal 135.
  • the voltage switch 180 outputs the output voltage on line 136 for voltage monitoring unit 12 and memory 116 further that of its input voltages that is bigger than the other.
  • the battery of the postage meter machine feeds the real-time clock 122 with date and / or time registers and / or the static RAM (SRAM) 124, which holds security-relevant data, in the aforementioned manner in the aforementioned manner. If the voltage of the battery falls below a certain limit during battery operation, the circuit described in the exemplary embodiment connects the feed point for RTC and SRAM to ground. Ie the voltage at the RTC and the SRAM is then 0V. The result of this is that the SRAM 124, which contains important cryptographic keys, for example, is deleted very quickly. At the same time, the registers of the RTC 122 are also deleted and the current time and date are lost.
  • SRAM static RAM
  • This action prevents a possible attacker from manipulating the battery voltage to stop the postage meter machine internal clock 122 without losing security-relevant data. This prevents him from bypassing security measures such as long time watchdogs.
  • the circuit described changes to a self-holding state, in which it remains even when the voltage is subsequently increased.
  • the processor can query the status of the circuit (status signal) and thus and / or, by evaluating the contents of the deleted memory, conclude that the battery voltage has in the meantime fallen below a certain value.
  • the processor can reset the monitoring circuit, ie make it "armed".
  • the first data processing unit 120 is programmed by a program stored in the program memory 128 of the security module to precalculate the data authorization code DAC and to transmit it to the separate data processing unit ⁇ P, 91, which is parallel to and approximately simultaneously with the operation of the pre-calculation by a program in its program memory 92 Print data preparation and programmed to calculate a print image. It is provided that the first data processing unit 120 of the security module 100 has an internal non-volatile memory 124, in which at least one key for the calculation of the data authorization code (DAC) is stored in a manner protected against access.
  • DAC data authorization code
  • a second data processing unit 150 is provided in the security module 100 for billing the postal registers, so that the data processing unit separate from the security module 100 forms a third data processing unit ⁇ P, 91 in particular for processing the printing tasks.
  • the second data processing unit ASIC 150 contains a hardware accounting unit for carrying out the accounting, which stores the new postal register record with the accounting data in the non-volatile memory 114, 116.
  • the first data processing unit is a module processor 120 of the Security module, which is preferably programmed, the first 8 Bytes of the data authorization code (DAC) according to an algorithm in to calculate a first round for every day.
  • the algorithm for the data authorization code (DAC) includes a DES algorithm, in particular a triple DES algorithm (3DES).
  • the module processor 120 of the security module is programmed at Single mail processing after entering a postage value the data authorization code (DAC) in advance or in bulk mail processing after settlement of the previous postage value predict the next data authorization code (DAC), if the postage value is not changed and after advance calculation the Data authorization code (DAC) to the third data processing unit ⁇ P, 91 to be transmitted immediately.
  • DAC data authorization code
  • DAC Data authorization code
  • the internal non-volatile memory 124 is a battery 134 supported SRAM memory of the module processor 120 and is with Areas for protected storage of at least part of the Data of a postal register record formed, which in a pre-billing arises. In one of the memory areas is that for Calculation of a data authorization code (DAC) required at least one key is saved protected.
  • DAC data authorization code
  • the module processor 120 of the security module 100 is programmed with the postage value the increasing register value R2 (ascending register) in To be determined in advance and taking into account the determined value Data authorization code (DAC) for the data of the security imprint to calculate in advance.
  • Data authorization code (DAC) for the data of the security imprint to calculate in advance.
  • the data authorization code (DAC) can be calculated in advance of the security imprint are: machine identification, OCR key indicator, Date, post value and register value R2 for the rising register, the was determined in advance billing.
  • the microprocessor CPU 121 is programmed by a corresponding program stored in the flash 128 to carry out the aforementioned self-tests, a power-on self-test being carried out in a first step 300 after the start 299 and then a question being asked in step 301 as to whether the power on Self-test has given an OK. If this is the case, in step 302 the green LED 107 is controlled by the microprocessor CPU 121 via an I / O port 125 to light up. Otherwise, in step 303, the red LED 108 is controlled by the microprocessor CPU 121 via an I / O port 125 to light up.
  • Step 302 branches to query 304, in which it is checked whether a further static check is required. If this is the case, the method branches back to step 300. Otherwise, a branch is made to query 305, in which it is checked whether a letter system is detected by a letter sensor or whether an input of a new postage value is recognized by module processor 120. If neither of these is the case, a branch is made back to step 302 and a queue is thus continued until a letter system / new entry has been determined. In the latter case, a branch is made to step 306 in order to finish entering the data. Beginning simultaneously or shortly after time t 0 , a step 307 for MAC calculation is started on the basis of the postal register data P ' to available at time t 0 .
  • a MAC (P to ) formed earlier by the module processor 120 is valid at time t 0 .
  • the MAC calculation is completed at time t 1 .
  • the calculated MAC (P ' to ) is compared in step 308 with the old MAC (P to ) valid at time t 0 (already formed earlier by module processor 120) at time t 1 . If they do not match, a branch is made to step 315 in order to control the LEDs 107, 108 with an orange light. Otherwise the program branches to step 309. There, at time t 2 in module processor 120, the ascending register value R2 t2 is calculated in advance and a new DAC calculation is carried out.
  • step 310 the postal register set P t2 is precalculated, a MAC is newly formed , possibly with storage in NVRAM_P 124.
  • the precalculation of the data authorization code (DAC) includes the ascending register value R2 and further data from a point in time t i + 1 , which after the end of data entry and / or in the case of mass frankings from the creation of a further item of mail and before the actual settlement (312).
  • the other data which includes at least the postage value p and the date, at least the machine ID and, if applicable, the date can be included in the DAC forecast after the creation of another mail item (time t 0 ), if it is for the respective franking stack of letters remains unchanged.
  • the generation in the security module is completed by time t 5 .
  • time t 3 when in step 311 the storage of the MAC (P t2 ) in NVRAM_P has been completed by one data processing unit 120, the other data processing unit, namely the hardware accounting unit - shown in FIG. 5 - in ASIC 150 a calculation of the new postal register record was carried out in step 312.
  • the results P ' t3 and MAC (P t2 ) are stored in the NVRAM_A.
  • a number of further steps can then be carried out serially or parallel to the aforementioned steps, which include at least one sub-step for generating a security code DAC and which conclude with a step 314 for providing print data for franking the letter.
  • the latter at least includes sending the security code DAC to the microprocessor 91 of the meter.
  • the method then branches back to step 302.
  • a basically the same MAC formation procedure is also used, but the DAC is composed of the ascending register value R2 and other data (machine ID, OCR key indicator, date, postage value p) and the generation takes place at a different time t i + 1, for example from the end of data input.
  • system data such as the OCR key indicator, the machine ID and the date
  • DAC data authorization code
  • at least the machine ID and optionally the date from the end of the data input are included in a pre-calculation of n bytes of the data authorization code (DAC).
  • changeable system data such as the postage value and the ascending register value can also be included later at the time of billing.
  • the module processor 120 works together with the control processor ⁇ P 91 of the meter shown in FIG. 5, the latter receiving at least the security code DAC (R2 t (i + 1) , further data), compiling the print data and transmitting it to the print head.
  • the security module is for use in postal Devices determined, especially for use in a franking machine.
  • the security module can also have a different design, which allows it to work with a personal computer can, which acts as a third data processing unit. It can for example connected to the main board of a personal computer who controls a commercially available printer as a PC franking device.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Mathematical Physics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Devices For Checking Fares Or Tickets At Control Points (AREA)
  • Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
EP00250186A 1999-06-15 2000-06-09 Dispositif et procédé pour générer un motif destiné à la sécurité Withdrawn EP1061479A3 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19928058 1999-06-15
DE19928058A DE19928058B4 (de) 1999-06-15 1999-06-15 Anordnung und Verfahren zur Generierung eines Sicherheitsabdruckes

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1061479A2 true EP1061479A2 (fr) 2000-12-20
EP1061479A3 EP1061479A3 (fr) 2001-02-07

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EP00250186A Withdrawn EP1061479A3 (fr) 1999-06-15 2000-06-09 Dispositif et procédé pour générer un motif destiné à la sécurité

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EP1488361A4 (fr) * 2002-03-12 2009-08-19 Pitney Bowes Inc Optimisation de la capacite de machines de traitement du courrier
US7613654B2 (en) 2002-10-30 2009-11-03 Neopost Technologies Use of electronic devices for money transfer
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* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
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EP1454259A4 (fr) * 2001-05-03 2007-03-28 Pitney Bowes Inc Procede de calcul d'affranchissement de courrier
EP1488361A4 (fr) * 2002-03-12 2009-08-19 Pitney Bowes Inc Optimisation de la capacite de machines de traitement du courrier
US7613654B2 (en) 2002-10-30 2009-11-03 Neopost Technologies Use of electronic devices for money transfer
EP3654295B1 (fr) * 2018-11-13 2026-04-01 Francotyp-Postalia GmbH Appareil de traitement de marchandises

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US6853986B1 (en) 2005-02-08
EP1061479A3 (fr) 2001-02-07
DE19928058A1 (de) 2000-12-28
DE19928058B4 (de) 2005-10-20

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